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Abstract

Since 2006, the United States has imposed countervailing duty, in addition to
antidumping duty, on imports from Vietnam. This application of countervailing duty
has been paradoxical: in order to apply the duty, the U.S. Department of Commerce
must recognize that market forces exist in Vietnam, which are distorted by government
intervention; at the same time, however, the Department of Commerce (“Commerce”)
uses a “nonmarket economy” (“NME”) methodology to calculate the amount of
countervailing duty. This NME methodology looks to surrogate country prices to
approximate the extent of government distortion of market forces, and thus the amount
of countervailable subsidies, in Vietnam.
The NME methodology poses problems for Vietnamese enterprises, the
Government of Vietnam, and global trade more generally. First, the methodology
provides discretion for Commerce to impose unpredictable duty rates. Second,
Commerce has taken an all-or-nothing approach to recognizing market-oriented
industries within Vietnam; as it stands, unless all significant inputs within an industry
are subject to market-driven prices, Commerce looks to surrogate-country prices as
benchmarks to calculate countervailable subsidies. This paper analyzes a series of
countervailing duty cases against Vietnam to determine which government programs
are most frequently treated as providing countervailable subsidies, to make
recommendations for Vietnamese enterprises and the Government of Vietnam, and to
analyze trends in the development of Commerce’s practice of imposing countervailing
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duty against Vietnam as a nonmarket economy country. The author recommends that
Commerce adopt a “mix and match,” or “bubbles of capitalism” approach to calculating
countervailing duty that makes greater use of in-country benchmarks to impose
countervailing duty more justly and predictably.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Background
In the years since 1990, Vietnam has undergone a remarkable economic
transformation: foreign investment and private enterprise have proliferated, and even
the formerly state-run banking system has opened to private commercial operators. As
a result of these and other market-driven reforms, Vietnam entered global trade regime:
in the early 1990s, the IMF and World Bank resumed lending to Vietnam, and the
United States lifted its Vietnam War-era trade embargo.1 And after a decade of
normalized trade relations, Vietnam formally became a member of the WTO in January
2007. Since then, Vietnam’s economy has skyrocketed, as has its role in global trade:
by 2019, Vietnam-U.S. trade flows had grown to $77.6 billion, making Vietnam the
seventh-largest source of U.S. imports and 27th-largest destination for U.S. exports.2
Along with this historic trade growth has come a series of trade disputes
between American and Vietnamese producers, chiefly regarding the imposition of the
antidumping duty (“ADD”) and countervailing duty (“CVD”) laws by the United
States against Vietnamese exports. Historically (prior to 2006), the CVD law did not
apply to Vietnam: CVD is meant to offset distortions to the market caused by
government intervention in the form of grants or subsidies to producers, and thus the
CVD law was not used against “nonmarket economy” countries where the prevailing
view was that there was no private market for the government to distort. Rather, against
such countries, the United States focused on dumping and other trade remedies. As of
2006, however, the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) changed course and
determined that sufficient market forces were at play even in nonmarket economies to
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See infra, notes 957-958.
See infra, note 980.
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permit the identification and measurement of government distortion and thus to permit
the imposition of the CVD law.3 Against that background, the author conducted
research into problems and their potential solutions concerning the imposition of the
CVD law against Vietnamese producers.

1.2. Specific Scope and Questions of Research
Applying the CVD law to nonmarket economy countries has caused several
conflicts in the international trade regime. One problem, for instance, is doublecounting, or the idea that ADD and CVD will be duplicative of each other and thus
unfairly harm the foreign producer of American imports; this paper discusses that
concept somewhat as it pertains to the imposition of the CVD law in Vietnam.4 But a
far greater problem has been the method of calculating the CVD itself. When the U.S.
applies the CVD law to a market economy country, it is fairly easy in most cases to
measure the countervailable subsidy: for instance, if a foreign producer is able to
purchase raw materials at a reduced price due to a government subsidy on those
materials, one can ordinarily compare the price paid by the producer to the market price
of those materials in the country to determine the benefit of the subsidy (and thus the
amount of CVD that the United States would impose). But when it comes to a
nonmarket economy country, Commerce takes a different approach: because it does
not trust that the prevailing prices in such a country are actually market-driven prices
to begin with, Commerce uses benchmark prices from surrogate countries as the prices
against which to measure the subsidies received by the foreign producer.5 This

3

See infra, Section 4.3.2.4.3.
See infra, Section 4.3.2.5.
5
See infra, Sections 3.2.1.2.3 and 5.4.1.4. In some cases, even when imposing CVD against a market
economy country, Commerce uses surrogate country benchmarks, but this practice is generally limited
to cases in which there is no domestic market within the foreign producer’s country for the good or
service being measured.
4
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methodology has prompted criticism that it is applied unfairly, inconsistently, or
arbitrarily—and invariably to the detriment of the foreign producer.6
This dissertation analyzes the imposition of the U.S. CVD law against Vietnam,
with a particular focus on the implications of Vietnam’s status as a nonmarket economy
country. Much has been said about the nonmarket economy method for determining
antidumping duty rates, but this paper focuses on the methodology for calculating the
CVD. This paper analyzes three problems that particularly afflict Vietnamese
producers: (1) Commerce’s discretion in determining when a government program
does or does not count as a countervailable subsidy; (2) the International Trade
Commission’s discretion in determining when a subsidy does or does not cause actual
or threatened injury to American industry; and (3) most of all, Commerce’s decision to
treat Vietnam categorically as a nonmarket economy country despite the great increase
in the prevalence of market-driven prices in many industries in recent decades.
This third problem is this paper’s primary focus: Vietnam has been treated as
having a nonmarket economy since that label was first imposed against it in 2002 in an
antidumping investigation.7 But this paper will argue that Vietnam should take steps—
including the development of diplomatic ties with the United States and permitting
greater proliferation of market-driven prices—that will lead to revocation of the
nonmarket-economy label.8 As this paper will discuss, even countries like Russia and
Ukraine have gained market economy treatment despite the prevalence of non-marketdriven prices in many arenas in those countries;9 it is possible that Vietnam could do
likewise. Further, even if Vietnam cannot categorically be treated as having a market
economy, this paper contends that it (and Vietnamese producers) should argue in trade
proceedings that certain industries within Vietnam are “market-oriented industries” or,
at a minimum, operate as “bubbles of capitalism” within which the market economy
methodology should fairly be applied rather than the unfavorable nonmarket economy
6

See, e.g., infra, Section 5.4.6.3 (discussing the risk of inaccuracy when Commerce compares provincewide prices in Vietnam to city-wide benchmarks in dissimilar Indian cities).
7
See infra, Section 5.2.2.
8
See infra, Section 6.2.
9
See infra, Section 5.3.
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methodology.10 Moreover, in the interim, this paper argues that Commerce should
decrease its use of third-country surrogate benchmark prices when measuring
countervailable subsidies.11 Finally, this paper offers recommendations for Vietnamese
entities facing a U.S. ADD or CVD investigation.12
To some extent, Vietnam has assented to its misfortune in being treated as a
nonmarket economy; after all, when it acceded to the WTO, it agreed to permit
application of the nonmarket economy formulations through 2018 or until it
demonstrated adoption of a market economy.13 Vietnam, however, has not yet sought
review to challenge Commerce’s treatment of it as a nonmarket economy country. It is
with that in mind that this paper sets forth recommendations for the Government of
Vietnam and for Vietnamese producers as they continue to contend with the imposition
of the nonmarket economy methodology.

1.3. Structure of Research
This paper proceeds in five subsequent chapters. In Chapter 2, this paper will
discuss the history of the statutory language that underlies the U.S. trade regime. The
purpose of the CVD law has been to offset subsidies granted by a foreign government
to that country’s exporters, but identifying when government intervention counts as a
“subsidy” has proved to be a complex undertaking. Understanding the history of the
statutory language—and the longstanding ambiguities and lack of clear definitions for
interpreting that language—is integral to understanding the trade disputes that continue
to arise. In Chapter 3, this paper explores the elements of a subsidy with a focus on the
distinction between permissible country-wide government benefits and countervailable
industry-specific subsidies and on some of the difficulties in determining when a
particular government intervention actually produces a market distortion that should be
10

See infra, Section 6.3.
See infra, Section 6.4.
12
See infra, Section 6.5.
13
See infra, Section 5.2.1.
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treated as a countervailable subsidy. Chapter 3 also discusses briefly the change
wrought by the decision to apply the U.S. CVD law to nonmarket economy countries,
which was permitted by a statute that Congress passed in 2012 and made retroactive to
2006. In Chapter 4, this paper further analyzes the treatment of nonmarket economy
countries in CVD proceedings, together with relevant U.S. and WTO litigation. In
Chapter 5, this paper analyzes a series of cases involving Vietnam. These case studies
will reveal which kinds of government programs are more or less likely to be treated
as countervailable subsidies for the purpose of the CVD law, and they provide great
lessons to Vietnamese producers in determining how to prepare for future CVD
investigations. These case studies also provide insight into steps that the Vietnamese
government and producers may take in order to minimize the risk of unfavorable
outcomes in CVD investigations. Finally, in Chapter 6, the author makes several
recommendations for the Government of Vietnam, for Vietnamese producers, and for
the U.S. Department of Commerce. Even if Vietnam is not presently in a position to be
treated as a market economy, the author contends that the U.S. Department of
Commerce should apply the market economy methodology for calculating CVD
against products made in a market-oriented industry or a “bubble of capitalism” within
Vietnam. Likewise, the author recommends that the Government of Vietnam and
Vietnamese producers take steps to increase the prevalence of such industries, as
Vietnam continues its long but successful transition away from having a statecontrolled economy.

1.4. Methodology
This paper employs a historical research methodology to analyze the legislative
evolution of the countervailing duty laws. Based on the same methodology, the author
also analyzes the origin and development of nonmarket economy treatment within the
world trading system, particularly as the United States employs that treatment against
nonmarket economy countries like Vietnam. The author’s methodology involved

5

analysis of primary source documents such as analysis of filings and arguments made
during trade disputes, documents concerning the accessions of various countries to
trade organizations such as the WTO, and official documents imposing or challenging
trade remedies. The purpose of this historical research is to clarify how Commerce
practically utilizes the countervailing duty law in identifying and measuring subsidies
in nonmarket economy countries, and how that utilization has developed
contemporaneously with the relevant legislation.
The author also employs a comparative analysis between administrative
decisions and judicial decisions to clarify the interpretation and application of the
countervailing duty law by relevant authorities. Finally, the author uses case study
analysis of Chinese cases as a basis for further case study analysis of Vietnamese cases,
which comprises a core component of this paper. The chronological presentation of
case studies is intended to present the development of Commerce’s CVD methodology
in a systematic manner that permits analysis of which features from each case were
likely to contribute to a favorable or unfavorable resolution for the Vietnamese
producer under investigation. This research aims to clarify issues of great practical
importance for industry in Vietnam and for global trade more generally, particularly
for businesses that have not yet faced a CVD proceeding and for their respective
governments. The author’s recommendations aim to aid those entities in better
understanding and navigating such a proceeding, and in taking the risks and
consequences of such a proceeding into account when engaging in trade with the U.S.
market.

1.5. Originality and Value of Research
This dissertation will, for the first time, analyze the legislative development of
the U.S. CVD law, the origins of the disfavored treatment of nonmarket economy
countries in CVD proceedings, and the application of the CVD law to Vietnam as a
nonmarket economy country. This dissertation is also the first to present systematically

6

all relevant CVD cases involving Vietnam. The aim of the research is to contribute to
a clearer and more robust legal scholarship regarding the application of the CVD law
to Vietnam.
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Chapter 2. Key Statutory Language

This brief chapter discusses some of the important terminology that has been
used in American trade regulations since the late 1800s. As later chapters will reveal,
one of the persistent problems for foreign producers navigating American trade
regulation has been the uncertainty of whether and when the United States will deem
that an exporting country’s government has subsidized the production of exported
goods. Integral to this uncertainty are both the lack of clear definitions in the governing
statutes and the lack of clear guidance for the Department of Commerce in executing
the governing statutes. Understanding the history of these statutes and the key language
on which they rely is thus useful towards understanding current and future problems
that arise as the United States applies antidumping or countervailing duties in
previously unforeseen ways.
The United States enacted the first “countervailing duty” provision as early as
1890, but the core countervailing duty law was developed more extensively in 1930 in
the Tariff Act of 1930, which was then amended in the following years. The concept
of “countervailing duty” was originally established in 1890 to counteract “bounty”
granted by European countries to exporters of beet sugar. Since enacting the Tariff Act
of 1930, the U.S. government has been authorized to impose “countervailing duties”
more generally on imported goods that had received some “bounty” or “grant” paid or
bestowed by the government of an exporting country. Throughout the historical
development of the U.S. trade remedy laws, the Tariff Act of 1930 has been amended
several times to address issues pertaining to “subsidies,” especially “subsidies” from
“nonmarket economy” countries. Under the U.S. countervailing duty law,
countervailing duties are imposed on imported merchandise when its production or
exportation benefits from government subsidies if such imports cause or threaten to
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cause economic injuries to domestic U.S. industry.14 Some of the key terms to
understand in relation to the countervailing duty law are “bounty or grant,”
“countervailing duty,” “subsidy,” “market economy,” and “nonmarket economy.”
Clarifying the definitions of such key terms in the context of the historical development
of the countervailing duty laws will thus aid an understanding of how the countervailing
duty law is interpreted and applied in specific investigations by U.S. government
agencies.

2.1. “Bounty” or “Grant”
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “bounty” as “a premium or benefit offered or
given, especially by a government, to induce someone to take action or perform a
service.”15 As for the term “grant,” the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary defines
“grant” as “a sum of money that is given by government or by another organization to
be used for a particular purpose.”16 In practice, the term “bounty” was used more
frequently than the term “grant” during the legislative development of the U.S.
countervailing duty laws in the 1930s.
Historically, the term “bounty” was used for the first time in the Tariff Act of
1890, which was a very basic countervailing duty law. Under this Act, the United States
provided a bounty of 1.75 to two cents per pound for certain American sugar producers
who satisfied various legal requirements.17 Importers of refined sugars, however, did
not receive these benefits.18 On the other hand, an additional duty (above the ordinary
duty) of one-tenth of one cent per pound applied to certain sugars that were imported
from countries that paid bounties, directly or indirectly, on the export of such sugars,
the idea being that the additional duty would at least partially offset the benefit of the
14
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bounty.19 Thus, the concept of “bounty” has been used for over 130 years, both to
describe payments for American producers to promote domestic production and to
describe payments made by foreign countries to support their sugar production and
exportation (e.g., from Russia) that were then subject to an additional duty when
importing into the American market.
The Tariff Act of 1897, which is commonly recognized as the first general
countervailing duty law, added the term “grant” and used it interchangeably with the
term “bounty.”20 Although these two terms, “bounty” and “grant,” are very important
in determining the levy to be imposed on imported merchandise, the U.S. Congress did
not define what either term meant and offered little guidance on its intended scope or
meaning, leaving the interpretation of the term and its scope to the enforcement
authorities and to federal courts.21
In a landmark 1903 case, Downs v. United States,22 the U.S. Supreme Court
analyzed the definition of “bounty” to determine whether Russia’s remission of excise
taxes upon exported sugar was a bounty. Justice Brown relied on one dictionary
definition that a “bounty” was as “a premium offered or given to induce men to enlist
into the public service; or to encourage any branch of industry, as husbandry or
manufactures.”23 Another dictionary defined it as “an additional benefit conferred upon
or a compensation paid to a class of persons.”24 All nine Justices agreed with the

19

Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Discrimination: United States
Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 44 (1958), at 52.
20
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holding that the government of Russia had in fact conveyed a bounty when it secured
to the exporter “a money reward or gratuity whenever [the exporter] exports sugar from
Russia.”25
In Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. v. United States,26 the Court of International
Trade (“CIT”) noted, in evaluating the reasonableness of an estimated bounty or grant,
that “nowhere in the legislative history of section 303 [of the Tariff Act of 1930] is
there a definition of ‘bounty’ or ‘grant’.”27 The CIT opined that Congress refrained
from “spelling out” the standards for determining what constitutes a bounty or grant
because Congress intended for that term to be interpreted “judicially and through
administrative practice.”28 In this case, the court agreed with an interpretation by the
Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) that “bounty or grant” connotes “some
special or comparative advantage conferred upon an industry or group of industries”
and that is “not available to all manufacturers and producers within a given country.”
Commerce also believed that there can be no bounty or grant if there is no industryspecific or regional preference: that is, the provision of generally applicable
government services or policies that are available to all industries could not on its own
be treated as a bounty or grant.29
During more recent legislative development of the countervailing duty law
since 1974, the terms bounty and grant were replaced with the term “subsidy,” which
has been used more commonly throughout trade regulations.

2.2. “Subsidy”

25

Id. at 516.
Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1983).
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country, the Secretary of the Treasury is required to levy a countervailing duty, “equal to the net amount
of such bounty or grant,” upon importation of the product into the United States. See Zenith Radio Corp.
v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978).
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Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “subsidy” as:
[A] grant, usually made by the government, to any enterprise whose
promotion is considered to be in the public interest. Although
governments sometimes make direct payment (such as cash grants),
subsidies are usually indirect. They may take the form of researchand-development support, tax breaks, provision of raw materials at
below market prices, or low-interest loans or low-interest export
credits guaranteed by a government agency.30
In the Trade Act of 1974,31 the term “subsidy” appeared for the first time in the
statutory language, but, unsurprisingly, the Act did not define what “subsidy” meant.
In a landmark administrative case, Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland,32 Commerce
defined it as follows: “a subsidy (or bounty or grant) is any action that distorts or
subverts the market process and results in a misallocation of resources, encouraging
inefficient production and lessening world wealth.”
Notably, the Trade Act of 1974 marked a turning point that called for the
President to seek “any revisions necessary to define the forms of subsidy to industries
producing products for export and the forms of subsidy to attract foreign investment
which are consistent with an open, nondiscriminatory, and fair system of international
trade.”33 This provision paved the way for the term “subsidy” to be defined, and its
definitions further refined in the international trade regime.
When Congress enacted the Trade Agreements Act of 197934 to conform the
U.S. countervailing duty law to the GATT Subsidies Code,35 the term “subsidy” was
defined as having the same meaning as the term “bounty or grant.”36 In essence, the
30
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Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978.
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on Tariffs and Trade, concluded on April 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, 1186 U.N.T.S.
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term “subsidy” was seen to be very broad, such that it may include both bounties and
grants. Although the Subsidies Code had not defined “subsidy,” it did provide a list of
prohibited export subsidies in an illustrative Annex to the Subsidies Code.37
Since the Subsidies Code lacked a definition of “subsidy,” theoretically, all
kinds of government interventions that potentially distorted trade could be
countervailable, as was the case under the U.S. law.38 As successfully urged by many
developed countries, a definition of “subsidy” was finally included in the 1994 WTO
Subsidies Agreement.39 Unlike the GATT Subsidies Code, the Subsidies Agreement
made considerable improvements in defining certain key terms, and notably it provides
an “internationally agreed-upon definition” of the term “subsidy.”40 Its definition
appears to apply throughout the agreement, including the provisions of the
countervailing duties as well.41 Right from the beginning article of the Subsidies
Agreement, the term “subsidy” is defined as “a financial contribution by a government
or any public body,” which can occur with various practices such as direct funds
transfer, foregone revenue, or the provision of goods or services other than general
infrastructure.42
To be consistent with the Subsidies Agreement, the U.S. Congress amended the
related countervailing duty provisions by passing the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
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There are twelve categories of prohibited export subsidies listed in the Annex, Illustrative List of
Export Subsidies, to the Subsidies Code. These include, for example, direct subsidies by a government
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DOMINIC COPPENS, WTO DISCIPLINES ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES: BALANCING
POLICY SPACE AND LEGAL CONSTRAINTS 33 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014).
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GARY N. HORLICK, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: ANTIDUMPING,
SUBSIDIES AND TRADE AGREEMENTS 203 (World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 2014).
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of 1994.43 Similarly, that law provides that a “subsidy” occurs when an “authority”44
provides a “financial contribution”45 or “any form of income or price support within
the meaning of Article XVI of the GATT 1994.” Importantly, a subsidy exists only
where “a benefit is thereby conferred.”46 In other words, the definition of “subsidy” is
limited only to those benefits conferred by a government or a public entity.47 In the
case studies discussed in Chapter 5, this concept will play out in the trade battles
between Vietnamese exporters and the U.S. Department of Commerce: over and over
again, the question arises whether the Government of Vietnam’s participation in
markets for raw materials, its influence upon land rents, or its tax policies, for instance,
count as a countervailable “subsidy.”
As compared with the Subsidies Agreement, the U.S. law provides a narrower
definition in terms of focusing only on identifying countervailable subsidies, while the
Subsidies Agreement provides not only what constitutes a countervailable subsidy, but
also how to measure a benefit more generally.48

2.3. “Countervailing Duty”
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “countervailing duty” as “a tax
imposed on manufacturers of imported goods to protect domestic industry by offsetting
subsidies given by foreign governments to those manufacturers.”49 This definition is
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The Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) [hereinafter
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Sanghan Wang, U.S. Trade Laws Concerning Nonmarket Economies Revisited for Fairness and
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very close to how the countervailing duty is employed under applicable U.S.
countervailing duty law.
In the past, a countervailing duty was used as a kind of surtax, imposed in
addition to normal customs duties, upon those imports whose exportation had been
subsidized by bounties or grants or similar assistance in the exporting country.50 Such
additional duty was believed to be used intentionally to help neutralize foreign
subsidies, and therefore to prevent injury to the American producers of comparable
products who operate without the benefit of such subsidies.51
Historically, there were two types of countervailing duties: (i) countervailing
duties imposed upon imports receiving a bounty for manufacture, production, or export,
and (ii) countervailing duties imposed upon imports from a country imposing higher
rates on products from the United States.52 The term “countervailing duties” was
originally applied to denote not only duties designed to offset bounties, but also
“contingent” duties, i.e., duties contingent upon the rate of duty assessed by foreign
governments upon certain American products.53 The concept of using countervailing
duties was assumed to make the American protective system “watertight” or insulated
(i.e., to prevent foreign governments or foreign business associations from offsetting
through bounties the import duties of the United States).54 Throughout the evolution of
U.S. legislation together with its integration into the global trade system, countervailing
duty has been limited to being imposed only on a subsidized product, and the amount
of duty must be equal to the amount of net subsidy.55 In other words, a countervailing
duty is basically a duty equal to a grant or bounty extended or paid to an exporter by
50
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its home country to encourage exportation, or to aid the exporters and manufacturers
in confronting fierce competition.56 Thus, countervailing duties are intended to
eliminate the competitive advantage sought to be gained by government subsidization
of its own exporters.57
Under the WTO regime, the term “countervailing duty” meant “a special duty
levied for the purpose of offsetting any subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly upon
the manufacture, production or export of merchandise,” and that regime likewise limits
the amount of countervailing duty being imposed to “an amount equal to the estimated
bounty or subsidy determined to have been granted.”58

2.4. “Market Economy” v. “Nonmarket Economy”
Drawing a bright line between “market” and “nonmarket” economies is always
a controversial endeavor because, to some extent, all world economies are mixed.59 It
may seem that the concept of a “nonmarket economy” is simply the opposite of a
“market economy.”60 However, the reality of defining these terms is more complicated
because each economic system has had many variants during the evolution of modern
economic reforms as well as on account of the development of nations’ laws and
principles to meet market demands. Hence, it is a gross oversimplification to say that a
“nonmarket economy” is simply the opposite of a “market economy.”61
56
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And yet, the international trade regime has continually sought to draw such a
bright line between market and nonmarket economies, for reasons not particularly well
articulated, let alone justified, by anyone. Neither GATT nor the U.S. antidumping and
countervailing duty laws specify why the distinction has persisted, but as a result of the
distinction, only the costs and prices in market economy countries are treated as
legitimate.62 Although developed countries such as the United Kingdom and the United
States - important drafters and founders of GATT - understand their own economic
systems and the market or nonmarket features of other economic systems,63 they have
not provided clear definitions to distinguish a market economy from a nonmarket
economy for the purpose of applying multilateral trade agreements or even in applying
their own domestic laws. This glaring omission has worked to the detriment of such
countries as Vietnam, which is broadly categorized as a nonmarket economy and which
can only escape the negative consequences of that categorization if other countries, in
their generally unfettered discretion, see fit to recognize Vietnam’s economic reforms
as sufficiently market-oriented to make it a market economy. Perhaps a statutory
criterion defining “market economy” or “nonmarket economy” would be “too brief to
be truly meaningful.”64 In practice, some of Commerce’s investigators used to say:
“You know it if you see it.”65 And so, it remains the case that nebulous standards govern
whether a country is considered by other governments to engage primarily in market
or nonmarket behaviors.66
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2.4.1. “Market economy”
As is commonly understood, a market is a place of commercial activity in which
goods and services are bought and sold,67 and an economy is the management or
administration of the wealth and resources of a state or a country.68 As defined by the
Corporate Finance Institute, a “market economy” is an economy where the production
and provision of goods and services operate in accordance with the laws of supply and
demand in the general market; the market players—individuals and corporations,
instead of governments—take a key role in directing that market.69 In reality, the
definition of “market economy” is highly complex because each country has its own
economic system with different levels of market orientation in their laws and principles.
There are, however, countries that are either “market-driven” or “government-driven”
to varying degrees.70
2.4.2. “Nonmarket Economy”
Generally, the term “nonmarket economy” is understood to be an economy in
which the allocation of goods and resources is planned by the government rather than
by prices set in a market in a free manner.71 Such operation is contrary to the rules of
supply and demand commonly utilized in a market economy. In fact, however, the role
of the government is present in the operations of most economies, even in classic
market economies. But depending on the extent of the government’s involvement, its
economic form may be classified as a “state-trading”, or a “state-controlled economy,”
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“centrally-planned economy,” or “transition economy.” All of these economic forms
are generally classified within the set of nonmarket economy (“NME”).
One scholar opines that in an NME country, the government usually claims
ownership of most means of production and makes decisions as to what is produced
and how it is distributed within the society in question.72 Therefore, there is no price
mechanism wherein the supply and demand interact to allocate resources or incentivize
or disincentivize various production decisions.73 It has also been claimed that in an
NME country, the government “heavily intervenes in the setting of relative prices” and,
as a result, “the ultimate prices and costs” usually “reflect[] political, economic or
bureaucratic factors rather than local supply and demand.”74 Such an assessment is
closer to a description of the operations of a so-called “centrally-planned economy.” In
a centrally planned economy country, every trading activity is planned. The flow of
trade or the flow of export–import is planned according to the government’s economic
plan. Such economic plans may be set for five years at a time, as was in the case in the
former Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam, for the purposes of economic development.
According to Edmond M. Ianni, a centrally-planned economy or a nonmarket
economy has four features: (1) a national economic plan of the state that determines
resource allocation; (2) the determination of imports and exports by national economic
planning; (3) the state’s fixing of domestic prices, which, therefore, do not fluctuate
freely in response to supply and demand; and (4) nonconvertible currencies, which may
be neither transferred outside the country nor freely converted into any Western
currency.75
Importantly, the global trade economy has operated in a mix of countries with
different economic mechanisms including market economies, nonmarket economies or
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mixed economies. Further, there are other more nuanced descriptors, such as statetrading economy, state controlled (or centrally planned) economy, transition economy,
etc.76 Since a national economy is complex, labeling a country simply as having a
nonmarket economy or market economy will not always be accurate.77 Furthermore, it
is difficult and complicated to draw a clear line between a nonmarket economy and a
market economy, especially in the case of a mixed economy (i.e., a planned economy
that incorporates features of a market economy)78 or a transition economy (i.e., an
economy that is transforming from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy
in order to adapt to the requirements of international trade commitments) operating
based on market-oriented principles. And, of course, even in the most developed market
economy there are some resources owned or controlled by the government.79 In a
socialist country with public ownership, if a government is too involved or interferes
too much in its economic operations, that country is deemed to be “more non-market”
than other countries.
Therefore, defining a country as having a nonmarket economy is only
meaningful and helpful to the extent that it helps one country use that distinction to
enforce its antidumping and countervailing duty laws advantageously against countries
that it defines as having nonmarket economies, in order to protect domestic industry
from injuries caused by dumped or subsidized exports from a purportedly nonmarket
economy country.
In the case of the United States, its trade law defines a “nonmarket economy”
country as a country that the Department of Commerce determines “does not operate
on market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in such
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a country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise.”80 This amorphous definition
was used against purported nonmarket economies only in antidumping cases, and it
was used regardless of whether the target of the antidumping case had a mixed or
transition economy, until Congress changed the law in 2012 to apply the countervailing
duty law to target purported nonmarket economies as well. The Department of
Commerce has designated the following eleven countries as NMEs: Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.81 As this paper will argue, Vietnam should take steps to be
recategorized as a market rather than a nonmarket economy—and Commerce should
exercise its discretion to recognize Vietnam as such—in order to avoid the negative
trade consequences that attend nonmarket economy status.

2.5. “Double Counting”
Although this paper focuses primarily on countervailing duty laws, many of the
countervailing duty cases operate alongside parallel antidumping investigations, in
which case an allegation of “double counting” may arise. The term “double counting,”
also known as “double remedy,” refers to the simultaneous imposition of both
countervailing duties and antidumping duties upon the same imported merchandise at
issue. In some cases, the targets of the investigation have argued that imposing both
duties is duplicative because it offsets the same subsidization twice.82
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Chapter 3. U.S. Countervailing Duty Legislation

It can be said that the U.S. countervailing duty laws were initially aimed at
protecting fairness in international trade. Likewise, the antidumping laws aim to
prevent imported merchandise from being sold in the United States at less than its fair
value. Unlike antidumping duties, countervailing duties are used to countervail or
offset bounties, grants, or subsidies provided by a foreign government to its exporters
and producers by imposing countervailing duties to the imported goods. Indeed, the
playing field is not fair when a country is using public funds to grant advantages to
private exporters and producers.
In this Chapter, the author will first delve into enactments and developments of
the U.S. countervailing duty laws. Then, the author analyzes the provisions of the
countervailing duty law in the application of countervailing duties to subsidized
imports.

3.1. Historical Background and Legislative Evolution
3.1.1. Pre-1930 Laws
The goal of protecting American manufacturers from foreign competing
imports, while simultaneously encouraging or aiding them to gain more advantages in
domestic home market has long been a concern of the United States, present even in
1791.83 In 1791, Alexander Hamilton proposed that a special duty be imposed on
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certain subsidized foreign commodities imported into the United States and that the
received revenue be used in turn to provide bounties for the domestic production
(including production for export) of such commodities.84 Hamilton’s rationale was
based on an assumption that “certain nations grant bounties on the exportation of
particular commodities to enable their own workmen to undersell and supplant all
competitors, in the countries to which those commodities are sent.”85
However, Hamilton’s concept for imposition of a kind of countervailing duty
had to wait for a century to be adopted in the Tariff Act of 1890.86 It was an important
historical milestone for the beginning of using countervailing duties against subsidized
imports. At that time, the countervailing duty provision was very simple. The Act was
enacted simply to protect American sugar producers from unfair foreign competition.87
The purpose of the Act was to provide for a fixed countervailing duty (i.e., a fixed
amount per pound) on refined sugar imported from the nations that “pay, directly or
indirectly, a [greater] bounty on the exportation of” refined sugar than on raw sugar.88
In 1894, the first countervailing duty provision under the Tariff Act of 1890
was reenacted, but this time it was extended to all imported sugar, raw as well as refined
sugar.89 Thus, under the 1894 Act, all sugars imported from any country that “pays,
directly or indirectly, a bounty on the export thereof” would be subject to a fixed duty.90
Both Tariff Acts of 1890 and 1894 imposed countervailing duties only to sugar
as a bountied product. In 1897 came the first time that a generally applicable
countervailing duty law was passed, in Section 5 of the Tariff Act of 1897.91 The 1897
Act expanded its scope of application to all dutiable products receiving bounties or
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grants upon exportation.92 Under this Act, “countervailing duty” was clearly defined as
“an additional duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant” to be imposed, in
addition to all other levied duties, upon countries that “pay or bestow, directly or
indirectly, any bounty or grant upon the exportation of any article or merchandise from
such country.”93 That means that the amount of countervailing duty to be imposed
would be equal to the net amount of any bounty or grant paid directly or indirectly on
exportation.94 Also, by this Act, Congress authorized the Secretary of Treasury to
administer and determine the amount of countervailing duty. Remarkably, there was
no requirement for finding an injury caused to a domestic producer or an industry, and
imposition of countervailing duties was mandatory.95 The Secretary of Treasury and
the President had no authority to waive the mandatory duties.96
Subsequently, the countervailing duty on imports contained in the 1897 Act was
reenacted without any changes in the Tariff Acts of 1909 and 1913.97
In 1922, Congress amended the countervailing duty law to cover both export
and domestic subsidies.98 In particular, section 5 of the 1922 Act extended the
imposition of countervailing duties to those bounties or grants that were bestowed upon
the manufacture or production of goods and on their exportation.99 According to
Barceló, export subsidies are defined as those grants paid by the foreign government
upon export.100 On the other hand, manufacture or production bounties are domestic
subsidies paid by the foreign government without respect to the ultimate destination of
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the end product.101 The Act also applied to bounties or grants bestowed by a private
source such as “person, partnership, association, cartel, or corporation.”102 Besides
such changes, all other concepts inherited from the 1897 Act still remained.

3.1.2. The Tariff Act of 1930
In 1930, Congress reenacted the Tariff Act of 1922 and incorporated it into
Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930.103 The purpose of the Act was to provide revenue,
to regulate trade with foreign countries, to promote domestic industries, and to protect
American jobs.104 Notably, the Tariff Act of 1930, also known as the Smoot-Hawley
Act, was blamed for being the most highly protectionist act.105 In reality, the Act,
however, offered many significant contributions to U.S. trade laws. It provided an
important basis for the current tariff system, for example, by establishing a uniform
U.S. tariff schedule.106
More importantly, Section 303 of the Act has become the principal provisions
for countervailing duties imposed against foreign subsidies, and it is also the legislative
foundation for trade remedy laws in effect today. The imposition of countervailing
duties is applied to all dutiable goods that have received export bounties or grants,
whether that source of subsidy be public or private, collective or individual.107 The Act
allows the Secretary of the Treasury, with broad discretion, to “ascertain and determine,
or estimate” the net amount of the bounty or grant.108 Then the Secretary of Treasury
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will declare its findings and assess a duty equal to the net amount.109 The Secretary of
the Treasury also has power to make all regulations necessary for finding the bountied
products and for assessing and collecting the additional duties.110
Importantly, there were efforts to add an injury test and other amendments to
the countervailing duty law, but these proposed amendments died in Congress in 1951,
1952, and 1953.111

3.1.3. The Trade Act of 1974
From 1967 to 1974, with the effects of multilateral trade negotiations (i.e., the
Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations) leading to the creation of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, there were efforts in the United
States to extend the President’s authority in trade negotiations and, concurrently,
“potent forces’’ from developing countries in calling for changes from tariff barriers to
non-tariff trade barriers.112 As a result, the Trade Act of 1974 was enacted, and it
substantially extended the scope of the countervailing duty law under Section 303 of
the Tariff Act of 1930.113
First, the Act authorizes the President to enter into trade agreements with
foreign countries and also grants the power to proclaim any modification or
continuance of any existing duty-free policy or to impose additional duties if the
President determines such to be required or appropriate to carry out any trade
agreement.114 Second, to impose the countervailing duties upon any imported product
that falls into the list of duty-free merchandise, the International Trade Commission
(“ITC”)115 is required to investigate and then determine whether the American industry
109
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in question “is being or is likely to be injured or is prevented from being established.”116
Accordingly, an injury test clause was for the first time established under this Act, but
it applied only to duty-free merchandise, and all dutiable imports were still not subject
to the injury test.117 Before 1974, there was no injury test to any dutiable items because
Section 303’s application predated the GATT and, as such, fell within its “grandfather
clause” exemption; however, an extension of such coverage to duty-free goods was not
covered by the exemption.118
Notably, the Act had no specific provisions on the application of Section 303
of the Tariff Act of 1930 to nonmarket economy countries. However, it provided
separate provisions on “market disruption” to tackle imports from Communist
countries.119 Such action was considered an alternative trade remedy to protect the
American industry from market disruption caused by imports from Communist
countries. Besides these major changes, the definition of countervailing duties under
Section 303 of the 1930 Act remained the same and was incorporated into Section 331
of the Act.120
A remarkable change of the Act was the requirement that the Secretary of
Treasury publish a notice of initiation and the investigation determination (whether
affirmative or negative) in the Federal Register.121 Prior to this procedural change, the
Treasury Department merely released a very simple determination and did not include
the findings of fact and law in its determinations.122
3.1.4. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979
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In 1979, to approve and implement the trade agreements negotiated under the
Trade Act of 1974, U.S. Congress enacted the Trade Agreements Act (TAA) of 1979.123
Specifically, the TAA of 1979 was enacted to implement the GATT Subsidies Code
under U.S. law.124 The TAA of 1979 substantially amended the countervailing duty law
and created procedures, much like those applicable to antidumping proceedings, to
implement the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and
XXIII of the GATT, commonly called the Subsidies Code.125 In particular, the TAA of
1979 added a completely new title (Title VII - Countervailing and Antidumping Duties)
to the Tariff Act of 1930. The TAA of 1979 also requires an injury determination in all
cases involving nondutiable goods. In cases involving dutiable goods, the TAA of 1979
requires an injury determination if the goods are from a signatory to the Subsidies Code
or from a country that has a reciprocal obligation with the United States similar to that
under the GATT, or from a country accorded most favored nation status.126 Imports
from a country that does not fall into one of the above conditions are regulated by the
Tariff Act of 1930 (as amended), and an injury test is not required.127 When conducting
an injury test, the ITC was responsible for determining whether an American industry
was “materially injured” or “threatened with material injury,” or whether the
establishment of the American industry was “materially retarded.”128
It is important to note that the TAA of 1979 also provided some much-needed
clarification on which subsidies were countervailable.129 In compliance with the
GATT’s treatment of export subsidies, the TAA of 1979 provided that all such
subsidies would be countervailable.130 Importantly, a “specificity test” was introduced
123
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explicitly in the TAA of 1979, but it was actually not required by the Subsidies Code
and such a test is probably not found in the laws of other nations.131 In particular, the
“specificity test” requires that a countervailable subsidy would be found in cases where
a foreign government program provided benefits to a “specific enterprise or group of
enterprises.”132 The Act also included a non-exhaustive list of subsidy programs in case
of specificity, such as direct payments, the forgiveness of debts, or the provision of
services in terms inconsistent with commercial considerations.133
Following this Act, effective from January 2, 1980, the administration of the
antidumping and countervailing duty laws was transferred from Treasury to
Commerce, Exec. Order No. 12,188, 3 C.F.R. 131 (1980).134 However, the U.S.
Congress did not enact any specific provisions concerning the treatment of nonmarket
economy countries when it made this amendment.
3.1.5. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
In 1988, Congress enacted a comprehensive trade act called the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act.135 The 1988 OTCA is a major revision to U.S. trade law since
the amendment in 1974. The primary purpose of the 1988 OTCA is to enhance the
competitiveness of the domestic industry.136 Importantly, the Act altered the method of
calculating the dumping margins of NME imports in antidumping proceedings.137
However, the Act was still silent on subsidies from NME countries. For many decades
since the first countervailing duty laws originated, there was no clear statutory
provision on the applicability of the countervailing duty law to NME countries.
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Although there have been several cases brought to competent courts, there were
cases that firmly answered the question of the applicability of the countervailing duty
law to NME countries until 2012 when Congress enacted a law implementing such
applicability. Because the 1988 OTCA and prior acts did not support the proposition
that countervailing duties were to be applied against NME countries, there were two
alternative remedies to deal with subsidies by NME countries: section 406 of the Trade
Act of 1974, and the antidumping law.138

3.1.6. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994
Following the conclusion of GATT/WTO’s trade agreements (WTO
Agreement), the United States agreed to change its legislation to conform with the
WTO Agreement. In December 1994, U.S. Congress enacted the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act (“URAA”) for the primary purpose of implementing the trade
agreements concluded in the Uruguay Round.139 Since then, the URAA has established
a relationship between U.S. law and the WTO Agreement. However, it is important to
note that the URAA confirms that U.S. federal law prevails over a Uruguay Round
agreement in case of a conflict.140 The U.S. courts have also made it clear that the
GATT/WTO or panel determinations do not have a precedential effect in American
jurisprudence and, therefore, are not binding upon U.S. courts.141
One of the advanced points of the WTO’s Subsidies Agreement in 1994, as
compared to the prior Subsidies Code in 1979, is that the former provided multilateral
standards for subsidy discipline, while the latter focuses on unilateral application of
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national remedies against subsidized imports.142 The Subsidies Agreement provided a
broader definition of actionable subsidies, relying on standards of “specificity”
previously developed in U.S. law.143
The URAA, as consistent with the Subsidies Agreement, repealed Section 303
of the Tariff Act of 1930. Although Section 303 was repealed, the URAA provides that
countries that did not sign the Subsidies Agreement are not entitled to an injury test.144
For countervailing duty investigations involving imports from a country that is not a
WTO Member, a material injury test is not required.145 Therefore, until the passage of
the URAA, the United States maintained two sets of statutory provisions for
administering the countervailing duty law, including section 303 of the Tariff Act of
1930, codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1303; the second statutory provision was codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1677.
3.1.7. The Nonmarket Economies Act of 2012
In 2012, in response to the ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC) in the GPX Case,146 U.S. Congress enacted Public Law 11299 (“NME Act”). This NME Act amended the Tariff Act of 1930 to authorize
Commerce to impose countervailing duties on identified subsidies from nonmarket
economy countries.147 Section 1 of this Act does provide an exception to this
requirement when [Commerce] is unable to identify and measure subsidies provided
by the government of the NME country or a public entity within the NME country
because the economy of that country is essentially comprised of a single entity.
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Notably, the NME Act also requires Commerce to account for potential
overlapping remedies by reducing the antidumping (“AD”) rate to the extent that
Commerce is able to reasonably estimate the amount that the countervailable subsidy
has increased the “normal value” used in the NME AD methodology.148 The purpose
of this provision is to resolve the problem of double counting arising from Commerce’s
simultaneous application of both countervailing duties and antidumping duties on the
same merchandise imported from NME countries. The U.S. Congress agreed to pass
this provision to mitigate the double counting risks that had been claimed by NME
countries under previous investigations, especially from China, and as was also
recommended by the WTO’s dispute settlement body.
A notable controversy was that the NME Act applies retroactively to all
proceedings initiated on or after November 20, 2006,149 although this Act was enacted
in 2012. This controversy shall be discussed in more detail in section 4.3.2.6 of this
dissertation.
In conclusion, from the inception of the countervailing duty law, which was a
simple provision merely protecting the domestic sugar industry in the early 1890s, the
U.S. trade laws including the countervailing duty law have evolved as influenced by
both domestic industry forces and the international trade community. Each revision of
the countervailing duty law has been an “ad hoc series of amendments” derived from
specific proposals from domestic industries “involved in recent or anticipated cases.”150
Hence, each major revision in U.S. trade laws, notably beginning from 1974, has seen
amendments to both antidumping and countervailing duty laws to make it easier for
domestic industry to obtain relief against imports.151 A cycle of change was born: the
easier it became to get relief, the more cases were brought, generating more interest in
the use of these laws, and so on.152 The most recent change in the countervailing duty
law in 2012 to apply it to nonmarket economies has been perhaps the most controversial
148
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issue in the history of U.S. trade laws. Of course, it may be the result of a natural
legislative process that any law may be changed to adapt to American interests and
especially for the protection of American industry as part of the nation’s economic
development. But the imposition of countervailing duties upon countries that have been
categorized as NME countries has had a multibillion-dollar impact, and producers and
NME governments must be prepared to navigate the challenges that have resulted. In
Chapter 4, the author will discuss in more detail on the applicability of the
countervailing duty law to nonmarket economy countries by analyzing its practical
application and related cases at executive and judicial levels. And in Chapter 5, the
author will highlight several cases in which the countervailing duty law has been
applied to Vietnam in a manner that has disfavored Vietnam’s producers on account of
the duty-calculation methodology that applies particularly to NME countries.
In summary, the contemporary imposition of countervailing duties under U.S.
trade law is currently stipulated by Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, added by Title I
of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, as amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act of 1994 and the 2012 NME Act.

3.2. Imposition of Countervailable Subsidies
The U.S. countervailing duty law, among other trade remedy laws such as those
related to antidumping and safeguards, has been developed as a critical component of
the U.S. trade laws to mitigate against unfair foreign competition. As explained in
section 3.1 above, the imposition of countervailing duties under U.S. law is specifically
stipulated under Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, added by Title I of the Trade
Agreement Act of 1979, as amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994,
and the NME Act of 2012. In general, countervailing duties will be imposed on
imported merchandise when its manufacture, production or exportation receives
benefits from foreign government subsidies and such imports cause or threaten to cause
injuries to a U.S. domestic industry. The fundamental goal of imposing countervailing
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duties is to level the playing field in international trade by counteracting or offsetting
the unfair trade advantage that a foreign manufacturer or producer or exporter receives
from its government subsidies.
In fact, throughout the historical evolution of the U.S. trade laws, the Tariff Act
of 1930, as amended, is currently the principal Act that governs the imposition of
countervailing duties.153 From a U.S. government agency’s perspective, foreign
government subsidies distort the free flow of goods and adversely affect American
business in the global marketplace.154 The U.S. Department of Commerce
(“Commerce”), the administering authority for both U.S. antidumping and
countervailing duty laws, among many other things, is responsible for protecting U.S.
domestic producers from unfair competition within the U.S. that results from unfair
government subsidies granted to exporting companies.155
Therefore, as a tool to protect the American industry from foreign subsidies, a
countervailing duty is imposed to offset the foreign government subsidies that exist
under many forms, such as export or production subsidies that do not reflect market
conditions.
Like the antidumping law, the countervailing duty law employs a bifurcated
system. In a countervailing duty proceeding, Commerce and ITC are concurrently
required to be involved. Specifically, Commerce’s mission is to determine when an
unfair subsidy has been conferred and then measure or calculate the amount of subsidy
that the foreign producer has received from its government, establishing a basis for the
subsidy rate by which the subsidy is offset, or “countervailed,” through higher import
duties, which are known as countervailing duties.156

3.2.1. Elements of a Subsidy
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Under the U.S. countervailing duty law, a subsidy is countervailable if it meets
the three following elements:
Element 1: There must be a “financial contribution.”
Element 2: That financial contribution must confer a “benefit.”
Element 3: A subsidy must be “specific.”
Specifically, the statute provides that a subsidy is one in which an “authority”:
(i) provides a “financial contribution”,
(ii) provides any form of income or price support within the meaning of Article
XVI of the GATT 1994, or
(iii) makes a payment to a funding mechanism to provide a financial
contribution, or entrusts or directs a private entity to make a financial contribution, if
providing the contribution would normally be vested in the government and the practice
does not differ in substance from practices normally followed by governments,
to a person and a benefit is thereby conferred.157
The first two items, (i) and (ii), are considered to be direct subsidies when the
government provides funding directly to producers or exporters of the goods upon their
export.158 The last item (iii) is a form of indirect subsidy, in which the government
provides financial contribution through a funding mechanism or “entrusts or directs”159
a “private entity” to make such financial contribution to the producers or exporters of
the subject merchandise.160 The term “private entity” is not necessarily limited to a
single entity but it can include a group of entities or persons.161
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The statute further explains that the determination of whether a subsidy exists
shall be made without regard to whether the recipient of the subsidy is publicly or
privately owned and without regard to whether the subsidy is provided directly or
indirectly on the manufacture, production, or export of merchandise.162 Furthermore,
Commerce is not required to consider the effect of the subsidy in determining whether
a subsidy exists.163 On the other hand, the ITC is responsible for finding the effect of
the subsidy by conducting an injury test separately.
The countervailing duty law defines an “authority” as a government of a
country or any public entity.164 During its longstanding practice, Commerce has treated
“most government-owned corporations as the government itself.”165 To consider
whether an entity is a “public entity,” Commerce has in the past considered the
following factors: (1) government ownership; (2) the government’s presence on the
entity’s board of directors; (3) the government’s control over the entity’s activities; (4)
the entity’s pursuit of governmental policies or interests; and (5) whether the entity was
created by statute.166 In Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Korea,
when Commerce considered whether a government-owned bank was a public entity or
authority, it examined the issues of government ownership and control only and
concluded “a government-owned or controlled bank, be it a commercial bank or a
policy bank is considered a public entity or authority.”167

3.2.1.1. Element 1: Financial Contribution
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Element 1: There must be a “financial contribution.”
The first key element in determining whether there is a subsidy is whether there
is a “financial contribution,” which means:
(i) the direct transfer of funds, such as grants, loans, and equity infusions, or the
potential direct transfer of funds or liabilities, such as loan guarantees,
(ii) foregoing or not collecting revenue that is otherwise due, such as granting
tax credits or deductions from taxable income,
(iii) providing goods or services, other than general infrastructure, or
(iv) purchasing goods.168
Thus, the above provision lists the four generic categories of government
practices that constitute a “financial contribution.” The list is set out as a guideline for
Commerce in its subsidy findings. Congress has not indicated an intent for the
examples of particular types of practices falling under each category to be
exhaustive.169
For the first category, in practice, loans from a government policy bank or a
commercial bank controlled or owned by the government are considered as a direct
financial contribution and, therefore, are countervailable.
Another category of financial contribution, as usually considered in
countervailing duty cases, is the foregoing of revenue by the government such as by
the exemption of duties or by the reduction or exemption of income taxes. For instance,
in Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods “OCTG” from China,170 Commerce concluded
that the exemption or reduction of the income tax paid by productive foreign-invested
enterprises confers a countervailable subsidy. In fact, the exemption/reduction is a
financial contribution in the form of revenue foregone by the government of China
(“GOC”) and it provides a benefit to the recipient in the amount of tax savings.171
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In addition, another controversial issue that has percolated for many years is
whether the provision of land is a financial contribution and thus countervailable. For
example, in Laminated Woven Sacks (LWS) from China172, GOC claimed that the sale
of land-use rights is not a “financial contribution” because it does not fall into any of
the four categories of “financial contribution” as defined by the U.S. countervailing
duty law.173 However, Commerce identified the nature of the financial contribution for
the provision of land-use rights as a “good or service” based on the past practice in
many cases and its regulations.174 Commerce also noted that the statutory definition of
a financial contribution is written broadly, recognizing that governments have a variety
of mechanisms at their disposal to confer a financial advantage on specific domestic
enterprises or industries.175 According to Commerce, the SAA176 confirms that the
sweep of the statute is intended to be broad to ensure that such mechanisms are subject
to the countervailing duty law.177 Thus, as supported by Congress, Commerce has broad
authority to define what a financial contribution is based on its practice and its
interpretation beyond the above four generic categories of government practices. The
case below will show how Commerce has employed its broad interpretative authority
in determining whether a provision of goods or service other than general infrastructure
constituted a financial contribution.
In Royal Thai Gov’t v. United States,178 the Royal Thai Government (“RTG”)
challenged Commerce’s final affirmative countervailing duty (“CVD”) determination
that RTG’s provision of electricity constituted a financial contribution. RTG appealed
on the grounds that Commerce had erred in its finding that the provision of electricity
172
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to a Thai steel exporter (i.e., SSI, a mandatory respondent in the related CVD case)
constituted a financial contribution. RTG argued that the governmental provision of
electricity to SSI “properly should have been considered ‘general infrastructure,’” and
was therefore exempt from the U.S. CVD law.179 The Court rejected RTG’s position
and found that Commerce reasonably determined that RTG’s provision of electricity to
SSI was a potentially countervailable financial contribution and not merely the
provision of general infrastructure.180 The Court explained that “general infrastructure”
is “a term of art in U.S. countervailing duty law.”181 The Court stated that the CVD law
“directs that goods or services which constitute general infrastructure may not be
countervailed.”182 However, Commerce has interpreted this statutory language to
encompass “infrastructure that is created for the broad societal welfare of a country,
region, state or municipality.”183 Further, Commerce already elaborated on this
interpretation by noting that “the type of infrastructure per se is not dispositive of
whether the government provision constitutes ‘general infrastructure.’” Rather, the key
issue is whether the infrastructure is developed for the benefit of society as a whole.184
Accordingly, Commerce referred to this analysis as the “public welfare concept.”185
For such reasons, the Court upheld Commerce’s determination that RTG’s provision
of electricity to SSI was not for the general welfare where the subsidies were intended
to serve three purposes: “(1) provide electricity to low-income consumers; (2) ensure
rural electrification; and (3) promote economic activity outside of the congested
Bangkok metropolitan area.”186 As a result, the Court concluded that while the Thai
energy subsidy program had “broad social goals,” it primarily benefited only a portion
of Thai society.187
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3.2.1.2. Element 2: Benefit
Element 2: The financial contribution must confer a “benefit.”
After finding a financial contribution, the second element in determining the
existence of a subsidy is “benefit” (i.e., whether one of the defined and identified
financial contributions conferred an actual benefit). The U.S. countervailing duty law
and the Subsidies Agreement both call for a “benefit-to-recipient” standard.188 Simply
put, for a government subsidy to be countervailable, it must provide a benefit to the
recipient of that subsidy, and the U.S. statute provides that a “benefit” shall “normally
be treated as conferred where there is a benefit to the recipient.”189
Together with “financial contribution” and “specificity,” the concept of
“benefit” is obviously central to the administration of countervailing duty law.190
Adopting a more technical (and less circular) definition, Commerce has described “a
benefit to be conferred where a firm pays less for its input (e.g., money, a good, or a
service) than it otherwise would pay in the absence of the government program, or
receives more revenues than it otherwise would earn.”191 In other words, a benefit exists
to the extent that the subsidy recipient gets a financial contribution or in-kind assistance
on terms more favorable than those that would otherwise be available on the market.
As a benefit is a critical element in identifying a subsidy, the statute lays out specific
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rules for how benefits from certain categories of financial contribution would normally
be identified; specifically, a benefit is conferred:
(1) in the case of an equity infusion, if the investment decision is inconsistent
with the usual investment practice of private investors, including the practice regarding
the provision of risk capital, in the country in which the equity infusion is made;192
(2) in the case of a loan, if there is a difference between the amount the recipient
of the loan pays on the loan and the amount the recipient would pay on a comparable
commercial loan that the recipient could actually obtain on the market;193
(3) in the case of a loan guarantee, if there is a difference, after adjusting for
any difference in guarantee fees, between the amount the recipient of the guarantee
pays on the guaranteed loan and the amount the recipient would pay for a comparable
commercial loan if there were no guarantee by the authority;194 and
(4) in the case where goods or services are provided, if such goods or services
are provided for less than adequate remuneration, and in the case where goods are
purchased, if such goods are purchased for more than adequate remuneration.195
Consistent with the Subsidies Agreement, the U.S. countervailing duty law
defines a “benefit” as something better than the recipient could otherwise obtain in the
market. For instance, a government equity infusion confers a benefit “if the investment
decision is inconsistent with the usual investment practice of private investors … in the
country in which the equity infusion is made.”196 Similarly, a government loan provides
a benefit “if there is a difference between the amount the recipient pays” on the
government loan “and the amount the recipient would pay on a comparable commercial
loan that the recipient could actually obtain on the market.”197 Accordingly, “less than
adequate remuneration” means a government price for goods or services that is better
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than the purchaser could otherwise obtain in the market place.198 These concepts are
described in more detail in the sections that follow.

3.2.1.2.1. Equity Infusions
Equity infusions can present very complicated problems in a CVD
investigation. In cases where the government purchases equity or newly issued shares
(i.e., equity infusion) in a company, that investment may be considered as a
countervailable subsidy if it is inconsistent with “the usual investment practice of
private investors.”199 According to Commerce’s interpretation based on its practice, an
equity infusion is considered inconsistent if the price paid by the government for newly
issued shares is greater than the price paid by private investors for the same (or similar
form of) newly issued shares.200
In order to determine whether the government’s investment as an equity
infusion is consistent with usual investment practice, the equity infusion is compared
to actual purchases by private investors of similar newly issued shares.201 In selecting
a private investor price to make comparison, Commerce will rely on sales of newly
issued shares made reasonably concurrently with the newly issued shares purchased by
the government.202 Commerce does not use private investor prices if the private
investor purchases of newly issued shares are not significant.203 If the actual private
investor prices do not exist, Commerce will determine whether the company funded by
the government-provided equity was “equityworthy”204 or “unequityworthy” at the
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time of the equity infusion.205 For the purposes of making an equityworthiness
determination, Commerce will request that the respondents provide information and
analysis completed prior to the infusion, upon which the government bases its decision
to provide the equity infusion.206 Absent the existence or provision of an objective
analysis, containing information typically examined by potential private investors
considering an equity investment, Commerce will normally determine that the equity
infusion received provides a countervailable benefit.207 In other words, if the company
is determined to be unequityworthy, a benefit to the company exists in the amount of
the equity infusion.208 On the other hand, if the company is concluded to be
equityworthy, there are two possible outcomes. Commerce will examine the terms and
the nature of the equity purchased to determine whether the investment practice is
consistent with the usual business practice of private sectors. If it is consistent, there is
no benefit conferred and as a result that equity infusion is not countervailable. If it is
inconsistent, Commerce will determine the amount of the benefit conferred on a caseby-case basis.209
In Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from Belgium,210 Commerce examined three
government equity infusions of the companies under review. The respondent, ALZ,
and the government of Belgium (GOB) argued that Commerce did not properly address
the issue of whether a benefit was conferred on the recipients of the GOB equity
infusions.211 ALZ and GOB contended that, according to U.S. law and the Subsidies
Agreement, a benefit exists when a recipient is better off than it would have been in the
commercial marketplace.212 Thus, ALZ and GOB argued that in order to determine
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whether a benefit exists, a comparison must be made to the marketplace to determine
if the recipient is better off financially than it would have been absent the government
financial contribution.213 ALZ and GOB also contended that Commerce did not
conduct such a comparison in its analysis.214
In response to ALZ and the GOB, Commerce disagreed and relied on regulation
that provides, “Absent the existence . . . of an objective analysis, containing information
typically examined by potential private investors considering an equity investment, the
Secretary will normally determine that the equity infusion received provides a
countervailable benefit within the meaning of paragraph (a)(1) of this section.”215 Thus,
in the absence of such an objective analysis, Commerce will determine that the
company receiving the government’s equity infusion is receiving a benefit in the
amount of the infusion.216 According to Commerce, where a reasonable private investor
is purchasing equity, the investor would seek information about expected returns and
evaluate that information before making the decision to invest.217 Therefore, where
there was no evidence that a government had sought such information prior to deciding
to invest, Commerce concluded that the government was not acting in accordance with
“the usual investment practice of private investors.”218
3.2.1.2.2. Grants, Loans, and Loan Guarantees
“Financial contribution” is first defined as the direct transfer of funds, such as
grants, loans, and equity infusions, or the potential direct transfer of funds or liabilities,
such as loan guarantees.219
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The term “grant” has been used interchangeably with “bounty” as a form of
benefit or subsidy. Typically, grants are considered provide a benefit per se.220 In the
case of a grant, Commerce normally considers a benefit as having been received on the
date on which the company received the grant.221
With respect to “loans,” in determining whether a benefit is conferred from a
loan, the statute provides that a benefit exists “if there is a difference between the
amount the recipient of the loan pays on the loan and the amount the recipient would
pay on a comparable commercial loan that the recipient could actually obtain on the
market.”222
Thus, the benefit is typically the difference between the amount of a
government-provided loan that the company received and the amount of a “comparable
commercial loan” that the company “could actually obtain on the market”.223
In selecting a loan that is “comparable” to the government-provided loan,
Commerce will normally place primary emphasis on similarities between the structure
of the loans (e.g., fixed interest rate versus variable interest rate), the maturity of the
loans (e.g., short-term versus long-term), and the currency in which the loans are
denominated.224 Further, in selecting a “commercial” loan, Commerce will use a loan
taken out by the company from a commercial lending institution or a debt instrument
issued by the company in a commercial market.225
Also, Commerce will treat a loan from a government-owned bank as a
commercial loan, unless there is evidence that the loan from a government-owned bank
was provided on noncommercial terms or at the direction of the government.226
However, Commerce will not consider a loan provided under a government program,
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or a loan provided by a government-owned special purpose bank, to be a commercial
loan for purposes of selecting a loan to compare with a government-provided loan.227
A key component of identifying a benefit received from a loan is the
creditworthiness determination. Commerce initiates an investigation into a company’s
creditworthiness only when there is a specific allegation by the petitioner, supported
by information establishing a reasonable basis to believe or suspect that the company
is uncreditworthy.228 In its investigation, Commerce will consider a firm to be
uncreditworthy if, based on information available at the time of the governmentprovided loan, the company could not have obtained long-term loans from conventional
commercial sources.229 In the event that Commerce finds that a company that received
a government-provided long-term loan was uncreditworthy, Commerce will use a
“benchmark” interest rate in its benefit calculation formula.230
In summary, Commerce will follow three steps in identifying and calculating a
loan benefit. Step 1 is to select a comparable commercial loan that the recipient “could
actually obtain on the market,” that is a commercial loan with market-based interest.
When it is difficult to access the banking systems and private companies in the country
under investigation, Commerce has to rely on the “actual experience of the firm in
question in obtaining comparable commercial loans.”231 Step 2 will be conducted if the
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company does not have any comparable commercial loans. In such situation,
Commerce will use a national average interest rate to make a comparison. Step 3 is to
construct a benchmark interest rate for a long-term loan if the company is determined
to be uncreditworthy or the lender of the loan is a government-controlled bank. This
benchmark approach is also used for loan guarantees in the case of uncreditworthiness.
For loan guarantees, the benefit is typically the difference, after adjusting for
any difference in guarantee fees, between the amount the recipient of the guarantee
pays on the guaranteed loan and the amount the recipient would pay for a comparable
commercial loan if there were no guarantee by the authority.232 Under Commerce’s
regulations, the benefit conferred is the difference between the amount of interest and
any administrative fees paid and those that the company would have had to pay for a
comparable loan without the guaranty.233 In the event that a company, owned by a
government, receives a government loan guarantee, that guarantee does not confer a
benefit if the respondent provides evidence demonstrating that it is normal commercial
practice in the country in question for shareholders to provide guarantees to their firms
under similar circumstances and on comparable terms.234
3.2.1.2.3. Provision of Goods or Services at Less Than Adequate Remuneration
A benefit exists in the case where goods or services are provided to the recipient
for less than “adequate remuneration” (or, in the case of government procurement of
goods, for more than adequate remuneration).235 What counts as “adequate
remuneration” is not directly defined, but it is determined in relation to “prevailing
market conditions”236 These prevailing market conditions include price, quality,
availability, marketability, transportation, and other conditions of purchase or sale.237
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This statutory provision is believed to have opened a new model for using a market
benchmark in identifying and measuring subsidies in the provision of goods or
services.238
Therefore, the first factor (“adequate remuneration”) must be analyzed in
relation to the second factor (“prevailing market conditions”). In its practice,
Commerce has normally used a three-tiered hierarchy of market benchmarks to
determine whether goods or services are provided less than adequate remuneration.239
Specifically, Commerce’s regulations provide that the benchmarks for assessing
whether goods or services have been provided by a government for “less than adequate
remuneration” should be based on market prices (this is a so-called Tier-1
Benchmark).240 When actual prices in the market of the country under investigation
cannot be used, a world market price may be used “where it is reasonable to conclude
that such price would be available to purchasers in the country in question.” (this is a
so-called Tier-2 Benchmark).241 If there is no world market price available to
purchasers in the country under investigation, Commerce will assess whether the
government price is consistent with market principles (a Tier-3 Benchmark).242 In the
cases of actual market-determined prices and the world market prices, if the company
imported the product, Commerce will then adjust the comparison price to reflect the
price that the company actually paid or would pay.243
A notorious case that demonstrates how Commerce may exercise its discretion
in looking to out-of-country (Tier-2) benchmarks in measuring the benefit received
from a government’s provision of goods or services in a market economy is the
Canadian softwood lumber case. In Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada
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(Lumber IV),244 the U.S. petitioners (the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports Executive
Committee, representing thirteen domestic producers (collectively, Petitioner)),245 filed
a petition on April 2, 2001 and alleged that Canadian producers of softwood lumber
products received countervailable subsidies and that such imports materially injured an
industry in the United States.246 The major subsidy allegations in this case concerned
the timber management systems maintained by the provinces of Canada. Specifically,
the Petitioner alleged that, through the provincially administered stumpage systems,
the provinces provided softwood lumber producers with wood fiber for less than
adequate remuneration through the selling of rights to harvest timber on governmentowned (or Crown) forest lands.247 The Canadian respondents contended that stumpage
was not a countervailable subsidy because it did not fall within a statutory definition of
financial contribution.248
Further, the Canadian respondents explained that stumpage does not constitute
the provision of a good; rather, stumpage is simply a “conferral of a right of access to
exploit an natural resource.”249 In other words, stumpage is similar to licensing of
quotas to harvest fish, or leasing of the right to extract oil or minerals from public
lands.250 In its final determination, Commerce did not agree with the Canadian
respondents’ arguments and determined that the provincial governments of Canada
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provided a good (timber) to lumber producers, constituting a countervailable
subsidy.251
In measuring the stumpage subsidies, surprisingly given that Canada is a market
economy country, Commerce found that there were non market-based internal
Canadian benchmarks due to the dominance of Canadian government timbers sales in
the various provincial markets.252 In such a situation, Commerce concluded that “true
market prices may not exist in the country, or it may be difficult to find a market price
that is independent of the distortions caused by the government’s actions.”253 As a
result, Commerce decided to use U.S. stumpage (i.e., the American selling price for
standing timber) as a reasonable Tier-2 benchmark.254 For its benchmark selection,
Commerce reasoned that U.S. stumpage is also available to Canadian producers, and
that U.S. timber stands were comparable to Canadian timber stands.255 This concept
will resurge in Chapter 5 in the discussion of the CVD cases against Vietnam;
Commerce has exercised wide latitude in deciding when to apply Tier-2 or Tier-3
benchmarks, and in choosing which countries to use as surrogates for the purpose of
determining the amount of a countervailable benefit received by a Vietnamese exporter.
3.2.1.3. Element 3: Specificity
Element 3: A subsidy must be “specific.”
The third element, which was originally developed in the U.S. administrative
and statutory implementation of its countervailing duty law, is the concept of
“specificity.” The specificity test is a critical step in CVD investigations in determining
whether a benefit is a countervailable subsidy. The specificity test is used to check
251
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whether a subsidy is provided only to certain exporters or producers under
investigation.
Under U.S. law, the following are considered “specific” subsidies: (1) a subsidy
contingent on export performance; (2) an import substitution subsidy contingent on the
use of domestic goods rather than imported goods; and (3) a domestic subsidy that is
limited to an enterprise or industry within the jurisdiction of the authority providing the
subsidy.256 From a U.S. government agency’s perspective, the purpose of the
specificity test is to “function as an initial screening mechanism to winnow out only
those foreign subsidies which are truly broadly available and widely used throughout
an economy.”257 Accordingly, to be a countervailable subsidy, a benefit must be
granted to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries.
Subsidy benefits generally available may or may not be countervailable. In fact, not
every subsidy is or should be countervailable because governments have a legitimate
interest in supporting certain activities, such as national defense, education, and
infrastructure development.258 Further, for example, government assistance is not
countervailable if that program is generally available and widely and evenly distributed
throughout the jurisdiction of the subsidizing authority.259 Simply put, the specificity
test exists is to ensure that subsidies distributed generally and widely throughout an
economy are noncountervailable subsidies. For that reason, a subsidy is countervailed
only if it is provided to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or
industries.260 In particular, the entire Section 771(5A) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended, provides explicit guidelines for the specificity test. Section 771(5A)
implements the provisions of Article 2 of the Subsidies Agreement dealing with
specificity.
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The first time that Commerce used the specificity test was in Certain Steel
Products from Belgium261 in 1982. In this CVD case, Commerce used the specificity
test to determine that several generally applicable subsidies were non-countervailable
subsidies. Commerce viewed the word “specific” in the statutory definition as
“necessarily modifying both ‘enterprise or industry’ and ‘enterprises or industries.’”262
Commerce stated that “this criterion is necessary to distinguish between government
programs designed to benefit a specific sector and programs designed to implement
broader goals, such as a lower inflation rate or improved health care.”263
3.2.1.3.1. Export Subsidies and Import Substitution Subsidies
“Export subsidies” means the subsidies conditioned on export of the products
or on export performance.264 In other words, subsidies used to pay for an industry only
on products when they are exported are classified as export subsidies. Under the U.S.
countervailing duty law, “export subsidies” are defined as those subsidies that are, in
law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, contingent upon
export performance.265 This definition is more expansive than it was in the preceding
law and practice.266
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“Import institution subsidies” are defined as those subsidies that are contingent,
whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over
imported goods.267
The specificity test is not required in the case of export subsidies and import
institution subsidies because these two forms of subsidies are “deemed to be specific”
under both WTO legal framework and the U.S. law.268 These two subsidies are also
classified as prohibited (or red light) subsidies under the Subsidies Agreement.269
Commerce has set out specific rules to identify export subsidies from Section
351.514 to 351.520, which incorporate the appropriate standards from the Illustrative
List contained in the Subsidies Agreement.270 In particular, Commerce considers a
subsidy to be contingent upon export performance if the provision of the subsidy is, in
law or in fact, tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings, alone or as
one of two or more conditions.271 Exceptionally, a benefit does not exist in export
promotion activities that consist of general informational activities that do not promote
particular products over others.272 In its regulations, Commerce has regulated specific
criteria for identification and calculation of benefits conferred from the following type
of subsidies: (i) internal transport and freight charges for export shipments; (ii) price
preferences for inputs used in the production of goods for export; (iii) exemption or
remission upon export of indirect taxes (e.g., sales taxes and valued added taxes); (iv)
exemption, remission, or deferral upon export of prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes;
(v) remission or drawback of import charges upon export; and (vi) export insurance.273
The category of import substitution subsidy is a new type of subsidy that did
not exist in the preceding laws (i.e., the Subsidies Code and the 1979 TAA). Import
substitution subsidies are added under the Subsidies Agreement and the URAA, and
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they are automatically considered to be specific. The purpose of the import substitution
subsidies is generally to “protect domestic input producers by imposing requirements
or providing incentives for companies to use these inputs”274. Since this type of subsidy
is new, Commerce preserved its definition as exactly provided under the statute and
did not issue additional related regulations due to its lack of experience in dealing with
this new subsidy.275 However, Commerce promised that it will develop practice
regarding this type of subsidy on a case-by-case basis.276
In Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from China,277 Commerce
found that GITI Anhui Radial, a respondent, received export seller’s credits from the
China Exim Bank that constituted a financial contribution, and the loans were specific
because they were tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings.278 In
addition, the petitioner alleged that the tire producers also benefited from subsidized
export credit insurance provided by China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation, a
government-owned insurance company.279 Specifically, the petitioner claimed that
export credit insurance for Chinese tire producers and exporters provided a
countervailable subsidy under U.S. law where the premium rates charged by the
programs were inadequate for covering the programs’ long-term costs and losses, and
that these subsidies were specific because the provision of insurance was contingent
upon export performance.280 However, during the Commerce’s verification, it was
found that this program was actually a grant provided by the local government to
reimburse the company for the cost of its export insurance premiums.281 Then,
Commerce decided simply to countervail the benefit as a grant because it constituted a
274
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financial contribution in the form of a direct transfer of funds or a potential transfer of
funds in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(D)(i).282

3.2.1.3.2. Specificity of Domestic Subsidies
“Domestic subsidies” can be understood as those that are primarily granted to
production without respect to output destination.283 In this situation, the subsidies are
granted to a domestic industry on all of its production of a product, regardless of
whether that production is exported or not.284 Like export subsidies, domestic subsidies
are believed to have the ability to distort resource allocation by drawing resources into
production of a product where production would be economically infeasible but for the
subsidy.285 However, as to the degree of trade distortion to the importing market,
domestic subsidies are viewed as less aggressive than the export subsidies that are
prohibited under the WTO’s legal framework.286
Under the U.S. countervailing duty law, domestic subsidies are all subsidies
besides export subsidies and import subsidies.287 The specificity test is used to
determine whether a domestic subsidy is a specific one, in law (de jure) or in fact (de
facto), to an enterprise or industry within the jurisdiction of the authority providing the
subsidy.288 This is a simple definition, but it creates a high volume of work and
technical analysis for identifying a genuinely specific domestic subsidy. In fact, the
specificity test for determining whether the domestic subsidy is specific is divided into
two further steps: de jure specificity and de facto specificity.
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3.2.1.3.2.1. De Jure Specificity
Domestic subsidies are either specific or not, as determined based on an analysis
of whether the subsidy is specific as a matter of law (de jure specific) or specific as a
matter of fact (de facto specific).289 The test of de jure specificity is affirmative when
the authority providing the subsidy, or the legislation pursuant to which the authority
operates, “expressly limits access” to the subsidy to “an enterprise or industry.”290 In a
contract, a subsidy is considered not to be de jure specific if the eligibility criteria or
conditions for the subsidy are objective and transparent, if the eligibility rules are
automatic, and if these eligibility rules are clearly stipulated in the existing laws capable
of verification and strictly followed.291 The statute defines the term “objective or
conditions” as criteria or conditions that are neutral and that do not favor one enterprise
or industry over another.292 Further, the SAA directs that such criteria or conditions
must be economic in nature and horizontal in application, such as stipulating the
number of employees or the size of an enterprise.293
De jure specificity also exists where a subsidy is limited to designated
geographical regions within the jurisdiction of the granting authority.294 These
subsidies are also considered to be regionally specific.
Commerce has found de jure specific domestic subsidies in several cases. In
Lightweight Thermal Paper (LTP) from China,295 Commerce found that the GOC has
a policy in place to encourage and support the growth of the paper industry through
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preferential financing initiatives, as expressly reflected in the government plans and
related documents. Through a de jure specificity test, Commerce concluded that the
loans from such a program are de jure specific because of the GOC’s policy, as
illustrated in its government plans, to encourage and support the growth and
development of the paper industry.296
In Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road (OTR) Tires from India,297 Commerce
found a tax deduction to cover expenses related to in-house R&D for companies
“engaged in the business of bio-technology or in any business of manufacture or
production of any article or thing …. in the list of the Eleventh Schedule of the Income
Tax Act of 1961” was a countervailable subsidy. As this type of subsidy was expressly
limited to certain enterprises and industries, it was considered to be de jure specific.298

3.2.1.3.2.2. De Facto Specificity
In practice, Commerce may be suspicious that a subsidy program is apparently
provided as generally available to all companies and industries, but that it actually
targets only some companies that are in a position to take it; or perhaps, in fact, only a
limited group of industries or some specialized companies can fulfill the conditions
necessary to receive the subsidy. In such a situation, Commerce has a reason to believe
that such a subsidy may be specific as a matter of fact (de facto specific). Therefore,
Commerce will examine the actual distribution of benefits to determine whether it may
be de facto specific. Commerce discerns de facto specificity from the presence of one
or more factors. Factor 1: whether the actual number of recipients is limited; Factor 2:
whether an enterprise or industry is a predominant user of the subsidy; Factor 3:
whether an enterprise or industry receives a disproportionally large subsidy amount;
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and Factor 4: whether the authority favored an enterprise or industry in its decision to
grant a subsidy.299
As a standard rule for examining these four factors, Commerce will examine
each factor in sequential order of its appearance. If a single factor warrants a finding of
specificity, Commerce will stop there and not undertake further analysis.300 In
analyzing these four de facto specificity factors, Commerce is required to take into
account (i) the extent of diversification of economic activities within the economy in
question; and (ii) the length of time during which the subsidy program in question has
been in operation.301
In Pneumatic Off-The-Road (OTR) Tires from China,302 the provision of natural
and synthetic rubber by state-owned rubber producers to OTR tire producers at less
than adequate remuneration was found to be de facto specific because the industries
are “limited in number.”303 During the preliminary investigation, the government of
China provided a list of industries that use natural and synthetic rubbers: “tires, rubber
bands and tubes, shoes, machinery components and commodity products.”304 Prior to
the final determination, the petitioners argued that at the verification, an official from
the Chinese Synthetic Rubber Industry Association (“SRIA”) stated that “tire industry
is the largest consumer of natural and synthetic rubber in the country” and that the
“main consumers of synthetic rubber are: shoemakers, rubber pipe producers,
construction companies, and automobile producers.”305 Consequently, Commerce
continued to find that industries that use natural and synthetic rubber are “limited in
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number;” therefore, such benefit was de facto specific.306 In addition, Commerce noted
that the tire industry is the largest consumer of natural and synthetic rubber in the
country, and the figures collected from SRIA officials during verification indicated that
the tire industry consumes over half of the total rubber consumed in the country during
the period of investigation (“POI”), indicating that this program may also be de facto
specific under the predominant and disproportionate analyses (i.e., Factor 2 and Factor
3). In other previous cases in the past, among many others, for example, Circular
Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe (CWP) from China307 and Certain Steel Products
from Belgium,308 Commerce also found the subsidies were de facto specific due to the
“limited in number” factor.
3.2.2. Injury Determination
Historically, the provisions of the injury test had their origin in the Antidumping
Act of 1921.309 From 1921 to 1954, the injury determinations in antidumping cases
were in the hands of the Department of Treasury. Then, in 1954, the responsibility for
finding injury finding was transferred to the Tariff Commission, later renamed the
International Trade Commission (“ITC”).310 The countervailing duty law, however, did
not contain an injury test for many years, until one was implemented with the enactment
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of the Trade Act of 1974.311 At that time, a basic injury312 test was added to the
countervailing duty law for imports of nondutiable goods only.313 It was, however, a
landmark moment for the beginning of a bifurcated system in countervailing duty
proceedings.314 In 1979, a completely new injury test315 was added for all imports from
signatories to the 1979 Subsidies Code. Since the establishment of the WTO in 1995,
the United States has extended the injury test to apply in all countervailing duty cases
involving a WTO member.316 It should be noted that the legal requirements for injury
test are fundamentally the same both for dumping and subsidies.317
3.2.2.1. Statutory Criteria for the Injury Test
Under Section 701(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 1671(a)), a two-step system is stipulated, respectively, as follows:
(a) General rule. If—
(1) the administering authority318 determines that the government of a country
or any public entity within the territory of a country is providing, directly or indirectly,
a countervailable subsidy with respect to the manufacture, production, or export of a
class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation,
into the United States, and
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(2) in the case of merchandise imported from a Subsidies Agreement country,
the Commission319 determines that—
(A) an industry in the United States—
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded,
by reason of imports of that merchandise or by reason of sales (or the likelihood
of sales) of that merchandise for importation,
then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise a countervailing duty, in
addition to any other duty imposed, equal to the amount of the net countervailable
subsidy.
From the language of the foregoing provisions, to impose a countervailing duty
to a subsidized product from a WTO member country, one must satisfy three important
elements. These include: (i) an existence of a countervailable subsidy benefiting the
exported product; (ii) a material injury to the U.S. domestic industry; and (iii) a causal
link between the material injury and the imports, as indicated by the language “by
reasons of imports of that merchandise.” The last two elements, (ii) and (iii), comprise
the two-step injury step, and both elements are necessary for the imposition of a
countervailing duty. Therefore, the ITC’s injury determination is a decisive component
of any countervailing duty investigation. In further detail, the first step of the ITC’s
injury test provides three options: “material injury,” “threat of material injury” to U.S.
industry, or “material retardation” of the establishment of U.S. industry. Then, in step
two, whichever form of injury exists must be shown to have been caused “by reason
of” imports of the products under the countervailing duty investigation.
In addition, as is evident from section 701(a)(2), the ITC only conducts the
injury test only when the exporting country of the product under investigation is a
“Subsidies Agreement country.”320 Looking back to the legislative history when the
319
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U.S. Congress amended the Tariff Act of 1930 in 1979 to add the injury test in
conforming with international commitments to implement the Subsidies Code, Section
303321 of the Act was still retained to cover those cases related to imports from the
countries that are not “countries under the Agreement.”322 For instance, if such
countries (e.g., non-WTO members) export the subsidized goods into the U.S. market,
they are not entitled to an injury finding by the ITC.323 That means they are back to the
one-step system and are more likely to be exposed to the imposition of a countervailing
duty if Commerce finds the related subsidies are countervailable, with no findings of
any sort required by the ITC. In essence, the bifurcated system is intended to ensure
that CVD determinations are not concentrated in only one agency, and the relatively
independent nature of the ITC could insulate it from political pressures in its injury
determinations.324 Notably, determinations by both Commerce and the ITC can be
subject to judicial reviews.325 That provides some protection against arbitrary
imposition of high duties; notably however, there is no judicial review available for
Commerce’s determination that a country has a nonmarket economy, and such
determination is thus indefinitely binding until revocation or reconsideration by
Commerce.326
3.2.2.1.1. Material Injury
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The ITC’s focus in any antidumping or countervailing duty case is finding a
“material injury” to the domestic industry. The term “material injury” is defined as
“harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant.”327 Supporting this
technical definition, the law provides the ITC with a list of economic factors to be
reviewed; and the ITC is given substantial discretion in its analysis and weighing of
such factors.328 The list includes: (1) the volume of imports of the subject merchandise,
(2) the effect of imports of that merchandise on prices in the United States for domestic
like products, and (3) the impact of imports of such merchandise on domestic producers
of domestic like products in the context of production operations within the United
States.329 In considering whether there is a material injury, the ITC is allowed to
consider “such other economic factors as are relevant.”330 This provision has granted
the ITC a very broad discretion, and there is some risk that the ITC may abuse its
discretion by failing to consider an important factor that is not otherwise listed among
the statutory criteria.331
Technically, when evaluating the volume of imports, the ITC is directed by law
to consider whether the volume of subject imports, or any increase in that volume,
either in absolute terms or relative332 to production or consumption in the United States,
is significant.333 Thus, the ITC has substantial discretion to conclude what constitutes
a “significant” increase.334
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In its review of the effect of imports on the subject merchandise on prices, the
ITC is further instructed to consider two basic aspects of pricing: (1) whether there has
been significant price underselling by the imported merchandise as compared with the
price of domestic like products in the United States and (2) whether the effect of
imports of such merchandise otherwise depresses prices to a significant degree or
prevents price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant
degree.335
The third element that is the broadest one requires the ITC to examine the
impact of imports on the affected domestic industry.336 Specifically, the ITC is required
to evaluate all relevant economic factors that have a bearing on the state of the industry
in the U.S., including, but not limited to [the following five factors]:
(1) actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, gross profits,
operating profits, net profits, ability to service debt, productivity, return on investments,
return on assets, and utilization of capacity;
(2) factors affecting domestic prices;
(3) actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment,
wages, growth, ability to raise capital, and investment;
(4) actual and potential negative effects on the existing development and
production efforts of the domestic industry, including efforts to develop a derivative or
more advanced version of the domestic like product; and
(5) in dumping proceedings, the magnitude of the margin of dumping.337
The purpose of the law is to provide general guidance to the ITC in its material
injury considerations, but the ITC still has its broad discretion by a statutory standard
for making its determination as provided by the law. The law states that “the presence
or absence of any factor which the Commission is required to evaluate shall not
necessarily give decisive guidance with respect to the determination by the
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Commission of material injury.”338 One of the most important factors in the ITC’s
injury determination is causation, that is the causal link between the material injury to
the domestic industry and the imports of the subsidized product.339

3.2.2.1.2. Threat of Material Injury
There is no specific definition or interpretation of a “threat of material injury”
under the countervailing duty law. The concept of “threat of material injury” is more
complicated to define than that of “material injury,” which is an existing or actual injury
that has already occurred. In fact, to evaluate whether the “threat” exists, the ITC has
even more leeway than in the case of an existing injury, because the ITC is expected to
evaluate trends for the future, which in many cases are not clear.340
Thus, in practice, the ITC has not infrequently found a threat of material injury,
rather than an actual material injury, as the basis for an injury determination.341 As a
matter of concept, a determination of a “threat of material injury” is similar to that of a
“material injury”; however, the prospective nature of determination of a threat of
material injury makes them more difficult.342 As explained by Congress, the purpose
of the threat of material injury standard is “to permit import relief under the
countervailing duty and antidumping laws before actual injury occurs.”343
In evaluating the threat of material injury, the ITC is required to consider,
among other relevant factors, the following specific criteria:
“(1) if a countervailable subsidy is involved, such information as may be
presented to it by the administering authority as to the nature of the subsidy
(particularly as to whether the countervailable subsidy is a subsidy described in Article
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3 or 6.1 of the Subsidies Agreement), and whether imports of the subject merchandise
are likely to increase,
(2) any existing unused production capacity or imminent, substantial increase
in production capacity in the exporting country indicating the likelihood of
substantially increased imports of the subject merchandise into the United States,
considering the availability of other export markets to absorb any additional exports,
(3) a significant rate of increase of the volume or market penetration of imports
of the subject merchandise indicating the likelihood of substantially increased imports,
(4) whether imports of the subject merchandise are entering at prices that are
likely to have a significant depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices, and are
likely to increase demand for further imports,
(5) inventories of the subject merchandise,
(6) the potential for product‐shifting if production facilities in the foreign
country, which can be used to produce the subject merchandise, are currently being
used to produce other products,
(7) in any investigation under this title which involves imports of both a raw
agricultural product (within the meaning of paragraph (4)(E)(iv)) and any product
processed from such raw agricultural product, the likelihood that there will be increased
imports, by reason of product shifting, if there is an affirmative determination by the
Commission under section 705(b)(1) or 735(b)(1) with respect to either the raw
agricultural product or the processed agricultural product (but not both),
(8) the actual and potential negative effects on the existing development and
production efforts of the domestic industry, including efforts to develop a
derivative or more advanced version of the domestic like product, and
(9) any other demonstrable adverse trends that indicate the probability that there
is likely to be material injury by reason of imports (or sale for importation) of the
subject merchandise (whether or not it is actually being imported at the time).”344
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In addition, as instructed by the law, the ITC’s determination of a threat of
material injury “may not be made on the basis of mere conjecture or supposition;”345
instead, it must be based on current and historical data that demonstrate that “dumped
or subsidized imports are imminent and whether material injury by reason of imports
would occur unless an order is issued or a suspension agreement is accepted.”346
3.2.2.1.3. Material Retardation
Congress does not define “material retardation” in the countervailing duty law.
Material retardation is even more difficult to define than a threat of material injury. If
a U.S. industry under the ITC’s review is not already well-established, there is typically
insufficient data to demonstrate actual material retardation.347 In practice, the ITC
rarely chooses to use the “material retardation of an industry” standard as provided in
the statute when determining whether there is injury.348
In reviewing this issue in past cases, the ITC has started by examining whether
the U.S. industry is “established.”349 If American producers have started production
and such operations have “stabilized,” the industry is considered to be established.350
In its evaluation, the ITC examines the following factors:
(1) when the U.S. industry began production;
(2) whether the production has been steady or start‐and‐stop;
(3) the size of domestic production compared to the size of the domestic market
as a whole;
(4) whether the U.S. industry has reached a reasonable “breakeven point;” and
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(5) whether the activities are truly a new industry or merely a new product line
of an established firm.351
If the industry is not established, the ITC considers whether the performance of
the industry reflects normal start‐up difficulties or whether the imports of the subject
merchandise have materially retarded the establishment of the industry.352
3.2.2.2. Cumulation
One of the long-standing concerns in determining material injury is how to deal
with the situation involving the same products that are imported from more than one
country. In particular, the main concern in such proceedings is whether all imports from
the countries in question should be aggregated or “cumulated” to assess their combined
effect on injuries or whether each country’s imports should be separated to conduct a
separate injury analysis.353 The cumulative approach may be unfair to the country of
which the import volume is at the lowest level, but the cumulation of all imports from
all countries in the same CVD proceeding may result to an affirmative injury
determination.
As required by U.S. law, cumulation is used in both countervailing duty and
antidumping proceedings.354 When identifying a material injury, the ITC is directed to
cumulate subject imports from all countries as to which petitions were filed and/or
investigations self-initiated by Commerce on the same day, if such imports compete
with each other and with domestic like products in the U.S. market.355 The law,
however, provides exceptions to the application of cumulation in the following
circumstances: (1) if Commerce has made a preliminary negative determination with
respect to imports from a particular country and does not make a final affirmative
351
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determination on those imports prior to the ITC’s final determination; (2) when the
investigation has been terminated for a particular country; (3) for a country designated
a beneficiary country under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (“CBERA”)
(except that two or more CBERA beneficiaries must be cumulated with each other);
and (4) for imports from Israel.356
In practicable circumstances, at its discretion, the ITC may cumulatively assess
the volume and effect of imports of the subject merchandise if such imports compete
with each other and with domestic like products in the U.S. market.357
3.2.2.3. De Minimis Countervailable Subsidies
Commerce has applied a long-term practice that if the aggregate of net
countervailable subsidies is below a certain de minimis level, it will be treated as zero
and no countervailing duties will be imposed. Under the applicable CVD law,
Commerce is directed to disregard any de minimis countervailable subsidy.358 The
standard de minimis threshold is set based on a statutory rule that “a countervailable
subsidy is de minimis if the administering authority determines that the aggregate of
the net countervailable subsidies is less than 1 percent ad valorem or the equivalent
specific rate for the subject merchandise.”359 However, there are exceptions for
developing countries, including (i) not exceeding 2% for most developing countries360
and (ii) not exceeding 3% for certain other developing countries.361
356
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It should be noted that the standards of 1%, 2%, and 3% de minimis threshold
can be applied only in the original CVD investigation to determine whether the
imported goods from a country should be subject to a CVD order. In regular
administrative reviews and other determinations other than preliminary or final CVD
determination in an original investigation of CVD orders, Commerce uses the standard
of less than 0.5 percent ad valorem upon the imported goods from all countries.362
Under the U.S. AD and CVD laws, the Trade Representative (“USTR”) shall
publish in the Federal Register, and update as necessary, a list of (i) developing
countries that have eliminated their export subsidies on an expedited basis within the
meaning of Article 27.11 of the Subsidies Agreement, and (ii) countries determined by
the Trade Representative to be lease developed or developing countries.363 The first
time that the USTR published such a list was on June 2, 1988.364 The USTR recently
revised that list on February 10, 2020.365 For the purpose of the U.S. CVD law, the
USTR considers countries with a share of 0.5 percent or more of world trade to be
developed countries.366 As a result, Vietnam together with other countries such as
Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand are now ineligible for the 2% de
minimis standard.367 The special meaning of this change for Vietnam is that it will no
longer receive preferential treatment of the 2% de minimis threshold in CVD
investigations. In other words, Vietnam will be subject to a lower threshold for
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triggering a CVD investigation into whether exports from Vietnam are unfairly
subsidized by the government and cause injuries to U.S. industries.
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Chapter 4. Application of U.S. Countervailing Duty Law to
Nonmarket Economy Countries

Thus far, in Chapters 2 and 3, this dissertation has traced the development of
global and U.S. trade laws, with a focus on two features that have caused controversy
in the context of U.S. countervailing duty investigations, namely the discretion
allocated to the U.S. Department of Commerce in determining when a subsidy is
countervailable, and the discretion allocated to the ITC in making an injury
determination. This Chapter highlights another aspect is integral to understanding the
cases to be studies in Chapter 5: the treatment of Vietnam as having a nonmarket
economy, and the disfavored treatment afforded to nonmarket economies generally by
the U.S. trade regime. First, in Section 4.1, this Chapter discusses the historical
underpinnings of the disfavored treatment of nonmarket economies. Then, in Section
4.2, this Chapter briefly discusses the U.S. trade laws’ treatment of nonmarket
economies. Finally, Section 4.3 dives into U.S. countervailing duty investigations
against nonmarket economies. Of particular importance are some of the alternative
approaches to the traditional bright-line distinction between market and nonmarket
economies: for instance, this Chapter highlights the “mix and match” (or “bubbles of
capitalism”) and “market-oriented industry” theories, either of which could prove
promising as nonmarket economies like Vietnam seek to gain more favorable
international trade treatment as a response to their market-oriented reforms.

4.1. The Origin of NMEs in the Multilateral Trading System
This section discusses issues related to nonmarket economies under the
multilateral trading system, mainly highlighting historical developments of GATT
1947 to WTO regime in relation to nonmarket economies.
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4.1.1. GATT 1947
Looking back to the Cold War era after World War II, the world was divided
into two spheres of influence: one side, the United States; the other, the Soviet Union
(USSR).368 In this “bipolar world,” the Soviet bloc included so-called state-trading or
planned-economy countries, then mainly in Central and Eastern Europe.369 On the other
side, the United States emerged as a leader of market economy countries in initiating
the success of the first General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), which is
based mostly on market-oriented rules and principles.
In late 1945, as supported by the U.K., the United States published the Proposals
for Expansion of World Trade and Employment and called for multinational
negotiations on tariff reductions.370 As stated by the U.S. Secretary of State in the
Proposals, “it is urgently necessary that these policies should be agreed upon, in order
that the world may not separate into economic blocs.”371 At about the same time the
United Nations was beginning its work, and one of its principal organs, the Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC), was established.372 In December 1945, the United
States invited a small “nuclear” group of fifteen countries (including the Soviet Union
and China) to participate.373 In February 1946, at the first ECOSOC meeting, the United
States introduced a resolution, which was adopted, calling for the convening of a
“United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment” with the purpose of drafting
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a charter for an international trade organization374 (ITO). In the draft “Suggested
Charter for an ITO,” which was based mainly on the Proposals, the United States
proposed several principles and methods for dealing with state trading monopolies,
including “Equality of treatment,” “State monopolies of individual products,” and
“Complete state monopolies of foreign trade.”375
With an expectation of bringing the Soviet Union countries into the multilateral
organization, the U.S. had tried many times to invite the Soviet Union to join in the
Preparatory Committee.376 However, the Soviet Union did not reply to the repeated
invitations377 The Soviet Union also declined to participate in the subsequent
conferences in London, Geneva, and Havana.378 It could be understood that the Soviet
Union did not want to participate because the two economic blocs had different
economic systems with different political and trade interests to achieve. Indeed, the
United States had proposed provisions actually reflecting the principles of free trade,
non-discrimination and multilateral negotiations, which were incompatible with the
Soviet Union’s planned-economic system, economic policy of self-sufficiency, and its
target of consolidating the linkage with the newly established socialist countries and
control of bilateral trade arrangements with those countries.379 However, the proposed
methodologies to deal with “complete state monopolies of foreign trade”380 is believed
not to be new.381 The concept of “global purchase arrangement” had already existed in
several bilateral trade agreements between the Soviet Union and some nations, for
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example, an agreement with Latvia in 1927, with Finland during the 1930s, and in a
bilateral trade agreement with the United States in 1935.382 Therefore, the “global
purchase agreement” proposed by the United States was the recognition and
multilateralization of this reciprocal trade arrangement between nonmarket economies
and market economies.383 However, because the Soviet Union had shown no interest
in participation into the multinational negotiations that led to the conclusion of the
GATT in 1947, the provision of “complete state monopolies of foreign trade,” as a
multilateral trade arrangement between nonmarket economies and market economies,
was eventually excluded from the text of the GATT.384 The other provisions, proposed
by the United States, including “Equality of treatment” and “State monopolies of
individual products” were integrated into Article XVII, “State Trading Enterprises” of
the GATT.385
It should be noted that the GATT was drafted as an agreement to embody the
results of the tariff negotiations at Geneva conferences from April to October 1947,
concurrently with the work on the ITO charter.386 However, under the Reciprocal Trade
Agreement Act extension of 1945, the U.S. President only had the authority to negotiate
the tariff agreements (including the GATT), but no authority to accept international
organization membership.387 Also, because the GATT itself was not self-executing
without other nations’ parliamentary actions to implement many of the GATT’s general
clauses, and in because while the U.S. President’s authority to enter into a trade
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agreement was going to expire in the middle of 1948, as a result, a Protocol of
Provisional Application of the GATT was signed in late 1947, which then became
effective on January 1, 1948. The ITO charter was finally dead because the U.S.
Congress did not approve it.388
4.1.2. The WTO Regime
From the outset, the GATT was constructed as an international trading system
operating on market-oriented rules and principles. Some commentators considered the
GATT as having been designed by market economies for market economies, or as a
rich nations’ club of the West’s market economy bloc vs. the East’s socialist or
nonmarket economy bloc.389 Therefore, the GATT was not effective in dealing with
many institutions and economies that do not operate under free-market principles, such
as state trading agencies or monopolies, government-owned industries, centrally
planned economies, and transition economies, and so on. These circumstances have
raised some difficult conceptual problems for the GATT trading system.390 As an
example, GATT’s Article XVII requires state trading enterprises to make transactions
“solely in accordance with commercial considerations, including price, quality,
availability, marketability, transportation….” Thus, theoretically, it does not take into
account other motivations, which seems to contradict the “basic tenets of economic
planning” in the socialist countries.391 Another issue is that the GATT is premised on
a classical economic model (i.e., private enterprises are stimulated by profit motives
and trade goods in response to market forces). On the contrary, nonmarket economies
do not follow this classical model; for example, instead of responding to market forces,
purchases and sales are largely based on central planning requirements and state trading
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decisions.392 Therefore, the most critical issue for the GATT was how to manage
acceptance by major nonmarket sectors.393
Prior to the official establishment of the WTO in 1995, many Eastern European
countries desired to transform their economies into a market-oriented economies. The
flow of their accession into the GATT has triggered a change of direction in how the
multilateral trading system approached nonmarket economies.394 Instead of adapting
GATT rules to integrate nonmarket economies, the main concern was promoting a
more efficient transition of these economies.395 Yugoslavia is a typical example of a
country adapting, by way of economic reforms, to the GATT’s market-oriented rules
and principles.396 Other Eastern European countries acceded to the GATT during their
centrally planned economy stages such as Poland (1967), Romania (1971), Hungary
(1973).397 Hence, the tendency to move from nonmarket economies to market
economies reflects the “natural, inevitable and progressive”398 features in the
multilateral trading system under the GATT and WTO regime.
The GATT shirt, however, seems to be unfit for a bigger body of more and more
acceding economies. Therefore, at the Uruguay Round negotiations, which started in
1986, there was a demand for creation of an institution with decision-making
procedures to meet the needs of all members. After eight years of multinational
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negotiations, the WTO was officially created in 1994 and began its life on January 1,
1995.399
China, as one of the largest nonmarket economy countries, has spent a
complicated long run to be acceded to the WTO. Indeed, China was one of the founders
of the GATT in 1947, but after the Communists came to power in 1949, the thenRepublic of China withdrew from the GATT in 1950.400 In 1968, China officially
applied to the GATT for resumption of its status as a contracting party; however, the
Working Party viewed this process as the same as an accession process.401 It took China
for sixteen years to be officially accepted as the 143rd WTO member on December 11,
2001.402 However, China has yet to be recognized by the United States as a market
economy country since its accession to the WTO.
The former leader of the socialist bloc during the Cold War, Russia, officially
became the WTO’s 157th-member in 2012.403 Unlike China, Russia chose a completely
cooperative strategy with large market economy countries at the early stage of its
economic transition.404 The fact that Russia was recognized by the United States as a
market economy country in 2002 was significant in “nudging Russia toward eventual
accession into the World Trade Organization.”405

4.2. The Origin of NMEs in Relation to the U.S. Trade Laws
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from Communist areas.406 Specifically, the law prohibited the United States from
granting most-favored-nation (“MFN”) status to any nation or area dominated or
controlled by a foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world’s
Communist movement.407 That reaction was strengthened again in 1962 when
Congress enacted another law to prevent Communist economic penetration.408
Congress classified this measure as a national security one to prevent the imports from
any country dominated or controlled by Communism.409 The United States took such
actions as trade controls for political purposes rather than for ensuring production of
goods essential for defense as required by national security purposes.410 Simply, during
such tension that was emblematic of the Cold War period, a nation may have chosen to
refrain from granting MFN status to other nations merely because those countries were
viewed as unfriendly or because to grant such status would have been politically
unpopular and therefore a risk to the survival of elected officials’ positions.411
Consequently, trade between the Soviet Union and the United States prior to the 1970s
was stagnant.412
Remarkably, in 1974, Congress changed trade policies by enacting a law to deal
with the trade relations between the United States and Communist countries having
NME status.413 In particular, for an NME country to receive MFN benefits, that country
must meet the requirements of freedom of emigration.414 In addition, the Act added a
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new section on dealing with “market disruption,” which is a special escape-clause415
channel that applies only to Communist countries.416 Specifically, the law provides a
remedy against the imports of the merchandise from a Communist country that causes
a “market disruption” for the merchandise produced by domestic industry.417 The term
“Communist country” was simply defined as any country dominated or controlled by
Communism.418 Congress thought that the provision regarding “market disruption”
would cure the fear that Communist countries would engage in storing up goods and
then suddenly flooding the American market for the purpose of destroying the
market.419 To a certain extent, the “market disruption” remedy was based on a
recognition of the difficulty of applying normal unfair trade laws, such as antidumping
and countervailing duty laws, to NME countries.420 It should be noted that the Act also
prohibited granting the GSP benefits to Communist countries unless they received
MFN status from the United States and were members of the GATT and the IMF.421
In addition to the “market disruption” provision, the Act added a new
constructed-value methodology for calculating the dumped imports from a statecontrolled economy.422 However, there were no specific statutory provisions dealing
[lobbying] movement in the Congress, generated by U.S. citizens interested in promoting the opportunity
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with the NMEs’ subsidies under the CVD law. It was assumed that the United States
would take any possible action against the subsidization from NME countries by the
other alternative measures, such as with the antidumping law under the Antidumping
Act of 1921, as amended by the Trade Act of 1974, or with the “market disruption”
remedy under Section 406, or with import relief (i.e., the highest level of action) under
Section 301, by providing import-restriction measures to tackle export subsidies from
foreign countries that had the effect of substantially reducing sales of competitive
American products.
In 1988, Congress drastically changed the provisions pertaining to NME
countries under the antidumping duty law by enacting the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988423. First, the Act added a completely new section entitled
“Dumping by nonmarket economy countries.”424 The term “state-controlled economy”
disappeared and was replaced by “nonmarket economy” throughout the section. It was
the first time that a definition of “nonmarket economy” had been seen; it was defined
as “any foreign country that the administering authority determines does not operate on
market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in such
country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise.”425 The withdrawal of the term
“state-controlled economy,” which was never defined in the previous laws, and which
was replaced by the term “nonmarket economy,” implies that the two forms of
economic systems are the same or similar and can reasonably be used interchangeably.
It seems that the language used by the statute when defining the term “nonmarket
economy” is technically applicable only to antidumping actions.
determine the foreign market value of the merchandise on the basis of the normal costs, expenses, and
profits as reflected by either (1) the prices at which such or similar merchandise of a non-state-controlledeconomy country is sold for consumption in the home market of that country or to other countries,
including the U.S.; or (2) the constructed value of such or similar merchandise in a non-state-controlledeconomy country….” The concept of using a constructed value of the non-state-controlled-economy
country was previously used since 1968 under the Treasury Department’s regulations to deal with the
merchandise from controlled economy countries. 19 C.F.R. § 53.5(b) (1969). See also Cuneo, Donald
L., and Charles B. Manuel, Roadblock to Trade: The State-Controlled Economy Issue in Antidumping
Law Administration, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 277 (1981).
423
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, supra note 135.
424
Id. at Section 1316.
425
19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A).

81

Second, it is important to note that the Act also sets forth the six golden factors
for Commerce to take into account when determining whether a country has a
nonmarket economy.426 However, these six factors are not “weighted or ordered” and
there is also “no formula” for NME determinations.427 Instead, such factors work as
guidelines for application to each fact-specific NME determination.428 When such a
determination is made, it remains in effect until it is revoked by Commerce.429 It should
be noted that this NME determination is not subject to judicial review.430 For instance,
when Commerce made an NME status determination of Vietnam in its first
antidumping case in 2002, Vietnam was unable to make an appeal to the U.S. Court of
International Trade or any other judicial body to challenge that decision.
Third, with respect to antidumping investigations, the Act once again
strengthened the dumping calculation methodologies. It provides a methodology of
“factors of production” to determine the foreign market values for NME countries.431
This new methodology has replaced the constructed value methodology as provided
under the Trade Act of 1974. Again, NME countries are not mentioned in any statutory
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provisions under the sections regulating actionable subsidies and countervailing duty
actions.
Noticeably, the Act provides a separate section on “Accession of state trading
regimes to the [GATT].”432 This section requires that, before any major country
accedes to the GATT, the President must determine the following: (i) whether that
country’s state-trading enterprises account for a significant share of that country’s
exports or goods that compete with imported goods; and (ii) whether the state-trading
enterprises of that country unduly burden and restrict, or adversely affect the foreign
trade of the United States or the United States economy.433 If both determinations are
affirmative, the President can choose to withhold extension of the application of the
GATT between the United States and the acceding country until that country enters
into an agreement with the United States undertaking that the state trading enterprises
of that country will make purchases of goods and services that are not intended for
governmental use, and sales in international trade in accordance with commercial
considerations (including price, quality, availability, marketability, and transportation)
and that the U.S. firms will have an adequate opportunity, in conformity with
customary practice, to compete for such purchases or sales;434 alternatively, an
extension of GATT rules may be approved by Congress under an expedited
consideration, or so-called “fast-track” procedures.435 Section 1106 has been slightly
amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 by changing the “GATT”
into “GATT 1947” and inserting the term “WTO Agreement” in order to apply to all
acceding WTO members.
In the case of China when it acceded to the WTO in 2001, President George W.
Bush determined that the state trading enterprises accounted for a significant share of
the exports of China and goods that compete with imports into China. Therefore, the
President determined that such state trading enterprises unduly burden and restrict, or
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adversely affect, the foreign trade of the United States or the United States economy.
Since China was seeking to become a WTO member, it was affirmed that China must
make commitments that it will ensure that all state-owned and state-invested
enterprises will make purchases and sales based solely on commercial considerations
and the U.S. business firms will have an adequate opportunity to compete for sales to
and purchases from these enterprises on nondiscriminatory terms and conditions.
Furthermore, the President required that China not influence, directly or indirectly,
commercial decisions on the part of state-owned or state-invested enterprises. As the
obligations that China assumed under the WTO Agreement, including China’s protocol
of accession, meet the requirements of section 1106(b)(2)(A), the President’s
determination under section 1106(a) therefore does not require invocation of the
nonapplication provisions of the WTO Agreement.436

4.3. Application of CVD Law to Nonmarket Economies
The issue of whether the CVD law should be applied to NME countries is
perhaps the most notable and hotly debated topic in the history of U.S. trade remedy
laws for many decades prior to 2012.437
Before 2007, the longstanding position of Commerce was that the CVD law did
not apply to NME countries. A series of cases such as Textiles and apparel from
China,438 Carbon Steel Wire Rods (CSWR) from Czechoslovakia439 and Poland440 were
typical cases that Commerce initiated against NMEs in 1983. Although the China
436
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Textile Case was terminated before a preliminary determination,441 the CSWR cases
from Czechoslovakia and Poland resulted in determinations by Commerce that the
bounties or grants (or subsidies) could not be found in NME countries.442 Commerce’s
rejection of the applicability of CVD law to NMEs was later appealed and resolved by
two levels of courts. These cases have been noticed by many academic scholars,
practitioners, administrators, and legislators. The impact of the cases has been one of
the catalyst of the historic amendment of the CVD law in 2012 to apply it to NME
countries.
In 2007, Commerce, with its broad discretionary power for administering the
CVD law, changed its longstanding position and accepted a petition, filed on October
31, 2006, by NewPage Corporation, against the paper produced and exported from
China (i.e., NME country), Indonesia and Korea (i.e., ME countries).443 This case was
the first time that Commerce went through all steps from initiation to a final affirmative
determination that the CVD law could be applied to NME countries, in the case of
China.
The complexity of the trade remedy laws, and especially the absence of clear
statutory provisions on NMEs in the CVD law, had led to significant inconsistencies in
Commerce’s application of the CVD law to NMEs.
The sections that follow focus on analysis of the foregoing NME cases to
unpack the inconsistencies and controversial features of the decision of Commerce and
the competent judicial courts in determining the applicability of CVD law to NMEs.
These cases are presented in a chronological order as the relevant legal proceedings
transpired.

441

Textiles, Apparel, and Related Products from the People’s Republic of China; Termination of
Countervailing Duty Investigations, 48 FR 55492-03 (December 13, 1983) [hereinafter China Textile
Case Termination].
442
Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia: Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination, 49
FR 19370-01 (May 7, 1984); Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland; Final Negative Countervailing Duty
Determination, 49 FR 19374-01 (May 7, 1984).
443
Notice of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations: Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s
Republic of China, Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea, 71 FR 68546-01 (November 27, 2006)
[hereinafter CFS Paper Case Initiation].

85

4.3.1. Nonapplicability of CVD Law to Nonmarket Economies
4.3.1.1. Theoretical Debates
Initially, the CVD law was devised in the early 1890s when there was no clear
division between the economic systems of the targeting countries. Throughout its
historical evolution, the spirit of the law has been maintained as countervailing or
offsetting the foreign government’s bounties or grants provided to the exported
products. Such bounties or grants are, of course, considered as unfair trade competition
to the American industry. In reality, it appears that the applicability of the CVD law to
NME countries has been uncertain for a long time. Remarkably, U.S. legislators, as
required by internal forces and international commitments, implemented several
critical amendments to the trade laws such as the Tariff Act of 1930, the Trade Act of
1974, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, and then the URAA of 1994. But they did
not provide any specific statutory provisions or guidelines for dealing with NMEs
under the CVD law. Perhaps they believed that issues related to NMEs could be
resolved more effectively with the alternative tools of the antidumping law, the market
disruption remedy, or safeguard measures.
In 1981, the Comptroller General of General Accounting Office (GAO),444 a
nonpartisan federal watchdog agency, released a report to the U.S. Congress to address
the concerns on how to improve the trade remedy laws (including the CVD law) in a
more effective way to protect the American industries.445 It should be noted that the
GAO’s concerns came from its studies of East-West trade issues and the emergence of
NME countries such as China, which had been increasingly expanding their exports to
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the United States.446 From the beginning of its report, the GAO admitted the most
perplexing aspect of import trade administration vis-a-vis the NME countries involves
questions of subsidies and countervailing duties.447 In essence, in any CVD
investigation, it is very difficult to identify and quantify the bounties or grants of the
subsidized goods. When NMEs involved in such a proceeding, the difficulty is
greater.448 For instance, in any CVD proceeding, it is required to identify the subsidies
and then quantify the amount thereof. However, this work involves a lot of significant
obstacles such as the complex intertwining of subsidies and taxes; access to information
concerning the subsidies granted; and the nonexistence of a suitable exchange rate for
converting subsidy amounts from NME currencies into the U.S. dollars.449
Unfortunately, the GAO had no recommendations on how to apply the CVD law to
NME countries, but it concluded that the practical effect of the problems is that
“actually identifying and quantifying subsidies remains only remotely possible.”450
In a response to the GAO, the Department of Justice was unsure whether CVD
proceedings against NME countries were at all appropriate because it believed that the
concept of subsidies may not have meaning in the NME context.451 The application of
CVD law to NME countries should be permitted, it was thought, only if actual subsidies
could be identified and quantified by the petitioner in the original countervailing duty
petition.452 Therefore, according to the GAO, such a difficult job discouraged U.S.
industries from making requests for CVD investigations of foreign subsidy practices.453
It seems that the theoretical question on the applicability of the CVD law to
NMEs left an unresolved debate for the legislative and executive branches. In a more
academic sense, there appear to be two opposing “schools of thought” as to whether a
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government having an NME system can disburse a bounty, grant, or subsidy.454 The
first school of thought argues that no subsidy can exist in an NME because the entire
economy is controlled by government intervention.455 The purpose of the CVD law is
to correct market distortions caused by government interventions. However, when the
public sector and private sector are essentially one in an NME setting, such correction
seems to be impossible.456 To be sure, the supporters of this theory acknowledge that
government action distorts the allocation of resources within NME settings.457 In
addition, in order to calculate a CVD duty when a subsidy exists, it is necessary to rely
on commercial benchmarks.458 Yet there are no available commercial benchmarks (or
commercial standards) against which to measure the government distortion.459
Consequently, lacking such a market-based norm, it is impossible to determine whether
there is a subsidy and how to quantify it, if it actually exists.460
On the other hand, the second school of thought defines a subsidy based on the
concept of “preferentiality;” for example, if the government grants a special treatment
to a group, a subsidy is conveyed and existing.461 Based on this “preferential treatment”
approach, the government’s preference that one group or industry receives is already a
countervailable subsidy. In order to apply this approach, the administrating authority is
required to establish the normal or average price levels within a country, and then
determine whether the group or industry under investigation received any preferential
treatment.462 The proponents of this second school of thought concluded that this
approach could be used to measure the degree of preferential treatment provided to one
454
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group or industry in either an ME or NME.463 According to Robert H. Lantz, this
approach seems to be difficult to employ in dealing with subsidies embedded in an
NME’s normal or average price levels. A group or industry could be the beneficiary of
government involvement in setting the economy’s normal or average price levels
without incurring CVD liability. In order that the administering authority is able to
identify a countervailable subsidy, it would have to find a second level of government
preference for that group or industry beyond that normally found throughout the
economy. As a result, under this approach, a great deal of government subsidies would
not be countervailable.464
The following sections shall unpack and apply the above theoretical views as
well as the two schools of thought applied in practice by Commerce in CVD
proceedings against China, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. From the studies of these
cases and their subsequent appeals, these theoretical debates have revealed great
practical consequences as reflected by both administrative and judicial decisions.
4.3.1.2. Administrative Decisions by the Department of Commerce
4.3.1.1.1. Textile and Apparel Case Against China
Considering whether the CVD law could be utilized to deal with unfair trade
competition from NME countries was a “novel issue” from Commerce’s perspective.
The first time that Commerce confronted the issue of applying the CVD law to NMEs
was in 1983, when the American Apparel Manufacturers Association representing the
U.S. textile industry (“Petitioners”) filed a petition on September 12, 1983.465 The
Petitioners alleged that textile producers, manufacturers, or exporters in the People’s
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Republic of China (“China”) received bounties or grants within the meaning of the
applicable law.466
Prior to this petition, all countervailing duty cases involved imports from ME
countries. Having recognized the importance of this new issue, Commerce held a
“novel issue” public conference to seek for opinions from interested parties on whether
bounties or grants may be found in an NME country.467 At the conference, there were
different views presented by two groups of interests (i.e., the petitioners’ group and
importers’ group). To certain extent, these views had useful contribution to
Commerce’s determination in its preliminary results and other subsequent cases.468 The
first group relied on the “plain language” of the CVD law to interpret that the law can
be applied to imports from “any country, dependency, colony, province, or other
political subdivision of government.”469 This group argued that the CVD law applies
to all countries, regardless of the ME/NME distinction, and makes no exceptions based
on economic preconditions or form of government.470 They also reiterated that the
equal application of the CVD law to both NMEs and MEs is fully consistent with the
intended purposes of the statute, i.e., to prevent domestic producers from being placed
in “jeopardy” by the “unfair competitive advantages” that foreign governments use to
subsidize their exporters.471 On the contrary, the second group, mainly importers,
interpreted the “plain language” in a different way to fight against the first group. The
second group argued that the phrase “any country” must be interpreted in dependency
with the next phrase of the provision that “shall pay or bestow … any bounty or grant;”

466

Id.
Notice of conference on novel issues, 48 FR 46092 (October 11, 1983). Commerce’s notice of
conference was announced two days prior to the notice of investigation initiation was released.
468
Cichanowicz (1983), supra note 72, at 408-12.
469
19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1) (1980). Id. (citing Submission on Behalf of the ACTWU, the ILGWU and the
AAMA, Oct. 28, 1983, at 1-10. DOC DKT No. C570-005).
470
Id. Section 303(a)(1) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1)) applies: “[w]henever any country,
dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of government, person, partnership,
association, cartel, or corporation, shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant upon
the manufacture or production or export of any article or merchandise manufactured or produced in such
country, dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of government.”
471
Cichanowicz (1983), supra note 468. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-46 (1979)).
467

90

and the “grants” are actually not found in NME countries.472 In addition, the second
group further argued that the grants are nonexistent and cannot be measured in NMEs
because of the government intervention in determining the allocation of resources for
manufacturers, producers or exporters, as compared to MEs, where such allocation is
made based on market forces.473 With respect to legislative purpose, the second group
argued that there is explicit methodology for dealing with NME countries set forth in
the antidumping law and Section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974.474 Specifically,
Congress’s concerns regarding lower priced NME exports flooding U.S. markets are
addressed through antidumping and Section 406 procedures.475 Therefore, CVD law is
simply “inappropriate” for use against imports from NME countries.476 Arguments by
both sides at the conference did not come to any specific resolution on whether the
CVD law should be applied to NMEs, but they did “break the ice” for the subsequent
cases.477
It is interesting that the China Textile Case was terminated at the due date of
the preliminary determination on December 6, 1983, due to a withdrawal request by
the petitioners.478 It seems to be a purely legal action, but the reason behind this
termination is very interesting. The U.S. textile industry agreed to withdraw the petition
as recommended by the Secretary of Department of Commerce in favor of tighter
controls over textile imports to be announced by President Reagan in that same
month.479 Finally, the American Apparel Manufacturers Association issued a statement
472
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to welcome the President’s decision as “a step forward in dealing with the problem of
disruption of the American textile and apparel market by imports” and confirmed not
to refile their petition against Chinese imports in the CVD case.480 The American textile
makers were pleased with the President’s action because a stricter control of textile
imports (e.g., import quotas) would definitely benefit them in the long run moreso than
merely offsetting the bounties or grants provided to the exported textiles by an
affirmative CVD decision. This shows that the American textile industry effectively
used the CVD petition as a tool in its negotiations with its own government to “clamp
down” on imports, especially those from China.481
4.3.1.1.2. Carbon Steel Wire Rods Against Czechoslovakia and Poland
Just a week after the termination of the China Textile Case, Commerce initiated
two separate CVD investigations against the products of carbon steel wire rods
imported from Czechoslovakia and Poland.482 The two petitions were separately filed
by four American steel producers483 who alleged that manufacturers and exporters in
Czechoslovakia and Poland received benefits conferring bounties or grants. These two
cases raised the same issue that had yet to be determined: whether the CVD law could
be applied to NME countries.
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In its preliminary decisions for both countries, Commerce stated that the
Congress had not exempted NME countries from the CVD law.484 The reasoning was
that section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended can be applied to “any country,
dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of government.” This
interpretation of the law by its literal terms was more or less influenced by the
petitioners’ arguments voiced at the “novel issue” conference held in the China Textile
Case. However, in this preliminary investigation, Commerce found no benefits that
constituted bounties or grants to producers in either country.485
Three months later, Commerce reversed its preliminary determination and ruled
that bounties or grants could not be found in NMEs.486 In reaching this surprising
determination, Commerce did shift its focus from a narrow reading of section 303 to
include an additional jurisdictional question on whether government activities in an
NME confer bounties or grants.487
To come to the crucial conclusion that bounties or grants could not be found in
NMEs, Commerce conducted comprehensive research and analysis on four aspects: (i)
the subsidy concepts as applied and compared in both MEs and NMEs; (ii)
reexamination of the legislative history of the countervailing duty laws from 1890s to
1979 and following developments; (iii) consensus of opinion from academic literature
delivered by prestige law professors and practitioners; and (iv) broad discretion in
subsidy determination.
First, Commerce defined a subsidy as any action that distorts or subverts the
market process and results in a misallocation of resources, encouraging inefficient
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production and lessening world wealth.488 According to Commerce, in an ME, scarce
resources are channeled to their most profitable and efficient uses by the market forces
of supply and demand.489 In contrast, in NMEs there are no such market process to
distort or subvert.490 In particular, the government’s central planning, rather than the
market forces of supply and demand, determines the allocation of resources and
therefore distorts the costs, prices and profits. It was also noted that because the notion
of a subsidy is a market phenomenon, it does not apply in a nonmarket setting.491 That
means if a subsidy is a distortion from a market norm, it can exist only in a market
context. Hence, to impose that concept where it has no meaning would force Commerce
to identify every government action as a subsidy.492 Then, Commerce confirmed that it
was not prepared to do this job, i.e., it could not impose the market-based concept of a
subsidy on a system where it had no meaning and could not be identified or fairly
quantified.493
Second, through the enactment of the first U.S. CVD law in 1890 and its
subsequent amendments in 1974 and 1979, Congress chose two other vehicles for
dealing with unfair trade practices from NME countries.494 For that reason, Congress
has remained silent on the question of whether the CVD law applies to NME
countries.495 When reviewing the development of the CVD law after 1979, Commerce
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took the view of the GAO NME Report in 1981 that it is only “remotely possible” to
identify and quantify subsidies in NMEs.496
Third, the consensus appeared to be that the CVD law simply cannot be applied
to NME countries.497 For instance, according to Professor John H. Barceló, III:
If an NME exporting country is involved, most of the analysis used thus far
for both export and domestic subsidies, is entirely inapplicable. One cannot
speak of market imperfections and nondistortive actions or even the
distinction between export and domestic subsidies if an economy as a whole
is not governed by the market principle. Theoretically, any given sale may
be subsidized or not, but since there is no market reference point, it is idle
to speak in such terms.498
In addition, Professor Robert E. Hudec supported Commerce’s view that under
both the 1974 and 1979 trade legislation, “state-controlled-economy” trade is treated
as a problem under the antidumping laws, and nothing at all is said about this subject
in the law pertaining to subsidies.499
Fourth, by citing United States v. Zenith Radio Corp.,500 Commerce reasoned
that it has broad discretion in determining the existence or nonexistence of “bounty or
grant” or subsidies.501
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Based on the above analyses and records in the investigations, Commerce
finally ruled that both Poland and Czechoslovakia satisfied the test to be NME countries
and for that reason it was impossible for Commerce to identify or determine subsidies
in such economies.502 As a result, the manufacturers, producers, or exporters in both
countries did not receive bounties or grants, and therefore, all allegations of the
petitioners were denied.
In the same year, there were two other petitions filed by American chemical
companies against potassium chloride products imported from the German Democratic
Republic and the Soviet Union, but Commerce dismissed all petitions and rescinded
the initiations of the related CVD proceedings against these NME countries based on
the same reasoning.503

4.3.1.3. Judicial Decisions
4.3.1.3.1. Continental Steel Corp. v. United States
The inconsistency of Commerce between its preliminary and final decisions in
determining the inapplicability of CVD law to NMEs has fed some entities’ hope to
reverse the outcome by resort to the courts. Petitioners in both the CSWR and potash
cases appealed to the Court of International Trade (“CIT”) for reversal of Commerce’s
NME determination.504
On July 30, 1985, the CIT reversed Commerce’s decisions and held that the
CVD law covers countries with NMEs and that subsidies, which are target of the law,
502
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may be found in NMEs as well as in MEs.505 First, the CIT noted that the basic principle
for determining the scope of a statute is to look first at its language.506 Then, based on
its interpretation of section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the CIT opined
that the language of the law is “perfectly indifferent to forms of economy.”507 Indeed,
it ruled, the law was written to apply to all countries, including both MEs and NMEs.508
However, in its judicial interpretation of the law, Commerce was self-contradictory
from its inception.509 Commerce preliminarily recognized that the law covers “any
country” and did not allow per se exemptions from the law for any political entity.510
Nevertheless, in its final determinations, Commerce looked at different criteria, called
an “additional jurisdictional question,” i.e., whether government activities in an NME
can confer a “bounty or grant” within the meaning of the law.511 According to the CIT,
if this was truly a “jurisdictional” question, a failure to meet the jurisdictional criteria
of the law would indeed deprive Commerce of its authority to enforce the law beyond
the determination of that point. That would amount to a per se exemption from the law
and would conflict with the plain statement that the law covers any country.512
Second, the CIT ruled that it was a fundamental error to conclude that a subsidy
can exist only in a market economy.513 The CIT also disagreed with Commerce’s
definition of a subsidy as one “results in a misallocation of resources, encouraging
inefficient production and lessening world wealth.”514 According to the CIT, a subsidy
in its purest form is the encouragement of exportation by means of some type of special
505
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preference.515 The CIT concluded that subsidies can exist in NMEs, and that Commerce
should find a method to identify and quantify them.516
Third, the CIT also rejected Commerce’s reasoning that Congress aimed to use
the antidumping law and section 406 as alternative trade remedies to deal with unfair
imports from NME countries. The CIT observed that the potent specialized nature of
the countervailing duty law is not affected by the existence of possible alternative
remedies.517
Finally, the CIT ruled that Commerce’s determinations were arbitrary and not
in accordance with the law. Therefore, the final determinations in the CSWR cases
were reversed and the matters were remanded for a determination consistent with CIT’s
opinions.518 The CIT also ordered the resumption of the potassium investigations in the
potash cases.
The CIT’s decision was a big victory for the American steel industry in
particular and for other domestic industries in general, which need a legal security in
their competition against products imported from NME countries. In addition, this
decision stood to stimulate a significant increase in CVD petitions filed against NME
imports.519 However, one of the trade policy concerns was that if Commerce found
significant subsidies, import trade with NMEs could be drastically reduced.520 Further,
it was believed that the imposition of countervailing duties on NME imports could
contravene the efforts of the United States to encourage East-West trade over the
preceding several years.521 It also could have a certain impact on imports from China.
Therefore, the CIT’s decision also left Commerce with a dilemma of how to reconcile
U.S. trade interests and its efforts to identify and quantify the subsidies in NME
515
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countries, where all trading factors are distorted by government intervention and where
all public market-based information and data such as costs and prices are hard to
collect. That seemed to be an impossible mission to Commerce. On September 17,
1985, the government filed its notice of appeal with the court522, which opened another
chance for the NME issue to be reviewed by a higher court (i.e., the U.S. Court of
Appeals for Federal Circuit).

4.3.1.3.2. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States
The appeal of Commerce at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(“CAFC”) and its outcomes were landmark litigation on the applicability of CVD law
to NME countries. On September 18, 1986, the CAFC reversed the CIT’s ruling and
upheld Commerce’s position that the CVD law did not apply to NME countries.523
Initially, based on procedural grounds, the CAFC determined that the CIT had
no jurisdiction over the CSWR cases because Georgetown Steel Corporation, Raritan
River Steel Company, and Atlantic Steel Company (collectively, “Georgetown Steel”)
did not file the summons at the CIT on time.524 For that reason, the CAFC remanded
those cases to the CIT to dismiss Georgetown Steel’s complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.525 As a result, the CAFC reviewed the merits only of the CIT’s reversal of
522
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Commerce’s determination in the potassium cases.526 This decision did not affect the
analysis of NME applicability because Commerce had determined both the CSWR and
the potassium cases based on virtually identical facts and on the same reasonings.527
With respect to the application of CVD law to NME countries, the CAFC
reversed the CIT’s ruling and supported the position of Commerce that the CVD law
does not apply to NMEs. The CAFC’s ruling was based mainly on the following
grounds: (i) the purpose of the CVD law is to prevent unfair competitive advantages,
and such advantages do not result from the imports from NMEs;528 (ii) the nature of
NMEs excludes the existence of subsidies provided by the governments since they
would in effect be subsidizing themselves;529 and (iii) Congress’ choice of the
antidumping duty law to deal with unfair trade practices from NMEs, while remaining
silent on the NME issue in the CVD law.530
First, the CAFC emphasized that the purpose of the CVD law was to “offset the
unfair competitive advantage that foreign producers would otherwise enjoy from export
subsidies paid by their governments.”531 The CAFC was also convinced by Commerce
that “a subsidy (or bounty or grant) is definitionally any action that distorts or subverts
the market process and results in a misallocation of resources, encouraging inefficient
production and lessening world wealth.”532 Basically, the purpose of the CVD law was
to protect American firms from such kind of unfair competition (or so-called trade
distortion) resulting from subsidies to foreign producers that gave them a comparative
advantage they otherwise would not have enjoyed.533
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Second, the CAFC echoed Commerce’s view that in an NME, the government
controls everything from the sales to the pricing determinations and even the terms.534
The CAFC was also in accord with Commerce’s description of the nature of an NME
with the following features: “an environment is riddled with distortions; prices are set
by central planners; losses suffered by production and foreign trade enterprises are
routinely covered by government transfer; investment decisions are controlled by the
state; money and credit are allocated by the central planners; the wage bill is set by the
government; access to foreign currency is restricted; and private ownership is limited
to consumer goods.”535 Hence, the CAFC concluded that the NME government
technically cannot subsidize an entity because this action is actually a “subsidy of
itself.”536 In other words, the purpose of the countervailing duty law (i.e.,
countervailing the trade distortion in a market) is inconsistent with the nature of an
NME (i.e., no market due to the state control of all market forces). The CAFC affirmed
Commerce’s holding that a subsidy has a function of a trade distortion to the market
and, therefore, if no market exists, no subsidy can exist.537
Third, the CAFC observed that section 303, regarding countervailing duty
actions, had remained unchanged since the time of its enactment in 1897.538 The CAFC
observed that at the time of the enactment of the first general countervailing duty
statute, there were no NMEs; therefore, Congress had no occasion to address the NME
issue.539 Since 1897, Congress had reenacted section 303 six times, without making
any significant changes to the NME issue.540 Further, the CAFC reasoned that
Congress’s actions in dealing with the problem of NME imports were embodied in
534
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other statutory provisions. In particular, the CAFC noted that Congress amended the
antidumping law by enactment of the Trade Act of 1974 to deal specifically with
imports from NMEs541 and especially by approving for a special “surrogate country”
method for determining whether NME imports were being “dumped” in the United
States.542 Nevertheless, when amending the CVD law under section 331 of the Tariff
Act of 1974, Congress did not change its scope to cover NME countries.543 Again, in
the enactment of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (“1979 TAA”), Congress reenacted
the special surrogate country method in antidumping investigations against statecontrolled economies, but Congress continued its silence on the NME applicability
issue in the CVD law.544 In addition, the purpose of enactment of the 1979 TAA was
to implement the GATT Subsidies Code,545 which permitted signatory countries to levy
either antidumping duty or countervailing duty against an NME by using “surrogate
country” pricing.546 While the CIT’s rationale was that Congress’s approval of the
Subsidies Code evidenced an intent that the CVD law apply to state-controlled
economies,547 the CAFC rejected such a conclusion, stating that it was a non
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sequitur.548 The CAFC reasoned that the Subsidies Code merely provides the method
for determining the existence of a subsidy, and leaves it to each country to determine
the particular method it would use to deal with the NME problem through either
antidumping duty or countervailing duty legislation. Therefore, the CAFC held that in
the United States, Congress chose to deal with that problem under the antidumping law
and not under the CVD law.549 Based on such reasoning, the CAFC found that the
inaction and silence of Congress was clear evidence that the CVD law did not apply to
state-controlled economies or nonmarket economies.550
In addition to the above rationale, it is important to note that the CAFC followed
the holding of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in United States v. Zenith
Radio Corp.,551 which was that Commerce has broad discretion in determining the
existence of a “bounty” or “grant” under the CVD law. The CAFC also reaffirmed that
Commerce’s conclusion that the benefits the Soviet Union and the German Democratic
Republic provided for the export of potash to the United States were not bounties or
grants was reasonable, in accordance with the law, and not an abuse of discretion.552
Another critical point should be noted from the CAFC’s opinion: Congress designed
the antidumping law to protect the American industry from injury resulting from the
sale in the United States of foreign merchandise that is priced below its fair value, and
Congress provided the related remedy. However, if that remedy was inadequate to
protect American industry from such foreign competition, then it is up to Congress to
provide any additional remedies it deems appropriate.553 This comment reminded the
government that the CVD law could be changed to combat imports from NME
countries.
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4.3.2. Applicability of CVD Law to Nonmarket Economies
4.3.2.1. Impact of the Georgetown Steel Case
The 1986 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed
Commerce’s discretion not to apply CVD law to NME countries. That decision
supports the first school of thought that subsidies cannot be found in NMEs due to the
market distortions caused by the government control. It clearly upholds the theory that
government intervention in an NME is so pervasive that meaningful comparisons
between subsidized and market-determined prices are impossible. Technically, the
outcome of Georgetown Steel Case did confirm that subsidies can be found and
measured only in ME countries, where commercial standards exist for Commerce to
rely on to calculate the countervailing duties. Nevertheless, these conceptual opinions
are still controversial and completely contrary to the second school of thought that CVD
actions can be taken against both ME and NME countries. Specifically, the CIT
supported the American industries’ view that the difficulties of the CVD law are not
those of meaning, but rather the problems of measurement, and it is the responsibility
of Commerce to detect and calculate the subsidies regardless of the form of the
economy.
From the perspective of the American industry, the Georgetown Steel Case was
not an end to their fight against unfair trade practices such as subsidies from NME
countries. In the long run, it could not stop the American industries from seeking an
effective methodology in the CVD law to mitigate against the subsidies implicit in the
products entering the United States market. That is also the purpose of the CVD law,
that such unfair benefits must be countervailed to level the playing field between the
domestic and foreign producers. Congress had bolstered the antidumping law, which is
equipped with special methodologies to protect American industries from sale below
fair value of the goods imported from NME countries. The CAFC opinion signaled that
if the American industries felt they were not fully protected by the antidumping law,
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they needed to seek support in Congress to change the CVD law to apply it to NME
countries.
From the perspective of the administrative authorities or practitioners, the
CAFC’s decision should be read in a narrower context. It was assumed that the CAFC
did not clearly hold that countervailing duties are never applicable to NME products.554
Instead, that decision may be read in the context of the particular subsidies that the
CAFC analyzed in the potash cases.555 This assumption could also help the American
industries and Commerce in distinguishing between the Georgetown Steel Case and
other alleged subsidies on subsequent NME products entering the domestic market.
Further, from the CAFC’s decision, it could be understood that the trade policy is a
discretionary process. That process is subject to the intent of the legislators and the
executive administration to structure it in an effective way to best protect the American
industries. As a matter of fact, the Georgetown Steel Case sent an important message
to the United States Congress that the trade laws applicable to NMEs should be
modified or changed to adapt with the continuously changing realities. As a result, the
CAFC’s decision triggered a lot of congressional actions to amend the CVD law to
apply it to imports from NME countries. In 1987, several bills were introduced in
Congress to invalidate Georgetown Steel Case and apply the CVD law against NME
countries.556 One of the remarkable efforts in this year was section 157 of the 1987
Trade Bill.557 Section 157 provided for the application of the CVD law to NME
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countries to the extent that a subsidy can reasonably be identified and measured by
Commerce.558 Although this provision was passed by the House, it was not included in
the Senate version in the final stages of the conference committee.559 In the same year,
there were other efforts to apply CVD law to imports from state-controlled economies,
but all were unsuccessful.560 Thereafter, there were many attempts to address the
application of CVD law to NMEs since 1993 to 2005, but all proposed bills were again
unsuccessful.561
In 2007, there was a large number of bills that were introduced in the 110th
Congress that sought to apply the CVD law to NME countries.562 Some of the bills
were proposed to direct the administrative authorities to apply CVD laws to NMEs;
some aggressively proposed a China-specific alternative methodology for determining
the amount of subsidy if special difficulties were found.563 These law-making efforts
were influenced not only by the Georgetown Steel Case, but also by a surge of imports
from emerging NME countries such as China, as motivated by its global integration
and economic reforms. Especially after its WTO accession in 2001, China had rapidly
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boosted its trade relationship with the United States. Among other bills, H.R. 1229, the
Nonmarket Economy Trade Remedy Act of 2007, was introduced by Artur Davis and
Phil English on February 28, 2007, trying to change the CVD law to apply to NME
countries, especially targeting China.564 According to the sponsors of H.R. 1229, China
was the most commercially significant NME country.565 In 2006, the United States
trade deficit with China was $232 billions, reflecting a 177% increase since 2000;
meanwhile, the worldwide trade surplus of China also rapidly increased.566 According
to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the United States and China’s total trade,
which was only $5 billion in 1980, rose to $387 billion in 2007.567 The second reason
that triggered the legislators’ alert on China was its long-overdue notification to the
WTO of 70 subsidy programs, which it made in 2006 after much urging by the United
States.568 Thus, the impact of the Georgetown Steel Case and the subsequent actions
by congressmen greatly contributed to Commerce’s decision to change of its
longstanding policy of not applying CVD rules to NME countries. In 2006, Commerce
officially initiated a CVD case against China as an NME country and continued with
other investigations in subsequent years. This change of direction was also influenced
by Commerce’s awareness of the economic transformation in NME countries.
Before analyzing these related countervailing duty cases against China, it is
important to explore the nature of transition economies and their impact upon
Commerce’s recognition in applying the CVD law to these nations.
564
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China notified the WTO of its subsidy programs in 2006, several years after the due date. According to
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December 11, 2006 [hereinafter USTR Report 2006], at 42.
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4.3.2.2. Impact of Transition Economies
The aspiration to grow and integrate into the global trading system has
motivated nonmarket economy countries to transform their economic systems to
become market economy countries or at least to operate on market principles. However,
the transformation of an existing nonmarket economy to a market economy or a marketoriented economy takes many years or even decades. Furthermore, the degree and
feasibility of economic reform in each country is also subject to the political system it
is pursuing. Such economic transformation was broadly implemented after the
dissolution of the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s.569 The reunification of East
and West Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 was also a
fundamental motivation for a wave of economic reforms in Eastern Europe.570 During
1989 and 1990, NME countries such as Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and
Hungary started to accelerate their economic reform efforts.571 As a leading
representative for NME countries in Asia, China initiated a comprehensive reshaping
of its economy beginning in 1978.572 However, it was not until 1992 that China made
it clear that it was to pursue a socialist market economy.573 Vietnam initiated its
economic renovation in 1986 with the objective of transition to a socialist marketoriented economy. Since then, transition to a market economy has been considered as
a main target and basic feature for almost all centrally planned economies, including
independent states from the former Soviet Union, Eastern European, and Asian
socialist countries.574
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Although the United States has supported transitions to market economies,575
one of the critical concerns of Congress and the administrative authorities is how to
deal with imports from these transition economies effectively under the domestic trade
laws such as antidumping and countervailing duty laws. As discussed in section 4.2 of
this Chapter, Congress did amend the antidumping law to incorporate new provisions
for NME countries within the 1988 OTCA.576 This Act defined the term “nonmarket
economy” and set forth the standards to determine whether a country has a nonmarket
economy for the application of the antidumping law.577 However, since this Act’s
enactment, Commerce has encountered difficulties in dealing with the market reforms
in NME countries. One of the difficulties is that each NME country, subject to its
particular social, political, and economic situation, may pursue market reforms with
varying degrees and toward various forms of market economies.578 Hence, it is a great
challenge for Commerce to cope with NMEs in transition by application of the outdated
NME provisions of the 1988 OTCA.579 On the other hand, the countervailing duty law
could not help to resolve such challenges itself because it was determined not to be
applicable to NME countries in the Georgetown Steel Case. As discussed in
Georgetown Steel Case, the determination of the CVD law’s inapplicability to NMEs
is based on the logic that subsidies have no meaning outside the context of marketbased economic systems. However, when a reforming NME begins to exhibit elements
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of both market and nonmarket economies, it becomes more difficult to justify that
inapplicability policy.580

4.3.2.3. U.S. Trade with Transition Economies
In 1980, two significant commercial developments affected economic relations
between the United States and the NME countries: the imposition of trade sanctions
against the U.S.S.R. and the normalization of commercial relations with China.581 Both
contributed greatly to changes in the pattern of U.S. trade with the NMEs. In that year,
the level of trade between the United States and NME countries rose very slightly.
Noticeably, China replaced the U.S.S.R. both as the most important NME buyer of U.S.
exports and as the principal NME supplier of U.S. imports.582 However, trade between
the United States and NMEs during that year slowed down because of the U.S.S.R.
sanctions. In particular, U.S. exports to NMEs increased by only 2.5 percent, from $8.2
billion in 1979 to $8.4 billion in 1980.583 On the other hand, U.S. imports from NMEs
increased by only 2.8 percent.584 However, imports from China occupied over a third
of total U.S. imports from NMEs.585
In the following years, China continued to dominate trends in U.S. and NME
trade. Specifically, in 1984, the two-way trade increased 43.3 percent, from $8.6 billion
in 1983 to $12.4 billion in 1984.586 U.S. exports to NMEs increased by 41.8 percent,
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from $5.1 billion in 1983 to $7.2 billion in 1984.587 U.S. imports from NMEs also
increased by 45.4 percent from $3.6 billion in 1983 to $5.2 billion in 1984.588
During the 1990s, the movement of market reforms in NME countries and their
deeper integration with the world’s economy significantly boosted two-way trade.
Remarkably, U.S. trade with NME countries more than doubled, setting a record level
of $26.3 billion by 1990.589 However, the trade balance between the United States and
NMEs reversed course. Although U.S. exports to NMEs declined by 18.6 percent, U.S.
imports from these countries grew by 25.0 percent, marking their eighth consecutive
year of expansion.590 As a result, the U.S. deficit in trade with NMEs nearly tripled
from $2.8 billion during 1989, the previous annual record, to $8.3 billion during
1990.591
Based on the data, it was claimed that trade with China was largely responsible
for the U.S. trade deficit with NMEs.592 In particular, U.S. imports from China
expanded by 27.5 percent, from $11.9 billion during 1989 to $15.1 billion during
1990.593 In contrast, U.S. exports to China decreased by 17.3 percent, from $5.8 billion
during 1989 to $4.8 billion during 1990.594 As a result, the U.S. deficit in trade with
China increased by 70 percent to $10.3 billion, reaching a new record level for the sixth
consecutive year.595 The U.S. deficit in trade with China continued to rise in the
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following years, to $12.6 billion in 1991,596 $18.2 billion in 1992597, and $22.8 billion
in 1993.598 More importantly, China’s share of total NME exports to the United States
rapidly jumped from 87.2% in 1990599 to 95.3% in 1991, 96% in 1992, and 93.1% in
1993.600
The above analysis of the trade data shows the undeniable role of transition
economies in trade development with the United States. Both sides need mutual trade
cooperation to reach their own goals for economic development and global trade
integration. In principle, promoting trade exports is essential, but the mission of
protecting each side’s domestic industries must be always ensured. Needless to say,
when the U.S. trade deficit with China started to rise rapidly from early 1990s, as
reported by the ITC, imports from China were noticed more, and then U.S. trade laws
were primed for two objectives: to protect the American industry and to balance the
level of trade deficit between the two countries.
The impact of Georgetown Steel Case, the economic transformation of NME
countries, and their rapidly increasing imports into the United States market have
forced Commerce to develop new approaches in antidumping investigations and to try
to test such approaches in CVD proceedings applied to NMEs in transition. Since
Congress did not provide any statutory guidance on dealing with transition economies
during this timeline, Commerce has made use of its broad discretionary power to
develop such approaches for administering the antidumping and countervailing duty
laws in a series of cases involving dumped and subsidized imports from China.601 The
next sections will examine several AD and CVD cases to elaborate on how Commerce
596
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applies the antidumping and countervailing duty laws to cope with the challenges posed
by China as an NME in transition.

4.3.2.4. Changes to the Department of Commerce's Approach to NMEs
4.3.2.4.1. Changes in Antidumping Investigations
Like the CVD law, the antidumping duty law is a remedial measure that
provides relief to American industries harmed by unfair trade practices (i.e., dumping
and subsidization). The antidumping duties are imposed if the two following conditions
are met: (1) Commerce determines that the foreign goods are sold in the United States
at “less than fair value” (LTFV) and (2) the International Trade Commission concludes
that American industries are either injured or threatened to be injured by reason of
imports of such foreign goods.602 This bifurcated statutory process has been unchanged
since the amendment of the Tariff Act of 1930 in 1974 up to now. In an antidumping
investigation, to determine whether the foreign goods are sold at LTFV, Commerce is
required to compare the U.S. price of the merchandise under investigation (or the
subject merchandise) with its “foreign market value” (FMV). After such comparison,
if the FMV exceeds the U.S. price (i.e., there is a positive dumping margin), Commerce
will determine the antidumping duty to be an amount equal to that positive dumping
margin. Otherwise, if the dumping margin is negative, it means there is no LTFV sale
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Section 731 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended in 1979 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673). Section
731 provides:
“If—
(1) the administering authority determines that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is
likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair value, and
(2) the Commission determines that—
(A) an industry in the United States—
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded,
by reason of imports of that merchandise,
then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise an antidumping duty, in addition to any other duty
imposed, in an amount equal to the amount by which the foreign market value exceeds the United States
price for the merchandise.”
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or no occurrence of dumping. However, it is complicated to determine the FMV of the
subject merchandise in an NME country. The methodology used to calculate the FMV
in a standard case (i.e., in a market economy) is different from that of an NME case. In
an ME case, in order to calculate the FMV, Commerce simply uses the prices in the
producer’s home market or in third countries (if there were no home-market sales) or
uses constructed values (where there were no sales in the home market and no sales to
third countries).603 However, if Commerce finds that the exporting country of the
subject merchandise is a state-controlled economy (SCE)604 or NME, it will use a
radically different methodology to calculate the FMV. This NME methodology would
be used because the sales prices or costs in the home (exporting) market of an NME
country are unreliable due to government controls. Alternatively, Commerce would use
the prices or costs collected from producers in a non-SCE or ME to calculate the
FMV.605 The reasons that Commerce does not trust the home-market prices or costs in
an NME are understandable. At least in a pure state-controlled or command economy,
inputs and outputs are centrally planned and prices are distorted and not determined by
supply and demand.606 Basically, such prices do not support a comparison between the
U.S. price and the NME’s sales price.607 Further, the NME’s nonconvertible currency
makes it difficult for Commerce to calculate the dumping margin on a U.S. dollar
basis.608 Therefore, to cope with such difficulties in an NME case, Commerce normally
uses the NME methodologies including a surrogate ME country, constructed value, and
factors of production to calculate the FMV.609
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In Electric Golf Cars from Poland610, imported golf cars manufactured in
Poland were determined to be sold at LTFV. During this time period, Poland was
regarded as an SCE, and the Treasury Department611 used the NME methodology to
calculate the fair price of the Polish golf cars. Specifically, it was found that golf cars
were manufactured in Poland solely for export to the United States market.612 During
that time, there were neither home market sales nor sales to other foreign countries.613
In its fair value investigation, the Treasury Department initially calculated the FMV of
the Polish golf cars based on the home-market prices of an obscure Canadian producer
which sold small quantities of similar factory-use cars.614 Later, the Canadian producer
went out of business in 1975, leaving the United States as the only other major producer
of golf cars.615 Given a lack of pricing data from any other foreign manufacturers, the
Treasury Department announced its intention to use the domestic prices of United
States manufacturers to calculate the FMV of the Polish golf cars.616 However, the
unfairness of such an approach plus oppositions from both Polish trade representatives
and from domestic industry “catalyzed a rethinking” within the Treasury
Department.617 In late 1977, in order to avoid using the U.S. prices or costs for its fairvalue investigation, the Treasury Department developed a “constructed value”
methodology to calculate the Polish cars’ FMV.618 This novel methodology constructed
a fair value that was based on the Polish producers’ factors of production (inputs such
as labor, raw materials, administrative and selling expenses, etc.) valued at prices found
610
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in Spain, which was a non-SCE country comparable to Poland in its level of economic
development.619 The Treasury Department formally proposed this approach as a
regulation in 1978.620 Despite critical comments and opposition from many interested
parties, this proposed regulation was ultimately adopted in the Treasury Department’s
Final Rule in 1978.621 It should be noted that the approach of “factors of production”
was used to supplement, not supplant, the surrogate country methodology.622 It
provided for a means to establish fair value in cases where the like product for the NME
merchandise under investigation was not manufactured in a market economy other than
the United States.623 However, because of congressional skepticism of the Treasury
Department’s 1978 Regulation, when Congress enacted the Trade Agreements Act of
1979, the newly adopted factors of production approach was not incorporated in the
amended antidumping law.624 This NME approach was, however, utilized in the
majority of antidumping investigations against NME countries after Commerce
assumed responsibility from the Treasury Department in 1980.625
In Natural Menthol from the People’s Republic of China in 1981, Commerce
continued to use the above-mentioned NME methodology and, for the first time,
declared that China was an SCE.626 The overriding issue in the preliminary stage of the
case was that Commerce had to determine whether China was state-controlled “to an
extent that sales or offers of sales of [menthol in PRC] or to countries other than the
United States do not permit a determination of foreign market value”627 by normal
standards. Since this case was investigated within the legal framework of the Tariff Act

619

Bello et al. (1992), supra note 477, at 675.
Antidumping: Proposed Amendments Pertaining to Merchandise from State-Controlled-Economy
Countries, 43 FR 1356 (January 9, 1978).
621
The Treasury Department’s 1978 Regulation, supra note 609.
622
Bello et al. (1992), supra note 477, at 676.
623
Id.
624
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, supra note 123; See Horlick & Shuman (1984), supra note at 59,
at 813.
625
Kabik (1992), supra note 614, at 362.
626
Natural Menthol from the People’s Republic of China; Antidumping: Preliminary Determination of
Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Suspension of Liquidation, 46 FR 3258 (January 14, 1981) [hereinafter
Natural Menthol Prelim].
627
Section 773(c), Tariff Act of 1930, as amended in 1979 (codified at 19 U.S.C. 1677b(c)).
620

116

of 1930, as amended in 1979, Commerce had yet no statutory criteria to define a
nonmarket economy. Commerce realized this case was “extraordinarily complicated
because it presents the novel issue of the extent of state controls in PRC.”628 To come
to its conclusion, Commerce examined the degree of control exercised by the state over
China’s economy generally and the impact of state control on the production and sale
of menthol.629 Commerce found considerable control by the Chinese government over
the composition of inputs and the distribution of outputs.630 Further, it was found that
the pervasiveness of state planning and control of major agricultural products
substantially limited the autonomy of production units and distorted the incentives that
would be developed by a freely operating market.631 Commerce came to such findings
based on the operating principles of a market economy where there is free from
government planning and the production and sale is directed by the supply and demand.
In the final determination, Commerce sustained the preliminary conclusion that
China’s economy is state-controlled both generally and in the agricultural sector.632
Since China was determined to be an SCE, Commerce did not use the home market
and export prices of menthol in China to calculate the FMV. Instead, Commerce
selected Paraguay as a non-SCE surrogate country to calculate the FMV.633 In this case,
it should be noted that Commerce started to pay attention to certain economic reforms
in China. In particular, Commerce indicated that a number of reforms had been
introduced to give greater play to market forces, but at the time of investigation
believed that such reforms “seem[ed] to us as too new and too limited to have altered
the fundamental nature of the PRC’s economy and its effects on the production of
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menthol.”634 This remark shows Commerce’s potential for reconsideration of the
application of its NME approach to transitional economies. It also implies that if certain
industries within an SCE or NME were able to operate on market forces or had
autonomy in pricing and production making decisions, such industries might be entitled
to a normal dumping methodology. This is particularly notable because countries that
are currently plagued by the negative effects of an NME determination could consider
proposing that Commerce adopt such a tailored approach in a countervailing duty case,
assuming Commerce remained unwilling to revoke the NME determination entirely.
4.3.2.4.1.1. “Mix and Match” or “Bubbles of Capitalism” Approach
Following the Natural Menthol case, from 1982 to 1990, the Department of
Commerce initiated 23 antidumping investigations against China.635 For most of the
cases, in analyzing whether China’s economy was state-controlled, Commerce
examined key factors such as government control over the ownership of the means of
production, allocation of resources or inputs and outputs; government control over
trade; and the foreign currency’s convertibility.636 Although significant economic
reforms in China were noticed during this period, Commerce still viewed China as an
SCE because of the fact that the Chinese government still controlled the business
sectors’ prices and levels of production at both local and provincial levels, and because
the Chinese government still owned most of the assets in the economy637.
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More notably, in a series of antidumping cases initiated in the 1990s, Commerce
attempted to adopt new NME methodologies to cope with the reality of the economic
reforms in China.
First, in Sparklers from China, initiated in July 1990,638 Commerce used the
“factors of production” (FOP) methodology, which was formally supplemented in the
antidumping statute by the 1988 OTCA.639 The statute requires Commerce to determine
the FMV based on the market valuation of the factors of production utilized in
producing the subject merchandise (unless Commerce determines the available
information on factor prices in market economies to be inadequate).640 Furthermore,
Commerce was permitted to value the FOP in one or more ME countries that are at a
level of economic development comparable to that of the NME and that are significant
producers of comparable merchandise.641 In this investigation, China’s economy was
continually regarded as a nonmarket economy. However, in its FMV calculation,
Commerce accepted the value for one factor on the actual price paid by a Chinese
producer for an input that was imported from a country with a market economy.642
Second, in the other two landmark antidumping investigations initiated in the
same year, Commerce showed progressive signs of flexibility in its adoption of NME
methodologies by developing a new approach known as “mix and match” or “bubbles
of capitalism.” Specifically, in Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans (Fans) from China,
initiated in November 1990,643 a large number of Chinese producers raised a variety of
novel methodological issues for Commerce to take into serious consideration. The
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respondents in this case asserted that although the Fans sector was operating within an
NME country, it was sufficiently free of state control to allow calculation of FMV
based on ME methodologies.644 In Chrome-plated Lug Nuts (Lug Nuts) from China,645
initiated two days after the Fans case, the Chinese manufacturers similarly claimed that
the chrome-plated nut industry was sufficiently market-oriented to permit Commerce
to determine FMV based on ME methodologies.646 In both cases, the Chinese producers
did not challenge the designation of China’s economy as an NME from a
macroeconomic perspective, but they requested use of the ME methodologies to
calculate the FMV of the subject merchandise. Such assertions caused Commerce to
seriously consider changing its NME methodologies. However, the applicable
antidumping law at the time did not give Commerce any clear interpretation or
guidance in applying the law to NMEs in transition. In fact, when enacting the 1988
OTCA, Congress gave no specific statutory instructions on how to determine when the
exporting country’s prices were market oriented and sufficiently free from the value
distortions caused by central planning.647 To overcome this obstacle, according to
Commerce, its task was to determine dispositive congressional intent by projecting (as
well as it could) how Congress would have dealt with this particular situation if
Congress had spoken.648 Consequently, in the Prelim Fans, Commerce developed a
“mix and match” methodology that was more flexible than the antidumping law
required.
In the preliminary investigation stage, in consideration of the Chinese
producers’ claims, Commerce started to examine how any industrial sector or
commercial entity in an NME could be said to be operating on market principles such
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that costs and prices were acceptable, reliable measures of FMV.649 After its
examination, Commerce concluded that absent a showing that all costs and prices were
market-oriented, FMV in an NME must be based on the FOP methodology, using
appropriate surrogate values to provide prices for factor input costs that were not
market-determined.650 That means in order to be eligible for the complete ME
methodology (i.e., using market values instead of surrogate values for factors of
production in FMV calculations), it is required that 100 percent of the producers’ costs
and prices for all inputs be purchased at market-determined prices.651 Nevertheless,
Commerce provided that if a company in an NME is able to establish that inputs are
purchased at market-oriented prices or from market economies, such prices are
accepted for the purpose of an FOP analysis.652 In addition, Commerce promised that
if the cost of inputs sourced in China, including materials, labor, water, electricity, and
rent, are valued on the basis of market principles, Commerce may substitute those
market values for surrogate country values in individual firm calculations.653
In Lug Nuts AD Prelim, which was issued before Fans AD Prelim, in response
to the Chinese producers’ request to use the ME methodologies to calculate the FMV,
Commerce stated that it did not have sufficient information to determine whether the
steel and chemical producers operated in a market environment.654 Thus, Commerce
did not base the FMV on input prices in China, but based on the surrogate values from
Pakistan as n surrogate ME country.655 Consequently, the dumping margin was
preliminarily calculated at 66.49%.656 Thereafter, based on analysis drawn from the
Fans AD Prelim, Commerce dropped the dumping margin from 66.49% to 4.24%.657
This huge drop is resulted from Commerce’s flexibility in adoption of the “mix and
649
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match” or “bubbles of capitalism” approach.658 Initially, Commerce acknowledged the
existence of a “bubble of capitalism” in an otherwise NME country, but it expressed
skepticism whether such a “bubble of capitalism” actually does or is likely to exist.659
Commerce explained that to find a “bubble of capitalism” and to treat the NME
producer as if it were an ME producer despite the fact that the economy in which it
operates is nonmarket, it must be persuaded that all prices and costs faced by the
individual producer are market determined.660 This means the “bubbles of capitalism”
test is passed only where the prices or costs of 100% inputs into the production of the
subject merchandise are market-driven. In such a situation, Commerce is willing to use
the reported NME input prices rather than surrogate ME values in determining the FMV
of the subject merchandise.661 However, this test does not work in practice because
even if almost all of the factors of production were found to be market driven, it is
impossible to find an industry completely insulated from nonmarket influences.662
Although Commerce could not find that all input costs were market-driven, it
recognized that “for certain inputs into the production process, market forces may be
at work.”663 In those situations where inputs are imported from ME suppliers and where
locally sourced goods are based on market forces, the prices of such inputs are actually
market-driven prices and they reflect the producer’s actual experience.664 Therefore,
Commerce believed that “it is appropriate to use those prices in lieu of values of a
surrogate, market-economy producer.”665 Eventually, although Commerce declined to
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find that the entire industry was 100% market oriented for using the complete ME
methodology, it started to realize that this “all-or-nothing” test was not appropriate for
evaluating the market orientations for reforming NME producers.666 Then, it added a
second “mini-bubble” test (also known as a “mix and match” approach), under which
the factor inputs sourced within an NME were considered market-driven if they were
shown to be free of direct or overt central government influence.667 Using this new
methodology, Commerce found that the prices paid for steel and chemicals used as
factor inputs in the production of chrome-plated lug nuts were market-driven.668
Consequently, Commerce decided to include the actual prices of these market-based
inputs in the FOP analysis.669 The intent of Commerce was to enhance “accuracy,
fairness, and predictability” in the circumstances where an NME producer’s factor
input prices are market determined.670 At the time of this landmark decision, Lug Nuts
appeared to be the only case where the factor inputs sourced within an NME country
could be used to calculate the FMV under the FOP approach.671
Following the Lug Nuts AD Final, a month later Commerce made its final
determination on the Fans case.672 However, the respondents in this case did not
provide sufficient information to prove that the prices of locally sourced inputs were
market-driven.673 Therefore, in its FMV calculation of such factor inputs, Commerce
valued each individual producer’s reported FOP using surrogate values from Pakistan
(as the most comparable surrogate) and India (as an acceptable alternative).674 With
respect to the factor inputs that were purchased from ME countries such as Japan, the
United States, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, Commerce used these actual market-based
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prices to calculate the FMV.675 Accordingly, instead of relying solely on surrogate
country values from Pakistan and India, by using the “mix and match” methodology,
Commerce also based its calculations on prices paid by Chinese manufacturers for
those raw materials imported from ME countries.676 As a result, the final dumping
margins were calculated at zero to 0.79 percent for oscillating fans and zero to 2.47
percent for ceiling fans.677
Not long after the release of Lug Nuts AD Final, the Lug Nuts petitioner,
Consolidated International Automotive, Inc. (Consolidated), initiated a civil action
challenging Commerce’s “bubbles of capitalism” methodology.678 The Fans petitioner,
Lasko Metal Products, Inc. (Lasko), also appealed the “mix and match” methodology
to the CIT.679 On the other hand, having recognized the possibility of treating an
industry as a “bubbles of capitalism,” both petitioners also filed countervailing duty
petitions.680 In fact, once Commerce opened the door to determining that the industries
of fans and lug nuts are market-oriented industries, the petitioners shifted their position
taken in the antidumping proceedings to argue that these industries were marketoriented, and therefore, should be investigated under the CVD law.681 Unexpectedly,
Commerce’s initial good faith in adding “accuracy, fairness, and predictability” to the
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NME methodologies created unintended outcomes that the market-driven industries in
an NME in transition are now “potentially vulnerable to attack” under the CVD law.682
Facing such a dilemma, on January 4, 1992, the government filed a motion to
remand the civil action by Consolidated so that Commerce could reconsider its new
methodologies in Final Lug Nuts.683 In its reexamination of the “bubbles of capitalism”
and “mix and match” methodologies, Commerce admitted that its prior “scope of
inquiry was too narrow” and that “the absence of explicit government involvement in
these transactions is not sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the prices for these
inputs are market-driven.”684 Instead of focusing on individual transaction prices,
Commerce turned to a broader examination of economic conditions in each industry
that supplied raw materials as inputs into the production of lug nuts.685 This method of
analysis was called “market-oriented industry” (MOI) test, which had been developed
during the antidumping proceeding of the Sulfanilic Acid case.686
Two days after the publication of Prelim Sulfanilic Acid, on March 20, 1992,
Commerce filed the remand determination with the CIT.687 By using the new MOI test,
Commerce reversed its position and declined to apply the “mix and match”
methodology for raw materials locally sourced within an NME in the Lug Nuts AD
Final. Accordingly, Commerce found that the prices paid for a significant input (i.e.,
steel) were not market-determined prices because of the extent of state-required
production of that input.688 Consequently, Commerce revalued the steel and chemical
inputs used in the production of the subject merchandise based on surrogate values in
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Pakistan.689 With this method of analysis, the antidumping duty rate was substantially
increased from 4.24% in the Lug Nuts AD Final to 42.42%.690

4.3.2.4.1.2. “Market-Oriented Industry” Approach
The “mix and match” approach had been tested for a couple of months and then
it was abandoned and replaced by the “market-oriented industry” (“MOI”) approach.
In Sulfanilic Acid, despite the fact that China was still treated as an NME, the Chinese
respondents claimed that certain inputs in the production of sulfanilic acid were market
driven.691 This case was a chance for Commerce to reconsider the appropriateness of
the specific approach established in Lug Nuts and Fans antidumping cases. As a result
of this reconsideration, Commerce developed stricter criteria for determining whether
an NME producer operates within an MOI in the NME. Specifically, to be qualified as
an MOI, the following three criteria must be met:
(1) There must be virtually no government involvement in setting prices.
(2) The industry should be characterized by private or collective ownership and
a lack of substantial state ownership.
(3) Market-determined prices must be paid for all significant inputs (whether
material or non-material).692
Under this strict MOI test, if any of the above criteria are not met, the producers
of the subject merchandise will be treated as NME producers, and then the FMV will
be calculated by using prices and costs from a surrogate country.693 In other words, if
this MOI test is failed, Commerce does not accept to evaluate whether individual inputs
used by the producer were sourced from within the NME based on the market
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principles. In essence, it is unlikely that 100% of the inputs sourced in an NME are
entirely driven by the market principles, unless all inputs used for the production of the
subject merchandise are imported from ME countries.694 In Sulfanilic Acid Prelim,
Commerce determined that there was insufficient “documentary evidence” to
overcome the presumption that the inputs used by the sulfanilic acid producers that
were sourced in China had not been purchased at market prices.695 Therefore,
Commerce determined the FMV on the basis of factors of production utilized in
producing sulfanilic acid, as valued in a surrogate country.696 However, the Chinese
producers in this investigation claimed that all of the manufacturers’ material and nonmaterial inputs used to produce sulfanilic acid were purchased at market-driven
prices.697 In Sulfanilic Acid Final, Commerce found that aniline, which is a significant
material input used to produce sulfanilic acid, is subject to state-required production.698
At the verification stage, Commerce requested but did not receive quantifiable data
from the Chinese government to evaluate the extent of state-required production of the
aniline input.699 Therefore, Commerce did not have sufficient information to evaluate
whether or not aniline prices were market-determined in China.700 Consequently,
applying the strict MOI test, Commerce concluded that once a significant material input
may not be purchased at market-determined prices, it does not need to consider (1)
whether the prices of other material or non-material inputs are market-determined; (2)
whether there is state-required production of the subject merchandise; or (3) whether
there is substantial state ownership in the sulfanilic acid industry.701 When Commerce
used this “all-or-nothing” approach to replace the “mix and match” approach
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previously used in the Fans and Lug Nut cases, it was unlikely that any producers
within an NME would pass the 100% MOI test.
This new MOIT test has been also used as a basis for determining whether it
could apply CVD law to the Chinese producers in Fans CVD case. This CVD case will
be discussed in detail in the next section.
4.3.2.4.2. Testing of MOI Approach in the Fans CVD Case
As discussed above, the likely existence of a “bubble of capitalism” within the
NME had seeded a glimmer of hope in the United States industries to overturn
Commerce’s longstanding position of not applying the CVD law to NME countries
following the Georgetown Steel case. In the CVD petition filed by the United States
industry producing oscillating fans and ceiling fans (collectively, “Fans”) on October
17, 1991, the Petitioner alleged that manufacturers, producers or exporters
(collectively, “Respondents”) in China received bounties or grants within the meaning
of section 303 of the CVD law.702 The Petitioner further alleged that regardless of
China’s NME status, the Fans industry operated substantially pursuant to market
principles and that the CVD law should apply.703 Therefore, Commerce was required
to determine (1) whether the Fans industry does, in fact, operate in a market setting;
and (2) if so, whether the CVD law could be applied to that industry.704
It was the first time since the Georgetown Steel case in 1986 that the
applicability of the CVD law was raised in a proceeding. At this time, however, the
issue in consideration was to determine whether the CVD law could be applied to
market-oriented industries within an NME country. In other words, Commerce needed
to decide whether an individual industry could actually operate in the marketplace free
from government control and whether all of the producers’ prices and costs of
production in that industry were based purely on principles of supply and demand

702

Fans CVD Initiation, supra note 681.
Id.
704
Id.
703

128

determined by the market. That mission required Commerce to adopt the MOI test that
was developed in the Sulfanilic Acid antidumping case. In its CVD preliminary
investigation, Commerce reaffirmed that, by adopting the MOI test, if the Fans industry
in China was found to be an MOI, the prices and costs to the Chinese producers would
be considered accurate measures of value.705 In particular, Commerce stated that the
concerns of Georgetown Steel case did not arise if NME prices and costs were marketdetermined and not significantly influenced or distorted by central government
planning.706 In such a situation, Commerce is free to apply the CVD law to an MOI
located within an NME.707
After using the MOI test, Commerce preliminarily concluded that (1) the price
of at least one significant input (i.e., steel) was not market-determined, (2) the record
did not support a finding that the prices of other significant inputs were marketdetermined, and (3) the record did not support a finding that market-determined prices
were paid for all but an insignificant proportion of all the inputs accounting for the total
value of the subject merchandise.708 Therefore, Commerce preliminarily determined
that the CVD law could not be applied to the Chinese Fans producers.709 Finally, after
verification of the data and records submitted by the Respondents, Commerce
determined that the Fans industry in China does not meet the third criterion of the MOI
test710 (i.e., market-determined prices must be paid for all significant material and nonmaterial inputs).711 Since the Respondents failed this “all-or-nothing” test, it was
concluded that the Fans industry was not an MOI; as a result, the CVD law could not
be applied to the Fans industry.712 In a similar Lug Nuts CVD case, when using the
MOI test to examine the lug nuts industry in China, Commerce also found that a
705
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significant input (i.e., steel) was not purchased at a market-determined price because
of the extent of state-required production of that input.713 In that case, the third of the
MOI criteria was also not satisfied; and consequently, consistent with its
redetermination in the Amended Lug Nuts AD Final, Commerce rescinded the Lug
Nuts CVD Initiation without further investigations.714
The MOI approach, which is much more restrictive than the “bubbles of
capitalism” approach, has been criticized by many commentators. Some commentators
opposed the MOI approach because under this strict test, especially the third criterion,
almost no MOI could be found within an NME country.715 Some others criticized that
the requirement that “significantly all” inputs must be purchased in market-determined
prices is ambiguous and would lead to arbitrary results.716 Indeed, the term
“significant,” which is not clearly defined, has caused considerable uncertainty in the
application of the MOI test.717 More importantly, this MOI approach could allow many
industries that are partly market-oriented in NME countries to avoid potential CVD
investigations, while retaining the benefits of injury determinations under the United
States antidumping law.718 Therefore, accepting the MOI approach has been a doubleedged sword for manufacturers and exporters from NME countries.719 However, the
MOI approach was used for testing only a few CVD and AD cases in the early 1990s.
Since then, there has been no designation of an MOI within the NME under this strict
approach.
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4.3.2.4.3. Application of CVD Law to Nonmarket Economies
For over twenty years, Commerce has held its belief from 1984,720 later
supported by the ruling of Georgetown Steel in 1986,721 that the CVD law could not be
applied to NME countries because it could not identify and measure the effects of
government subsidies within an NME. Although Commerce had attempted to apply the
CVD law to market-oriented industries within an NME in 1991, the NME countries
were still untouched under the CVD law until 2006. It was a landmark moment when,
on November 20, 2006, Commerce decided to initiate a CVD investigation on imports
of coated free sheet paper from China (“CFS Paper CVD”).722 This CVD investigation
was initiated in parallel to an initiation of AD investigation against the same CFS paper
product on the same day.723 To understand Commerce’s change of policy in application
of the CVD law, this section focuses on analyzing the CVD case only. In its CVD
petition, NewPage Corporation (“Petitioner”) argued that there was no statutory
restriction to applying countervailing duties to imports from China or any other NME
country.724 The Petitioner asserted that the court of Georgetown Steel deferred to
Commerce’s discretion that it did not have the authority to conduct a CVD
investigation, but the court’s ruling did not affirm the notion that the statute prohibits
Commerce from applying countervailing duties to NME countries.725 More
importantly, the Petitioner argued that the modern economy of China was entirely
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different from the Soviet-era economies investigated in Georgetown Steel, and
therefore, Commerce should be able to identify and measure the subsidies provided by
Chinese government.726
Having recognized the complex legal and policy issues involved in this CFS
Paper CVD case, Commerce requested public comment on the issue of whether the
CVD law should be applied to NMEs.727 It could be understood that Commerce took a
cautious course of action in this proceeding because, if Commerce decided that the
CVD law could be applied to NMEs, and if the courts later upheld that decision, this
case would serve as an important precedent for more and more CVD petitions filed
against China and other NME countries. Commerce was careful because it also realized
the significant economic transformations in China. In fact, upon accession to the WTO
in late 2001, China made a lot of progress in its economic reforms, and its economy in
the 2000s was quite distinguished from those economies involved in the context of
Georgetown Steel case. However, from Commerce’s point of view, China’s economic
reforms were insufficient to be completely recognized as a market economy under the
United States trade remedy framework. Specifically, in the most recent determination
prior to the CFS Paper CVD case, in response to the Chinese respondents’ request for
reevaluation of China’s NME status, Commerce conducted a thorough review of
China’s economy as a whole to determine whether China was an NME country.728
Initially, Commerce noted that although China had implemented economic reforms,
generally recognized, fundamental reforms in certain areas were still incomplete.729 In
particular, Commerce found the level of government intervention in certain key sectors
of China’s economy remained significant, as did deeply rooted institutional problems,
726
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e.g., with respect to the banking sector, land ownership and property rights, and the
rule of law.730 To consolidate its initial analysis, Commerce conducted a more
comprehensive analysis of the six statutory factors that govern NME country
designation.731 Then, Commerce finally affirmed that while China had enacted
significant and sustained economic reforms, market forces in China were not yet
sufficiently developed to permit the use of prices and costs in China for purposes of the
dumping calculation.732 Therefore, Commerce continued to treat China as an NME in
antidumping investigations.
Back to the CFS Paper CVD case, after receiving comments from all interested
parties and assessment of the distinguishing features between the Georgetown Steel
opinion and China’s present-day economy, on March 29, 2007, Commerce released an
important memorandum of analysis (known as the Georgetown Memo), providing its
legal justification for applying the CVD law to China.733 On the same day, the United
States Court of International Trade also decided to dismiss a lawsuit brought by the
Government of China and Chinese paper producers that had sought to enjoin
Commerce from conducting its CVD investigation.734 The CIT held that it could not
exercise jurisdiction prior to conclusion of investigation and final CVD
determination.735 In its decision, the CIT stated that:
“Although Plaintiffs allege that ‘the CAFC has definitively ruled that the CVD
law was not intended to be applied against NMEs,’ the Georgetown Steel court did not
730
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go as far as Plaintiffs claim and find that the countervailing duty law is not applicable
to NMEs. Rather, the Georgetown Steel court only affirmed Commerce’s decision not
to apply countervailing duty law to the NMEs in question in that particular case and
recognized the continuing ‘broad discretion’ of the agency to determine whether to
apply countervailing duty law to NMEs.”
It appeared that the CIT also supported the authority of Commerce to change
its policy in administering the CVD law. Such broad discretion is reflected in
Commerce’s comparative analysis of China’s economy at the time and the ‘Sovietstyle economies of 1980s’ illustrated in the Georgetown Steel case. Specifically,
Commerce noted that China’s economy presented a significantly different picture than
the traditional communist economic system of the early 1980s, i.e., the so-called
“Soviet-style economies” such as the economies at issue in Georgetown Steel.736
Commerce stated that the traditional communist economies during the time of
Georgetown Steel had no market forces, in which:
(p)rices are set by central planners. ‘Losses’ suffered by
production and foreign trade enterprises are routinely covered by
government transfers. Investment decisions are controlled by the
state. Money and credit are allocated by the central planners. The
wage bill is set by the government. Access to foreign currency is
restricted. Private ownership is limited to consumer goods.737
According to Commerce, the then-traditional communist economies were
significantly different from China’s non-market economy of today.738 Although
China’s economy was still riddled with the distortions attendant to the extensive
intervention of the government, it was more flexible than the Soviet-style economies
736
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of the period of Georgetown Steel.739 For instance, regarding wages and prices, Chinese
enterprises were free to set wages, and the majority of prices were market-based.740
Although currency convertibility remains limited to a certain extent, enterprises and
citizens in China generally have access to foreign currency for trade purposes (in
contrast with the Soviet-style economies).741 With respect to the obstacles of
identifying and measuring “bounties or grants” in Soviet-style economies, the current
nature of China’s economy does not create such obstacles to applying the CVD law
due to significant developments in privatization, foreign trading rights, and diminution
of the role of central planners.742
By recognition of China’s economic developments, Commerce concluded that
“it is possible to determine whether the PRC Government has bestowed a benefit upon
a Chinese producer and whether any such benefit is specific.”743 In other words,
Commerce believed that China’s economy had developed to the extent that the effects
of its government subsidies could be identified and measured. Hence, based on the
conclusion of the Georgetown Memo, Commerce continued its CVD investigation and
preliminarily determined that the CVD law could be applied to imports from China.744
It is important to note that the Georgetown Memo and the CFS Paper Prelim’s analysis
inquired into the possibility of applying the CVD law to China as an NME, but not into
trying to change China’s NME status as it had previously been designated for the
purposes of the antidumping law. At the final stage of the investigation, Commerce
affirmed the application of CVD law to China.745 Commerce determined that
countervailable subsidies had been provided to producers and exporters of CFS paper
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from China, and then calculated CVD rates ranging from 7.40% to 44.25%.746
However, the International Trade Commission ultimately concluded that there was no
material injury to the United States domestic industry, thus meaning there was no CVD
order imposed upon Chinese producers and exporters of CFS paper.747 Although this
case was not successful imposing a CVD order upon the Chinese CFS paper producers
and exporters thanks to the ITC’s negative determination, it triggered a lot of CVD
petitions filed by the United States industries in the following years.
One may observe that Commerce’s trade remedy policy toward NMEs such as
China is, to some extent, internally contradictory. While Commerce considered the
market forces in China exist to the point that subsidies could be identified and
measured, it conversely viewed the market forces are insufficient for the prices or costs
in China to be used as the basis for dumping margin calculations under the ME
methodologies.748 Commerce, however, has rejected such criticism. It explained that
the analysis underlying the question of “whether prices and costs in China can be used
for purposes of antidumping law” and the question of “whether it is possible to
determine that the government of China has bestowed a countervailable subsidy upon
a Chinese producer” are fundamentally different.749 Regardless of which side is correct,
by a parallel using of both antidumping duty and countervailing duty laws against
NMEs such as China, it seems that Commerce has attempted to employ all of the
strictest possible trade measures to protect United States domestic industries. For that
746
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reason, it is likely that Commerce may continue to use its “broad discretion” in
developing new methodologies or even changing its longstanding policy to adapt with
the radical changes of economic settings in NME countries. It should be noted that at
the time of this policy shift, only eleven countries still had NME status.750 And the list
is unchanged today.751 Among these NME countries, China has been emerging as the
largest trading partner with the United States; Vietnam has gradually increased its
significance as a U.S. trading partner. Therefore, it could be argued that Commerce’s
change of CVD policy was to target China as the largest NME exporter; and, seemingly
inevitably, Vietnam then became the second target after China for simultaneous
application of antidumping and countervailing duty laws.
4.3.2.5. The Problem of Double Remedies
Since 2007, when Commerce reversed its two-decade interpretation of the U.S.
CVD law to apply it to China, more and more CVD petitions have been filed in
conjunction with AD petitions against China. It is as if “the floodgates had opened”
with Commerce’s new policy, to a wave of numerous CVD petitions filed by the U.S.
domestic industries.752 In fact, in the four years 2008 through 2011, there were 23 CVD
orders imposed upon goods from China and one CVD order upon Vietnam.753 In nearly
750
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all of these cases, the U.S. petitioners simultaneously filed AD and CVD petitions,
seeking orders to impose both antidumping duties and countervailing duties on the
same imports. Thus, in these cases Commerce regularly initiated parallel AD and CVD
investigations; consequently, in every case, a CVD order was usually issued in
conjunction with an AD order on the same alleged product.754 Such actions have
marked a dramatic change in the U.S. policy to applying double trade remedies to China
and Vietnam.
In reality, the concurrent imposition of antidumping duties (ADDs) and
countervailing duties (CVDs) over the same alleged product from an NME country
inevitably causes a problem of duplicative remedy or “double remedies” (sometimes
referred to as “double counting”). “Double remedy” refers to a circumstance where the
simultaneous imposition of ADDs and CVDs results in the same instance of
subsidization being offset twice.755 In theory, the same injury or harm should be subject
to one remedy; however, the use of double remedies to compensate for the same injury
caused to the U.S. domestic industry is likely unfair. This unfair policy that is used to
recover injuries from unfair trade practice seems to be a “tit for tat” to combat the
dumping and subsidization from NME countries.
Needless to say, Commerce’s double-remedy practice has been controversial
and has been claimed to be potentially inconsistent with WTO rules.756 Indeed, in
Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People’s Republic of China
(“OTR Tires”),757 the Government of China (“GOC”) fiercely opposed and challenged
Commerce’s simultaneous application of CVD law and the NME methodology in its
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parallel antidumping investigation against the Chinese producers. In this case, the GOC
argued that Commerce’s reliance on normal values sourced from subsidy-free surrogate
values to calculate NME dumping margins produces an unjust antidumping price
comparison that penalizes Chinese producers twice for the same allegedly unfair trade
practice (i.e., the first time when the CVDs are applied to compensate for the alleged
subsidy, and then the second time when the allegedly subsidized export price is
compared with the non-subsidized constructed normal value).758 The GOC and Chinese
respondents further argued that the double counting occurs when ADDs and CVDs are
concurrently applied to NME producers because Commerce simultaneously measures
the alleged subsidy benefit (relying on ME benchmarks) and dumping (using its FOP
analysis based on surrogate prices) for many of the same inputs (e.g., interest expenses,
rubber, electricity, water).759 Then, the GOC urged Commerce to take measures to
prevent double remedies for a single alleged unfair trade practice, either by ending its
CVD investigation or by adjusting its AD calculations in the parallel AD investigation
to account for both the amount of any export subsidies and any domestic subsidies.760
In response to such arguments, Commerce stated that there was no statutory authority
to allow it to terminate the CVD investigation to avoid double counting, and that, if
Commerce finds any possible adjustment to avoid a double remedy, it would do so in
the context of an antidumping investigation.761 In the parallel OTR Tires AD case,762
the GOC and other respondents argued that Commerce must adjust any calculated AD
rate by the amount of both export and domestic subsidies determined in the companion
CVD investigation.763 In particular, all respondents argued that the NME AD
758
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methodology does not use actual prices or costs from the NME country, but rather uses
subsidy-free data from a surrogate ME country that corrects the market-distorting
behavior.764 Accordingly, the respondents concluded that when subsidy allegations are
addressed in corresponding CVD investigations, the result is correction of the marketdistorting behavior in both trade remedies (i.e., double remedies).765 For example, the
Chinese respondents showed the existence of double remedies as to the rubber input in
these AD and CVD investigations.766 The Chinese producers argued that the same
unfair advantage (the ability to purchase rubber at low prices) is directly addressed in
both the AD (as a raw material cost) and the CVD investigations (through application
of a world benchmark price).767 Then, the respondents further argued that by
countervailing the subsidies in the CVD investigation (where Commerce found that
rubber was subsidized) but by also using a surrogate value for rubber (thereby
eliminating the effect of subsidization) in the AD investigation, Commerce is unfairly
penalizing the Chinese producers in NME investigations twice.768 More importantly,
the Chinese respondents also argued that U.S. law and the WTO rules prohibit the
imposition of two duties for the same unfair trade practice.769 Actually, both WTO rules
and U.S. laws require adjustments in combined duty rates to avoid double counting of
export subsidies. Article VI:5 of the GATT 1947 provides that “[n]o product of the
territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting
party shall be subject to both AD and CVD duties to compensate for the same situation
of dumping or export subsidization.”770 This provision, however, is not clear as to
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whether a domestic subsidy can be double counted.771 The U.S. law echoes Article VI:5
by requiring adjustments in ADDs in the event that CVDs are applied simultaneously
to countervail export subsidies on the same products.772 The reason for this adjustment
is that export subsidies are presumed to lower the export price of the subject
merchandise, pro rata, increasing dumping margins correspondingly. This
requirement, however, is limited to offsetting export subsidies rather than domestic
subsidies. Hence, Commerce found that silence in the provision “about the plainly
related issue of CVDs to offset domestic subsidies, is not complete silence - it implies
that no adjustment is appropriate.”773 In response to the Chinese respondents’ legality
claims, Commerce concluded that, “absent a statutory directive for an adjustment and
underlying assumption similar to that regarding CVDs imposed to offset export
subsidies, or evidence that domestic subsidies have lowered U.S. prices in a given case,
any adjustment for an assumed or undetermined effect would be inappropriate.”774 As
a result, Commerce declined to make any adjustments to avoid the double counting as
claimed by the Chinese producers in the OTR Tires AD case. Consequently, Starbright,
who was the main respondent in OTR Tires, was subject to an AD rate of 29.93%775
and a CVD rate of 14%.776 With a combined cash deposit rate of 44%, it is unlikely
that Starbright could continue to export to the U.S. market. Undoubtedly, Commerce’s
771
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rejection of the double counting argument has opened a series of battles between China
and the United States at the legal battlefields of the U.S. courts and at WTO’s dispute
settlement body.

4.3.2.6. First Round of Legal Battles at U.S. Courts and WTO’s Dispute
Settlement Body
4.3.2.6.1. Legal Battles at U.S. Courts
GPX I: On September 9, 2008, GPX International Tire Corporation (“GPX”),
a domestic importer of OTR tires that wholly owns Chinese producer Starbright, filed
an action in the U.S. Court of International Trade (“CIT”) to contest Commerce’s
affirmative AD and CVD determinations and ITC’s injury determination.777 GPX also
sought for immediate relief from the 44% cash deposit rate, but this motion was denied,
on grounds of lack of irreparable harm attributable to the CVD determination.778 Then,
GPX moved for reconsideration or rehearing by the CIT for a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction, alleging that collection of full AD and CVD deposits
would cause irreparable harm, but unfortunately this second attempt was again denied
on December 30, 2008.779 On January 13, 2009, the Government of China moved to
intervene in the litigation, but its motion was denied due to untimely submission
without any good cause.780 On January 20, 2009, the CIT consolidated all actions
challenging the final AD and CVD determinations and moved forward for judgment.781
This consolidated decision is hereinafter referred to as GPX I. In GPX I, the two main
issues which were challenged by GPX were (i) the applicability of CVD law to China
as an NME and (ii) the double counting issue. First, GPX argued that throughout the
legislative history of the U.S. trade laws, Congress did not allow application of the
777
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CVD law to NMEs because of its ambiguity; on the other hand, Congress intended that
the AD law would be the sole remedy to combat unfair trade practices by NMEs.782
Second, with respect to the double counting, GPX argued that the concurrent
imposition of CVDs and ADDs using the NME methodology results in a double
counting of duties, as it “punishes Chinese companies twice for the same allegedly
‘unfair’ trading practices.”783 The CIT reasoned that Commerce has been granted broad
discretion in determining the existence of a subsidy under the CVD law.784 Therefore,
the CIT ruled that Commerce had the authority to apply the CVD law to products from
an NME-designated country.785 The CIT, however, noted that the CVD and NME AD
laws are unclear as to how Commerce is to account for the overlap between the statutes
when imposing both CVD and AD duties on goods from an NME country.786 Then, the
CIT provided the important insight that “if there is a substantial potential for double
counting, and it is too difficult for Commerce to determine whether, and to what degree
double counting is occurring, Commerce should refrain from imposing CVDs on NME
goods until it is prepared to address this problem through improved methodologies or
new statutory tools.”787 Therefore, the CIT remanded the case for Commerce to either
forego the imposition of CVDs on the goods at issue; or if Commerce “is to apply CVD
remedies where it also utilizes NME AD methodology,” it must “adopt additional
policies and procedures for its NME AD and CVD methodologies to account for the
imposition of the CVD law to products from an NME country and avoid to the extent
possible double counting of duties.”788
On April 26, 2010, in response to the CIT’s remand order, Commerce
determined to continue to impose CVD remedies on imports of OTR tires, but it
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proposed to deduct the amount of the CVD cash deposit rate applied on OTR tires from
the AD cash deposit amount in order to avoid the double counting of duties.789
To come to this conclusion, Commerce explained that it had evaluated three
procedural options to avoid the potential double remedy that the CIT found to exist: (1)
do not apply the CVD law to GPX/Starbright’s exports; (2) treat either Starbright, in
particular, or China, in general, under the ME AD methodology; or (3) offset
GPX/Starbright’s CVDs against GPX’s AD cash deposit rate.790 In the first two
options, according to Commerce, the potential for a double remedy would be
eliminated because it would not be concurrently applying the NME AD methodology
and the CVD law.791 In the third option, offsetting the two remedies would prevent the
two remedies from overlapping in the slightest degree.792 Commerce finally selected
the third option because it believed that this offset methodology is unobjectionable and
would create less confusion than the first two options.793 Commerce stated that this
option complies with the CIT’s order either “to forego the imposition of CVDs” or “to
adapt its NME AD and CVD methodologies to account for the imposition of CVD
remedies,” because offsetting the CVDs against ADDs had the same effect as not
applying CVD law to Chinese producers’ exports.794
GPX II: On review of Commerce’s Remand Results, which is, hereinafter
referred to as, GPX II, the CIT noted that by using the offset methodology, the
combination of the CVD margin and the NME AD cash deposit rate would always
equal the unaltered NME AD margin.795 The CIT pointed out that it would be
unnecessary to conduct both CVD and AD investigations when Commerce could
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obtain the same result by merely conducting an AD investigation.796 The CIT also noted
that the offset methodology used by Commerce was inconsistent with 19 U.S.C. §
1677a, which lists the specific offsets to export price and constructed export price that
are permissible.797 In summary, the CIT held that the offset methodology does not
comply with the statute and is also unreasonable due to the expense associated with
conducting an additional investigation that is essentially useless.798 As a result, the CIT
ruled that Commerce failed to comply with the first remand instructions; therefore,
Commerce had to forego the imposition of CVD law on the NME products.799 The CIT
came to this decision because it believed that Commerce’s actions on remand “clearly
demonstrate its inability, at this time, to use improved methodologies to determine
whether, and to what degree double counting occurs when NME antidumping remedies
are imposed on the same good.”800 Although Commerce disagreed with this second
remand, it complied under protest and made it clear that it would appeal the CIT’s
decision.801
GPX III: The U.S. government and domestic manufacturers favoring the
imposition of CVDs appealed the CIT’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (“CAFC”).802 This dispute is referred to as GPX III. According to the
CAFC, the CIT’s decision to bar the imposition of CVDs due to the high likelihood of
double counting was problematic because of the two reasons: (i) the extent to which
the statute may prohibit double counting was unclear and (ii) Commerce had
determined that it was far from clear that double counting had in fact occurred.803 As a
matter of law, the CAFC concluded that Commerce is barred by the statute from
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imposing CVDs on NME goods.804 The key reasoning of the CAFC is that the
legislative history of the CVD law, and particularly Congress’s repeated reenactment
of CVD law while approving the Georgetown Steel holding, demonstrates that
Congress adopted the then-prevailing position that CVDs cannot be imposed on NME
exports.805 Specifically, the CAFC found that in amending and reenacting the trade
laws in 1988 and 1994, Congress adopted the position that the CVD law does not apply
to NME countries.806 In the CAFC’s view, although Commerce has broad discretion in
administering CVD and AD laws, it cannot exercise this discretion contrary to the
intent of Congress.807 Accordingly, the CAFC affirmed the CIT’s holding, but on a
different and broader ground, that CVDs could not be applied to goods from NME
countries.808 Notably, referring to Georgetown Steel, the CAFC stated that if
Commerce believes that the CVD law should be changed, the appropriate approach is
to seek legislative change.809 However, it should be noted that the CAFC had not yet
issued the mandate in GPX III, which, when it issued, would have the effect of
invalidating

Commerce’s

CVD

orders

previously

issued.

The

CAFC’s

recommendation was based on the same opinion in Georgetown Steel in 1986, but at
this time it would have a more extensive impact upon Commerce. The CAFC’s ruling
put Commerce in a situation where, when the mandate issued (as it would by operation
of rule once the appellate proceedings had come to a final end), Commerce may then
have to revoke the 24 CVD orders against goods from NME countries (i.e., 23 orders
against China and one order against Vietnam).810 According to Commerce, those 24
orders cover $4.7 billion in annual imports.811 Therefore, Commerce was put in a
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position where it could not step back to comply immediately with the CAFC’s decision.
In order to retain these CVD orders, Commerce could have appealed that decision by
seeking a rehearing by the CAFC (which would have had the effect of staying the
mandate), or seeking reexamination (certiorari) by the Supreme Court. Or, otherwise,
Commerce could ask Congress to change the CVD legislation to abrogate the CAFC’s
decision and to allow Commerce to impose CVDs on imports from NME countries.
In addition to the pressure from the CAFC’s decision in GPX III, the legal
battles at the WTO against the concurrent application of AD and CVD laws to China
also had significant impact on Commerce’s efforts to seek a congressional change to
the CVD law. The next section shall focus on the legal battles between China and the
United States at the WTO regarding the legality of CVD application to China and the
issue of double remedies that arose from certain investigations initiated by Commerce.
4.3.2.6.2. Legal Battles at WTO: United States - Definitive Antidumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China (WT/DS379)
In strong support of the Chinese producers and exporters, the Government of
China (“GOC”) started another legal battle relying on the multilateral trading
mechanism of the WTO. Parallel with the litigation of GPX I in the CIT battle, on
September 19, 2008, the GOC concurrently initiated the first step in a dispute
settlement proceeding at WTO by requesting an official consultation with the
Government of the United States to challenge the imposition of ADDs and CVDs upon
several products exported by Chinese producers.812 While GPX and other Chinese
producers and exporters opened a legal battle at the U.S. CIT, the GOC made an effort
to fight against the United States by taking advantage of the WTO dispute resolution
mechanism. The same issue of double counting was raised in these parallel
proceedings. Specifically, the GOC challenged the imposition of concurrent ADDs and
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Request for Consultation by China, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing
Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/1 (September 22, 2008) [hereinafter Consultations
Request].

147

CVDs in the following four cases: (1) circular welded carbon-quality steel (“CWP”)
(July 2008); (2) new pneumatic off-the-road tires (“OTR Tires”) (Sept. 2008); (3) lightwalled rectangular pipe and tube (“LWRP”) (Aug. 2008); and (4) laminated woven
sacks (“LWS”) (Aug. 2008).813 GOC claimed that the measures used in these four cases
were inconsistent with the obligations of the United States under a series of articles
including Articles I and VI of the GATT 1994, Articles 1, 2, 10, 12, 13, 14, 19, and 32
of the Subsidies Agreement, Articles 1, 2, 6, 9, and 18 of the AD Agreement, and
Article 15 of the Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China (the
Protocol of Accession).814 These claims were considered as “as applied” challenges;
the GOC neglected to include “as such” challenges in its Consultations Request.815
On November 14, 2008, consultations between China and the United States
were held, but both sides failed to resolve the dispute.816 Therefore, on December 9,
2008, the GOC requested the establishment of a panel to resolve the dispute.817 This
time, the GOC added the following “as such” challenges:
“In certain of the investigations specified above, the U.S. Department of
Commerce stated that U.S. law provides no basis to make any adjustment to either the
anti-dumping or countervailing duty calculations to avoid the imposition of a double
remedy for the same unfair trade practice, where such a double remedy arises from the
use of the U.S. non-market economy (NME) methodology to impose anti-dumping
duties simultaneously with the imposition of countervailing duties on the same product.
The measures therefore include, as an omission, the failure of the United States to
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provide legal authority for the U.S. Department of Commerce to avoid the imposition
of a double remedy when it imposes anti-dumping duties determined pursuant to the
U.S. NME methodology simultaneously with the imposition of countervailing duties
on the same product.”818
Generally, in its Panel Request, the GOC claimed that the imposition of double
remedies was, both “as such” and “as applied,”819 inconsistent with Articles 10, 12.1,
12.8, 19.3, 19.4, and 32.1 of the Subsidies Agreement and with Articles I:1 and VI of
the GATT 1994.820
At its meeting on January 20, 2009, the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body
(“DSB”) agreed to establish a panel to resolve the dispute.821 However, due to the
substantive complexity of the dispute, up until October 22, 2010, the Panel could not
issue its Panel Report, which was ultimately in favor of the United States.822 Most of
the “as such” and “as applied” claims of the GOC were rejected by the Panel.
Specifically, the Panel found that the “omission”823 challenged by the GOC as part of
its “as such” claims fell outside the Panel’s terms of reference, because the GOC had
not identified this “as such” challenge in its Consultations Request.824 Hence, the Panel
found that China’s “as such” claims under Articles 10, 19.3, 19.4 and 32.1 of the
Subsidies Agreement and Articles VI and I:1 of the GATT 1994 equally fell outside
the Panel’s terms of reference.825 As a result, the Panel dismissed China’s “as applied”
claims under Articles 10, 19.3, 19.4, and 32.1 of the Subsidies Agreement and Article
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VI:3 of the GATT 1994.826 The Panel, however, reaffirmed the basic notion that the
simultaneous imposition of ADDs and CVDs may result in double remedies, but it
concurred with the United States’ assertion that the existence of double remedies in any
given case depends on the facts, specifically whether the subsidy in question results in
the reduction of the export price.827 Then, the Panel decided that none of the provisions
of the Subsidies Agreement or the GATT 1994 cited by the GOC prohibited the
imposition of both ADDs and CVDs with respect to the domestic subsidies.828 In
addition, the Panel observed that China’s Protocol of Accession does not address the
issue of “double remedies,” but does contemplate the use of CVDs while China remains
an NME.829
On December 1, 2010, the GOC appealed the Panel findings to the Appellate
Body.830 On March 11, 2011, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel findings and ruled
in favor of China.831 The Appellate Body mainly focused on Article 19.3 of the
Subsidies Agreement, which requires that subsidies be levied “in the appropriate
amounts in each case.”832 Article 19.3 of the Subsidies Agreement provides:
“When a countervailing duty is imposed in respect of any product, such
countervailing duty shall be levied, in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a nondiscriminatory basis on imports of such product from all sources found to be subsidized
and causing injury, except as to imports from those sources which have renounced any
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subsidies in question or from which undertakings under the terms of this Agreement
have been accepted.”833
In its findings, the Panel found that “the imposition of ADDs calculated under
an NME methodology has no impact on whether the amount of the concurrent
countervailing duty collected is ‘appropriate’ or not,”834 and that Article 19.3 of the
Subsidies Agreement does not address the issue of double remedies.835 However, the
Appellate Body found that the Panel erred in its interpretation of Article 19.3 and failed
to give meaning and effect to all the terms of that provision.836 According to the
Appellate Body, the appropriateness of the amount of CVDs cannot be determined
without having regard to ADDs imposed on the same product to offset the same
subsidization.837 Hence, the amount of a CVD cannot be “appropriate” in situations
where that duty represents the full amount of the subsidy and where ADDs, calculated
at least to some extent on the basis of the same subsidization, are imposed concurrently
to remove the same injury to the domestic industry.838 Accordingly, dumping margins
established on an NME methodology are likely to include some component that is
attributable to subsidization.839 Consequently, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s
interpretation of Article 19.3 and the findings pursuant to that interpretation, ruling that
the imposition of double remedies, that is, the offsetting of the same subsidization twice
by the concurrent imposition of ADDs calculated on the basis of an NME methodology
and CVDs, is inconsistent with Article 19.3 of the Subsidies Agreement.840 It should
be noted that the Appellate Body was of the opinion that it was not convinced that
double remedies necessarily result in every instance of a simultaneous application of
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ADDs and CVDs.841 This depends rather on whether and to what extent domestic
subsidies have lowered the export price of a product, and on whether the investigating
authority has taken the necessary corrective steps to adjust its methodology to take
account of this factual situation.842 With respect to the four specific cases that the GOC
claimed in this dispute, the Appellate Body found that the U.S. Department of
Commerce, by declining to address China’s claims concerning double remedies arisen
in these cases, failed to fulfill its obligation to determine the “appropriate” amount of
CVDs within the meaning of Article 19.3 of the Subsidies Agreement.843 Therefore,
the Appellate Body concluded that, in the circumstances of the four sets of AD and
CVD investigations at issue, by virtue of Commerce’s imposition of ADDs calculated
on the basis of an NME methodology, concurrently with the imposition of CVDs on
the same products, without having assessed whether double remedies arose from such
concurrent duties, the United States acted inconsistently with its obligations under
Article 19.3 of the Subsidies Agreement.844 Finally, the Appellate Body recommended
that the Dispute Settlement Body ask the United States to bring its measures into
conformity with its obligations under the Subsidies Agreement.845
China’s Ministry of Commerce described the WTO’s decision as a significant
victory, stating that the U.S. Department of Commerce had long refused to correct the
double counting problem despite pleas from Chinese trade officials and despite the CIT
decisions in GPX I and GPX II.846 By contrast, the United States Trade Representative
(“USTR”) Ron Kirk proclaimed that the WTO’s decision “appears to be a clear case of
overreaching by the Appellate Body.”847 Despite disagreement, the USTR later directed
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Commerce to implement its final determinations under section 129 of the URAA848
regarding the concurrent AD and CVD investigations of the four cases including CWP,
OTR Tires, LWRP, and LWS, in compliance with the WTO’s recommendations and
rulings.849 To a certain extent, this WTO victory together with the CIT’s rulings in
favor of the Chinese producers had significant impacts on Commerce’s efforts to
impose simultaneous ADDs and CVDs against China.

4.3.2.7. U.S. Congressional Action: Legitimization of CVD Application to NMEs
The existence of double counting resulting from the simultaneous imposition
of ADDs and CVDs to China as an NME country was supported by the WTO’s DSB
in DS379 and by the U.S. CIT in the GPX I and GPX II cases. Furthermore, the decision
of U.S. CAFC in GPX III, which was made after the WTO’s rulings, had a great
influence on the U.S. Department of Commerce because the CAFC barred the
applicability of the CVD law to China so long as it was still designated as an NME. In
reality, the CAFC’s ruling had a broader and stronger impact than the rulings of WTO
and U.S. CIT because the CAFC’s ruling sent a strong message that Commerce cannot
apply the CVD law to China and other NME countries in future cases, unless Congress
changes the applicable statute.850 More importantly, the CAFC’s ruling also set an
expiration date for the previously imposed CVD orders and pending CVD
investigations against China.851 Such critical pressures put Commerce in a position
848
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consider both judicial and legislative options (i.e., appeal the CAFC’s ruling or seek a
legislative change).852 In order to give the Congress more time to pass such a law, the
United States government concurrently opted for a strategy to file a petition with the
CAFC for a rehearing en banc in GPX III, which at least had the effect of keeping the
mandate from issuing.853 While this case was pending at the CAFC, the United States
government quickly pursued a legislative strategy by pushing Congress to change the
CVD law. Therefore, Congress was put in a situation wherein it had no choice but to
find a way to legitimize Commerce’s prior change of practice for using the CVD law
against China; or otherwise, Commerce would have to revoke all existing CVD orders
and terminate pending investigations854. As a result, the U.S. Congress, in a rare
bipartisan effort, passed a bill amending both CVD and AD laws at a rapid pace.855 On
March 13, 2012, President Obama officially signed the bill into law (coded as P.L 11299), namely “An Act to Apply the Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Tariff Act of
1930 to Nonmarket Economy Countries, and for Other Purposes.”856 P.L 112-99, also
known as “GPX Legislation,” abrogated (that is, legislatively overturned) the CAFC’s
ruling in GPX III so as to apply the CVD law to NME countries.
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P.L. 112-99 has two sections: (1) Section 1, which directs Commerce to impose
CVDs on goods from NME countries except where it is “unable to identify and measure
subsidies provided by the government of the [NME] country or a public entity within
the territory of the [NME] country because the economy of that country is essentially
comprised of a single entity”;857 and (2) Section 2, which applies only to proceedings
initiated following the enactment of P.L. 112-99, and which directs Commerce to
“reduce” the ADD in all proceedings involving the concurrent imposition of ADDs and
CVDs where it can “reasonably estimate the extent to which the countervailable
subsidy … increased the weighted average dumping margin” for the subject
merchandise.858 However, it was controversial that P.L. 112-99 extends the application
of CVD law to NME countries retroactively, back to 2006. In essence, the first purpose
of this law was to legitimize Commerce’s imposition of CVDs to NME goods from
China and other NME countries such as Vietnam. The second purpose was to retain all
existing CVD orders and pending CVD investigations by devising a controversial
provision that the law could apply to “all proceedings initiated on or after November
20, 2006.”859 This retroactive application clearly meant that Commerce had the lawful
authority to apply the CVD law to China and any other NME country back to the
initiation date of the CFS Paper case (i.e., November 20, 2006). This intentional action
shows the Congress’s enormous efforts to save Commerce from revoking its CVD
orders against China and Vietnam that had been already issued before the enactment of
P.L. 112-99.860
Another key component of P.L. 112-99 is the congressional attempt to avoid
the potential problems of double remedies as claimed by the CIT in GPX cases and in
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the WTO’s AB Report in DS379. Specifically, the law allows Commerce to adjust the
ADDs in the proceedings involving concurrent application of ADDs and CVDs against
NME imports.861 In order to satisfy the ADD adjustment, Commerce must find the
following three conditions: (i) a countervailable subsidy (other than an export subsidy)
has been provided; (ii) such countervailable subsidy has reduced the average export
price of the subject merchandise; and (iii) Commerce can “reasonably estimate” the
extent to which the countervailable subsidy has increased the dumping margin of the
subject merchandise.862 If these criteria are met, Commerce is required to reduce the
ADD by the estimated amount of the increase in the dumping margin inflated by the
countervailable subsidy on the export price.863 The law also sets a maximum limit for
the ADD reduction which is not more than the portion of the CVD rate attributable to
a countervailable subsidy.864 It should be noted that this adjustment methodology is
limited to the extent that the export price has been affected by the domestic subsidy
only. Ironically, the legal authority to adjust the ADDs, however, does not apply
retroactively back to 2006, but it only applies to the investigations and reviews initiated
on or after March 13, 2012 (i.e., P.L 112-99’s enactment date).865
It appears that the U.S. Congress has attempted to implement the findings and
recommendations by both WTO and U.S. CIT to resolve the problems of double
counting by adopting the methodology of ADD adjustment. In fact, it does so by
requiring Commerce to avoid double remedies by offsetting the dumping margin in a
situation where a countervailable domestic subsidy is passed through to lower export
prices.866 However, Commerce remains the right to reject the adjustments if it cannot
“reasonably estimate” the effects of the domestic subsidies on the dumping margins. In
this situation, it is not clear from the law how Commerce can effectively avoid double
counting problems. In fact, while the law provides Commerce a legal ground for its
861
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estimate, this law does not provide any specific guidelines on how to make a
“reasonable estimate” or how to avoid occurrence of double counting if such
“reasonable estimate” is unable to make.
Since this new law came into force, Commerce has applied and developed the
methodology of ADD adjustments for the first time in the proceeding of Section 129
Determinations, revising the determinations in the four sets of AD and CVD
investigations examined in the WTO DS379 dispute.867 In each of the four
determinations, Commerce used the same methodology to estimate the extent that the
subsidies reduced the average export price of the respective subject merchandise.868
For instance, in OTR Tires Section 129 Final Determinations, Commerce conducted its
analysis at the industry level (rather than requesting information from individual
respondent parties).869 Based on the industry-level information provided by the GOC,
Commerce identified a correlation between changes in input costs and changes in
output prices.870 It also found that certain types of subsidies had reduced input costs in
an industry.871 Accordingly, Commerce concluded that the variable cost-price link, as
measured by its RCT test,872 was a reasonable estimate of the extent to which subsidies
867
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that impacted variable cost passed through to prices.873 As a result, Commerce
determined that those input-price subsidies demonstratably reduced the OTR Tires
industry’s export prices and made pass-through estimates.874 However, by using a
methodology limited to variable cost-price link, the adjustments of the ADDs for
respective Chinese respondents were insignificant or even unchanged.875 In this case,
it is also important to note that Commerce believes the concurrent application of NME
ADDs and CVDs does not necessarily and automatically results in “overlapping
remedies.”876 According to Commerce, this notion was upheld by the WTO’s AB
Report in DS379.877 Hence, Commerce insisted that a finding that there is an overlap
in remedies, and any resulting adjustment, must be part of a fact-based inquiry.878
Furthermore, Commerce also believed that the burden of proof would be on the
respondent parties to demonstrate its entitlement to a particular ADD adjustment.879
4.3.2.8. Second Round of Legal Battles at Both US Courts and WTO’s Dispute
Settlement Body
4.3.2.8.1. Legal Challenges at U.S. Courts

producer price index in China (Bloomberg symbol CHEFTYOY) and divided it by the purchasing price
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As it was noted in the preceding section, before the enactment of the GPX
Legislation to apply the CVD law to NME countries, the United States government
embarked upon a judicial strategy by requesting for a rehearing en banc by the CAFC,
essentially in order to give Congress more time to change the CVD law before the
CAFC issued its mandate. That litigation strategy did help Congress to meet the judicial
deadline, but it consequently initiated the CAFC’s rehearing en banc.
GPX IV: The rehearing en banc requested by the United States government
was subsequently granted, and, following the enactment of the GPX Legislation, the
CAFC requested additional briefing on the impact of the new legislation.880 In this
resumed litigation, GPX argued that the GPX Legislation was unconstitutional because
(i) it attempted to prescribe a rule of decision for this case after the CAFC’s decision
in GPX III was rendered; and (ii) it properly creates a special rule applicable only to
this specific case due to the different effective dates in the two provisions; it thus creates
a situation in which both ADDs and CVDs may be imposed, without providing a
mechanism to account for potential double counting.881 In its decision, the CAFC
observed that this case was still pending on appeal when Congress enacted the GPX
Legislation, as the court’s mandate had not yet issued precisely because the United
States government had petitioned for a rehearing en banc in GPX III.882 As a result,
according to the CAFC, no issue was raised by the fact that the GPX III decision was
issued prior to enactment of the GPX Legislation, because this case remained pending
on appeal.883 With respect to GPX’s argument on the constitutionality of the new
legislation, the CAFC sided with the United States government in concluding that
880
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because this issue was raised for the first time in the rehearing petition, it should be
“considered by the Trade Court in the first instance.”884 As a result, the CAFC
remanded the case to the CIT for a determination on the constitutionality of the GPX
Legislation and for other appropriate proceedings.885
GPX V: On remand from the CAFC, GPX argued that the GPX Legislation
was unconstitutional for three reasons.886 GPX claimed that the GPX Legislation
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution,887 as well as the due process and
equal protection rights of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.888 The CIT
disagreed with all of GPX’s arguments and finally concluded that the GPX Legislation
(also referred to as the “New Law” in this case) was constitutional.889
In more detail, GPX’s first argument was that the New Law violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause of the Constitution because it effectively penalized certain importers
for past conduct.890 The United States government, however, argued that the New Law
was remedial in nature and therefore not subject to the proscriptions of the Ex Post
Facto Clause.891 The CIT concluded that the Ex Post Facto Clause “does not prohibit
the imposition of all retrospective laws.”892 Instead, the clause only “prohibits the
imposition of retrospective penal legislation, which often, though not always, takes the
884
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form of criminal law.”893 Further, the CIT agreed that retroactive remedial laws are not
prohibited by the Ex Post Facto clause.894
Secondly, GPX claimed that the New Law violated the Fifth Amendment’s due
process clause by retrospectively altering legitimate expectations of the level of duties
that would be imposed on their imports.895 Specifically, GPX argued that the New Law
is a new tax being applied retroactively without notice to the affected importers and
with harsh and oppressive effects deprived it of property without due process of law.
The United States government rejected the GPX’s claims, arguing that
Congress sought to correct an unexpected judicial decision with the New Law, and that
GPX did not have a settled expectation that trade-remedy duties would not have to be
paid on the covered imports.896 The CIT found that the retrospective nature of the New
Law does not violate the due process because customs duties and trade remedies are
part of a uniquely “retrospective assessment scheme.”897 That means that GPX could
not have reasonably relied on any predicted duty rate prior to the enactment of the New
Law. Consequently, the CIT concluded that because the New Law was general
economic legislation, “it is subject to a rational basis review,” and that GPX failed to
meet its burden to prove that Congress did not have a rational basis for passing the New
Law or that GPX had a vested interest in not having the CVD law applied to its
imports.898
The third argument made by GPX was that the New Law violated the right to
equal protection under the law by applying a different law to respondents whose
products were covered by CVD investigations between November 20, 2006, and March
893
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13, 2012, as compared to other companies whose products would be investigated for
unfair trade practices after the New Law was enacted.899 GPX pointed out that there
was a gap between the New Law’s effective dates for Section 1, November 20, 2006,
and Section 2, March 13, 2012. During this interim period, goods from NMEs may be
subject to the concurrent imposition of duties under the CVD and AD laws without any
possible offset for overlapping remedies.900 The United States government contended
that Congress had a rational reason to make only Section 1 expressly retroactive.
Specifically, because approximately 24 CVD investigations were conducted on goods
from NMEs during the interim period, Congress feared that without retroactive
application of Section 1, the results of these investigations could be overturned.901
Similarly, retroactive application of Section 2 of the law would have subjected those
investigations to reopening based on the New Law, requiring Commerce to recalculate
the AD or CVD rates in those investigations.902 Therefore, to preserve the finality of
the investigations and to avoid additional recalculation by Commerce, the United States
government argued that this interim period was needed.903 Furthermore, the United
States government explained that Section 2 was the result of an attempt to conform to
the WTO’s ruling in DS379. This action is normally taken under section 129 of the
URAA, with prospective application only.904 For such reasons, the United States
government argued that this feature of the legislation was rationally related to the
government’s interests in conserving limited resources and also consistent with the
general statutory approach of prospective implementation of changes based on an
adverse ruling in a WTO dispute.905 The CIT upheld all arguments made by the United
States government and concluded that the New Law was rationally related to legitimate
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government interests and therefore did not violate the equal protection guarantees of
the Constitution.906
GPX VI: GPX appealed the CIT’s determinations under the Ex Post Facto and
Due Process Clause to the CAFC.907 It should be noted that while this appellate process
was pending, the CAFC made a decision in another case challenging the ex post facto
nature of the GPX Legislation as well.908 In Wireking, the court held that the GPX
Legislation, while retroactive, did not violate the ex post facto clause because it was
remedial in nature rather than punitive.909 Therefore, in GPX VI, the court did not
deviate from its ex post factor analysis in Wireking and instead adopted the same
reasoning to dismiss GPX’s challenge on the ex post facto issue. Then, the court
focused on analysis of GPX’s arguments related to the Due Process Clause to resolve
the dispute. GPX continued to argue that the New Law violated the Due Process Clause
because it operates retroactively. However, the United States government argued that
“legislation cannot implicate the due process clause unless it disturbs a vested right,”
and that GPX’s due process challenge was therefore foreclosed at the outset by its
failure to establish a vested right in this case.910 In analyzing the claimed due process
violation, the court did not agree with the United States government that “the outcome
of the due process analysis depends upon a determination that a vested right exists”
(that is, even if there was a vested right, the outcome might still have been against
GPX); however, the Court noted that “the strong deference accorded legislation in the
field of national economic policy is no less applicable when that legislation is applied
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retroactively.”911 According to the CAFC, due process was satisfied “simply by
showing that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified by a rational
legislative purpose.”912 Specifically, the court assessed five factors utilized by the
Supreme Court in precedential cases to determine whether the retroactive application
of the New Law satisfied rational-basis scrutiny.913 The court found that each of the
five factors weighed in favor of a conclusion that the New Law was not
unconstitutional; and thus, holding that the retroactive impositions of ADDs and CVDs
in cases involving China and other NME countries, after Congress passed legislation
allowing it to do so, did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution.914
From this case, it can be understood that an importer does not have
constitutional rights to maintain an existing duty rate in the fact of new legislation or
quasi-legislative executive actions.915 This CAFC decision is the most recent case in a
series of cases regarding the application of CVD duties to NME countries. This case
apparently ended China’s judicial efforts to challenge to the retroactive application, on
constitutional grounds, of the imposition of CVD duties to China at the U.S federal
courts. This case also reflects a judicial assertion from the appellate court to clear away
the uncertainties of the legality of imposing CVDs upon NME imports in trade remedy
investigations. In short, all three branches of powers—judicial, legislative and
executive—of the U.S. government confirmed the application of the CVD law to NME
911
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countries such as China and Vietnam. It is unlikely that China or any other NME
country could seek to overturn the application of the CVD law to NMEs by pursuing
new legal battles at the U.S. federal courts (e.g., an appellate battle aimed at seeking
ultimate relief in the U.S. Supreme Court would be unsuccessful, even if the Supreme
Court decided to hear the case). The next section discusses China’s legal challenges
against the retroactive application of the CVD law at the WTO.

4.3.2.8.2. WTO Challenges: United States - Countervailing and Anti-dumping
Measures on Certain Products from China (WT/DS449)
The claimed irrationality of the retroactive application of the GPX Legislation,
together with Commerce’s continued failure to completely examine the double
counting occurring in the existing CVD orders and pending investigations, were the
main reasons that China initiated yet another WTO case. On September 17, 2012, about
three months after GPX had started its challenge to the GPX Legislation’s
constitutionality at the U.S. CIT, China started the first step in the WTO dispute
settlement proceedings by requesting formal consultations with the United States.916
Two months later, the GOC officially requested the WTO’s DSB to establish a panel
to resolve the dispute.917 The Chinese government focused on the two main challenges:
(1) Section 1 of the GPX Legislation was inconsistent with the transparency
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requirements under Articles X:1,918 X:2919 and X:3(b)920 of the GATT 1994; and (2)
the United States failed to investigate and avoid double remedies in certain
investigations and reviews initiated between November 20, 2006, and March 13, 2012,
and the resulting CVD measures therefore violate the Subsidies Agreement.921
For the first challenge, the GOC first argued that the GPX Legislation does not
meet the requirement of prompt publication under Article X:1 because, even though it
was enacted on March 13, 2012, the legislation was actually “made effective” as of
November 20, 2006.922 In fact, Section 1(b) of the GPX Legislation refers to November
20, 2006, as the “effective date.” According to the GOC, the term “made effective”
refers to when the measure became “operative,” that is, when it could have an actual
effect “in practice,” not the date on which it was formally promulgated or formally
entered into force.923 Therefore, the GOC claimed that the United States violated
Article X:1 because the latter did not promptly publish the legislation that was actually
effective as of November 20, 2006. Specifically, the GOC contended that the United
States backdated the legal authority of Commerce to conduct CVD investigations
against NME countries and did not provide public notice of this authority until more
than five years after it became effective.924 Second, based on such legal arguments, the
918
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GOC further claimed that under Article X:2, the United States was prohibited from
enforcing the CVD law prior to its official publication on March 13, 2012.925 In
particular, the GOC argued that the United States enforced the measure of general
application in Section 1(b) of the GPX Legislation by having the measure provide
retroactive legal authority for the imposition and continued maintenance of CVD
measures on Chinese products resulting from investigations initiated between
November 20, 2006, and March 13, 2012.926 Therefore, according to the GOC, such
retroactive enforcement was inconsistent with the prohibition in Article X:2 against the
enforcement of a measure “before such measure has been officially published.”927
Third, the GOC claimed that Section 1 of the GPX Legislation was also inconsistent
with the obligation of Article X:3(b) because it amended the U.S. CVD law
retroactively and made it applicable to judicial proceedings concerning administrative
actions taken prior to its enactment.928 Accordingly, the GOC argued that the
intervention in a pending judicial proceeding by the legislative branch of the U.S.
government was incompatible with the obligations of the United States under Article
X:3(b).929
For the second challenge, pertaining to the double remedies, the GOC claimed
that the United States failed to investigate and avoid double remedies in 26 CVD
investigations and administrative reviews initiated over the period 2008-2012.930 The
GOC referred to the DS379-AB Report to argue that Article 19.3 of the Subsidies
Agreement obligates an investigating authority to investigate and determine, on the
basis of “positive evidence,” whether double remedies arise in situations when an
investigating authority concurrently imposes CVDs and ADDs calculated under a NME
methodology.931 Based on this interpretation, the GOC alleged that the U.S.
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Department of Commerce had failed to take any steps to investigate and avoid double
remedies in the investigations and reviews at issue.
In response to China’s first challenge, the United States rejected and argued that
the GPX Legislation was “made effective” on the enactment date, i.e., on March 13,
2012.932 The United States submitted that the ordinary meaning of the “made effective”
clause confirms that it is aimed at limiting Article X:1’s application to measures that
have been adopted or brought into operation.933 On this basis, the United States
contended that the GPX Legislation came into existence and was made effective on
March 13, 2012.934 With respect to China’s Article X:2 claim, the United States
contended that Section 1 is not of general application and neither effects an advance in
a rate of duty nor imposes a new or more burdensome requirement or restriction on
imports.935 Further, the United States argued that Section 1 was not enforced until its
publication on March 13, 2012.936 In response to China’s Article X:3(b) claim, the
United States asserted that the claim fails for two reasons: (1) Article X:3(b) does not
impose any limitations on the ability of a national legislature to enact legislation or how
that legislation may be applied; and (2) Article X:3(b), instead, contains a “structural”
obligation on members to establish tribunals whose final decisions should be
implemented by agencies.937 Beside these two arguments, according to the United
States, China’s claim also failed because the litigation in question never produced a
final decision with legal effect prior to the time that the GPX Legislation was
enacted.938
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China’s second challenge was also rejected by the United States, which argued
that China’s claims were baseless both legally and factually.939 Regarding the legal
basis, the United States submitted that China’s claim was “founded on an erroneous
interpretation” of Article 19.3, and claimed that the Appellate Body’s reasoning in
DS379 was “not persuasive.”940 Such allegations demonstrated the continued
unwillingness of the United States to comply fully with the WTO decision. Regarding
the factual basis, the United States claimed that China failed to substantiate its
assertions regarding Commerce’s failure to investigate to avoid double remedies.941
In a mixed decision, the Panel rejected all of China’s Article X-related claims
and upheld the GPX Legislation that allows the United States to apply the CVD law to
NME countries; however, the Panel sided with China in ruling that the United States
failed to examine whether a double remedy had resulted from applying ADDs and
CVDs at the same time. Specifically, the Panel agreed with the United States that
Section 1 of the GPX Legislation was “made effective” on March 13, 2012 (and not on
November 20, 2006), and published on the same day.942 The Panel’s holding is
generally based on the Panel’s interpretation of Article X:1 that this provision does not
prohibit the United States from “making effective” CVD measures to events or
circumstances that occurred before their entry into force, provided such measures are
promptly published.943 With respect to Article X:2 arguments, the Panel concluded that
although Section 1 of the GPX Legislation was enforced before the law has been
officially published, the United States does not violate Article X:2 because Section 1
does not “effect an advance in rate of duty or other charge on imports under an
established and uniform practice,” or “impose a new or more burdensome requirement,
restriction, or prohibition on imports.”944 Regarding the arguments of Article X:3(b),
the Panel ruled that the provision, which requires that the administrative agencies
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implement and be governed by decisions of the tribunals maintained to review their
administrative action relating to customs matters, does not prohibit the United States
from taking legislative action in the nature of Section 1 of the GPX Legislation.945
China did not appeal the Panel’s rulings related to the provisions of Article X:1 and
X:3(b), but it did appeal the Panel’s finding and interpretation of Article X:2 to the
Appellate Body.946 China, however, won on the issue of double remedies. The Panel
sided with China and concluded that in 25947 parallel CVD and AD investigations and
reviews initiated between November 20, 2006, and March 13, 2012, the United States
acted inconsistently with its obligation under Article 19.3 of the Subsidies Agreement
in order to investigate whether, on the basis of positive evidence, double remedies arose
from the imposition of concurrent duties.948 The United States did not directly appeal
this double-remedy ruling to the Appellate Body, but it focused the appeal on accusing
China of a procedural violation, rather than arguing on the substance of the legal
questions at issue. Surprisingly, the United States claimed on appeal that China’s
claims listed in Part D of its panel request949 were in violation of Article 6.2 of the
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Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(DSU)950, which required China to “provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the
complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly.” According to the United States,
China merely listed general articles of the applicable laws (including the Subsidies
Agreement, AD Agreement, and GATT 1994) instead of pointing out specific subarticles (e.g., Article 19.3 in lieu of merely reference to Article 19), in violation of this
procedural rule.951
As for the appeals from both sides, the key issues focused on Article X:2 and
Article 6.2 of the DSU. In its ruling, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s
interpretation of Article X:2 as requiring a comparison between the measure of general
application and an established and uniform practice.952 Although the Appellate Body
partly sided with China on the interpretation of Article X:2, it concluded that it was
unable to complete the analysis under Article X:2 and determine whether the GPX
Legislation violated the WTO requirement because the Panel’s report did not provide
sufficient factual findings to examine this claim.953 Consequently, this claim was
declared moot and had no legal effect to the United States. That means that
Commerce’s actual application of CVD law to China between 2006 and 2012 was
deemed to be lawful under the U.S. law. Therefore, the United States succeeded in
continuing its application of the CVD law to China and other NME countries.
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With respect to the United States’ claim that China’s panel request was
inconsistent with Article 6.2 of the DSU, the Appellate Body noted that in order for a
panel request to meet this provision’s requirements to “present the problem clearly,” it
must “plainly connect the challenged measure(s) with the provision(s) of the covered
agreements claimed to have been infringed.”954 Further, the narrative of a panel request
functions to “explain succinctly how or why the measure at issue is considered by the
complaining Member to be violating the WTO obligation in question.”955 After a
thorough examination of the narrative explanation of China’s panel request, the
Appellate Body addressed that, even without a specification of the relevant paragraphs
of Article 19 of the Subsidies Agreement, Article 19.3 was nonetheless capable of being
identified as the pertinent provision.956 The reference to “double remedies” in China’s
panel request helps present the problem clearly by creating a plain connection between
the measure at issue and the legal claims.957 As a result, the Appellate Body concluded
that it was clear that the general reference to Article 19 of the Subsidies Agreement,
when read in conjunction with the narrative, could be considered to meet the
requirement of Article 6.2 of the DSU to “provide a brief summary of the legal basis
of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly.”958 Therefore, the Appellate
Body upheld the Panel’s finding that claims under Articles 10, 19.3, and 32.1 of the
Subsidies Agreement were identified in China’s panel request consistently with Article
6.2 of the DSU, and were therefore within the Panel’s terms of reference.959 That meant
that the United States, as recommended by the Panel, was required to bring 25
investigations and reviews initiated between November 20, 2006 and March 13, 2012,
into conformity with the WTO obligations.
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China and the United States separately claimed victory in this dispute. China
won the legal battles of double remedies in both DS379 and DS449 cases, while the
United States defeated China in its repeated attempts to challenge the United States’
enactment and application of the CVD law to China and other NME countries. As will
be discussed in Chapter 5, the case discussed in Chapter 4 paved the way for the series
of trade battles that have transpired between Vietnam and the United States, many of
which have given rise to some of the same issues as those that arose in the Chinese
cases—but with even greater complexity as Commerce continues to pursue its policy
of aggressive AD and CVD investigations against countries that have been categorized
as having nonmarket economies.
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Chapter 5. Case Studies of Vietnam

5.1. Introduction
Following the end of the war between the United States and Vietnam was ended
on April 30, 1975, the South of Vietnam was reunified with the North (“Reunification
Day”), and, on July 2, 1976, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was officially
proclaimed on July 2, 1976.960 In contrast, the loss of the Vietnam war was difficult to
accept for the United States government at the time; as a result, the United States
isolated the entire country of Vietnam by extending the trade and investment embargo
that had been previously imposed only against the North of Vietnam since 1964 (a
decade after the French defeat).961 From an American perspective, the Vietnam war
remained “a source of deep emotional conflict,” and there was actually a “fierce antiwar
sentiment both at home and abroad” under the then-President Nixon administration.962
After the Reunification Day, Vietnam faced formidable development
challenges.963 For example, essential infrastructures had been destroyed during the war,
societal wounds from internal conflicts between the North and the South were yet to
heal, food and other basic commodities were in short supply, and millions of people
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were dead, wounded or displaced.964 However, after a decade of struggling with the
stagnant economy under the centrally planned economy model, in 1986, Vietnam
started the most comprehensive economic reform package in its history, known as “Doi
Moi” (“renovation” in English). This was a significant economic transformation from
a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented economy where the state plays a key
leading role. The 1986 Doi Moi policy was historically viewed as a strong move from
bureaucratic centralized management based on state subsidies to a multisector, marketoriented economy, one that would be open to world markets.965 These large-scale
economic reforms focused on the key areas such as price reforms, agriculture sector
reforms, economic integration, macroeconomic stabilization, enterprise reforms,
decentralization, and social equity.966 In pursuit of the objectives of the Doi Moi policy,
prioritizing the economic integration and enterprise reforms, the National Assembly of
Vietnam for the first time enacted a Foreign Investment Law in 1987967 (providing a
basic legal framework for foreign investors to invest and do business in Vietnam), and,
in 1990, it enacted two sets of enterprise laws including the Company Law (providing
the legal framework for the registration of limited liability companies and joint-stock
companies) and the Private Enterprise Law (providing a legal basis for the
establishment of private enterprises).968
Reforms of the banking system in Vietnam have been also implemented since
the 1990s by the enactment of several laws and regulations that have expanded and
opened the banking system to both domestic and foreign investors. Specifically, in
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1990, private commercial banks (including branches of foreign banks and joint-venture
banks) were permitted to open and operate in Vietnam.969
The Doi Moi reforms boosted Vietnam’s underperforming economy
remarkably during the 1990s; in particular, the economic reforms focused on building
a market-oriented economy and creating opportunities for private-sector competition
sent a message to the world that Vietnam was willing to integrate into the global
economy. In fact, the impressive changes in Vietnam’s foreign and domestic policies
have been positively recognized by the international community. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to resume lending to Vietnam in 1993. That action was
a motivation for the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to
recommence their lending to Vietnam shortly thereafter.970 These funds were integral
to Vietnam’s post-war reconstruction of its infrastructure.
The most successful outcome of Vietnam’s efforts at economic reforms was the
lifting of the U.S. trade embargo. On February 3, 1994, then-President Clinton ordered
an end to the 19-year embargo that had banned all trade between the United States and
Vietnam.971 From President Clinton’s perspective, he lifted the trade ban because
Vietnam had made improvements in assisting the United States to search for American
prisoners of war (POWs) and those missing-in-action (MIAs).972 In addition, this action
was viewed as “casting away a central remnant of one of America’s most divisive wars”
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and “opened a potentially lucrative market to American goods.”973 However, it should
be noted that the lifting of the trade embargo was only the first step toward establishing
ties with Vietnam; it did not “constitute a normalization” of diplomatic relations.
Rather, the Clinton administration admonished that further progress for bilateral ties
would depend on Vietnam’s continued cooperation in helping in POW/MIA
searches.974
From the perspective of Vietnam, the end to the trade ban was a remarkable
stepping stone for Vietnam to promote its integration into the region and the world
economy. In fact, in the subsequent year, Vietnam became a full member of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995975, and Vietnam also entered
into a cooperation agreement with the European Union (EU) in the same year.976 1995
was indeed a historic year for Vietnam’s foreign relations, for it also achieved a second
remarkable step in rebuilding its relationship with the United States: specifically, in
July 1995, twenty years after Vietnam’s Reunification Day, the United States moved
forward to establish the formal diplomatic relations with Vietnam.977 This important
event supplemented Vietnam’s accomplishments in establishing its foreign relations
with the three economic spheres including ASEAN (a regional relation), EU (a
multilateral relation) and the United States (a bilateral relation). In addition, the historic
1995 accomplishments paved the way for Vietnam to join into the global economy in
the following years.
Since 1995, Vietnam and the United States have implemented several
significant steps toward bilateral trade normalization and cooperation. In July 2000,
both nations entered into an unprecedented bilateral trade agreement (“BTA”), marking
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a key step in the historic reconciliation between the United States and Vietnam.978 The
BTA includes five major sections: (1) market access for industrial and agricultural
goods; (2) intellectual property rights; (3) market access for services; (4) investment
provisions; and (5) transparency provisions.979 The BTA was a major step for Vietnam
to fulfill a condition necessary to have Normal Trade Relations (“NTR”) status, also
known as Most-Favored-Nation (“MFN”) status, granted by the United States.980 In
June 2001, then-President Bush submitted the BTA to Congress for approval; it was
passed by both the House and the Senate in September 2001 and October 2001,
respectively.981 Thereafter, the BTA was signed into law on October 16, 2001.982 The
National Assembly of Vietnam ratified the BTA on November 28, 2001983, and the
Vietnamese President Tran Duc Luong signed the agreement into law on December 4
of the same year.984 The BTA came into force on December 10, 2001, when the United
States and Vietnam formally exchanged notices of acceptance.985 The successful
conclusion of the BTA was a further key stepping stone along Vietnam’s path to joining
the WTO. Indeed, the BTA is regarded as an important step in securing the United
States’ support for Vietnam’s accession to the WTO. In addition, the processes of
negotiating and implementing the BTA were useful for upgrading Vietnam’s legal,
978
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regulatory, and economic systems to WTO standards.986 It should be noted that as part
of the BTA, Vietnam was granted only a conditional or temporary NTR or MFN status;
that status requires annual Presidential extensions, which must be approved by the U.S.
Congress. Following the BTA, the next step toward normalizing U.S.-Vietnam trade
relations was restoring permanent NTR or MFN status for Vietnam.
On May 31, 2006, U.S. and Vietnamese negotiators signed a bilateral
agreement on the conditions for Vietnam’s accession to the WTO.987 However, the
WTO requires its members to extend unconditional MFN or permanent NTR (PNTR)
status in order to receive the benefits of WTO membership in their bilateral trade
relations. Thus, in order for the United States to get the benefits of the trade concessions
that Vietnam grants to all WTO members, the United States has to grant PNTR status
to Vietnam. With recognition of the important economic and trade relations between
the two countries, the United States granted PNTR status to Vietnam on December 29,
2006.988 This important event marked a full economic normalization between the two
countries. Thereafter, Vietnam formally became a member of WTO in January 2007.989
In June 2007, the United States and Vietnam signed a Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement (TIFA) and set up a platform to discuss issues related to
Vietnam’s WTO commitments and additional investment and trade liberalization.990
Thereafter, then-President Barack Obama’s administration supported a free trade
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agreement, namely the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), that would have consisted of
a dozen countries in the Asia-Pacific region, including Vietnam, as a “lynchpin of a
U.S. strategic pivot to the region.”991 However, based on the allegation that the TPP
would undermine the U.S. manufacturing base, President Trump withdrew the United
States from the TPP shortly after he took office in 2017.992
Although the United States declined to join the TPP, U.S.-Vietnam bilateral
trade has increased remarkably during the past decades. According to U.S. trade
statistics, trade flows between the two nations grew quickly from $1.5 billion in 2001
to $77.6 billion in 2019, transforming Vietnam into the seventh-largest source of U.S.
imports and 27th-largest destination for U.S. exports.993 That rapid trade growth
inevitably caused the U.S. trade deficit with Vietnam to rise from $592 million in 2001
to more than $39 billion in 2018.994 Overall, from 2009 to 2019, imports of goods into
the U.S. from Vietnam increased 442.2%.995
Needless to say, the rapid increase in bilateral trade has created trade friction
over specific products in the two countries. Fierce competition has with regard to such
products as catfish, shrimp, plastic bags, steel pipes, and so forth. The rapid growth in
Vietnam’s exports of catfish (also known as basa, tra, or pangasius) since 2002 has
generated especially high trade tensions between the two nations. There is now a long
and bitter war between the Catfish Farmers of America (“CFA”), representing U.S.
catfish processors, and the Vietnamese producers and exporters of catfish in the
Mekong Delta region of Vietnam. Indeed, a catfish antidumping investigation was the
first trade remedy case that the United States government initiated against Vietnamese
producers, following the CFA’s petition in 2002996, and an antidumping (AD) order
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was finally imposed against Vietnamese catfish producers and exporters in 2003.997
The catfish AD order has now remained in place for more than 17 years, and it remains
in effect today. Following the initiation of the catfish war, several other antidumping
(AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) cases have been initiated against Vietnam. From
2003 to 2019, there were 15 AD and CVD orders imposed against Vietnamese
exporters and producers of frozen fish fillets (AD), shrimp (AD), uncovered
innerspring units (AD), polyethylene retail carrier bags (AD/CVD), steel wire garment
hangers (AD/CVD), utility scale wind towers (AD), welded stainless pressure pipe
(AD), oil country tubular goods (AD), steel nails (AD/CVD), tool chests and cabinets
(AD), and laminated woven sacks (AD/CVD).998 For these currently imposed AD and
CVD orders, in every investigation, the U.S. Department of Commerce has persistently
considered Vietnam a non-market economy (NME) country; therefore, it regularly uses
the NME methodology to calculate the AD and CVD rates imposed against the
Vietnamese exporters and producers. Pursuant to ITC statistical data, most of the
Vietnamese products investigated are similar to Chinese products for which the
Department of Commerce has also imposed AD or CVD orders.999 That is because the
same U.S. petitioners have attempted to prevent unfair trade competition with regard
to similar products imported from both China and Vietnam. In addition, in order to
restrict a bypass or circumvention of an AD or CVD order, U.S. petitioners have a
tendency to file an AD or CVD petition against Vietnam after a similar AD or CVD
order has been imposed upon China, or the U.S. petitioners may file a new AD or CVD
petition against both countries at the same time.
This chapter presents a series of case studies, focusing on countervailing duty
cases that the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) has lodged against
Vietnam as an NME country. In Section 5.2, the author will examine why Vietnam has
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been treated as an NME (by the U.S trade laws and under Vietnam’s WTO
commitments). In Section 5.3, through analysis of specific CVD cases, the author seeks
to identify the subsidy programs provided by the. Government of Vietnam (“GOV”)
that Commerce most frequently determines to be countervailable. Then, in Chapter 6,
the author will recommend strategies for the GOV and Vietnamese companies to adopt
in order to mitigate the challenges of U.S. countervailing duty investigations.

5.2. Vietnam’s Nonmarket Economy Status
5.2.1. Vietnam’s WTO Commitments on NME Status
To integrate into the WTO as a world trading system, Vietnam (as an acceding
member) spent years negotiating the terms of its accession with all WTO members.1000
This accession process took Vietnam for 12 years, from January 1995 to December
2006. In late 2006, at the final meeting of the Working Party, Vietnam successfully
concluded its negotiations on the terms of accession and later became an official WTO
member after ratification of the Protocol on the Accession of Vietnam.1001
Similar to China, Vietnam also agreed to be treated as an NME in antidumping
and countervailing duty proceedings. Specifically, Vietnam made commitments under
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its WTO Accession Protocol Agreement that an importing WTO Member, when
determining price comparability in an antidumping proceeding, may use either
Vietnamese prices or costs (i.e., the ME methodology) or a methodology that is not
based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in Vietnam (i.e., the NME
methodology).1002 The ME methodology may be used if the producers under
investigation can clearly show that ME conditions prevail in the industry producing the
product with regard to the manufacture, production, and sale of that product. In such
circumstances, the importing WTO Member can use Vietnamese prices or costs for the
industry under investigation in determining price comparability.1003 On the other hand,
the NME methodology may be used if the producers under investigation cannot clearly
show that ME conditions prevail in the industry producing the like product with regard
to manufacture, production and sale of that product.1004 This NME methodology - or
the so-called surrogate country approach - has consistently been used by the U.S.
Department of Commerce in all antidumping investigations against Vietnam.
As for its WTO’s commitments on countervailing duty proceedings, Vietnam
agreed that if there are special difficulties in the application of a methodology for
identifying a countervailable subsidy, an importing WTO member may use alternative
methodologies for identifying and measuring the subsidy benefit that take into account
the possibility that prevailing terms and conditions in Vietnam may not be available to
serve as appropriate benchmarks.1005 This means that Vietnam agreed under its WTO
1002
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obligations that the investigating authority of an importing WTO member can select
external benchmarks in CVD investigations for determining the benefits granted to
Vietnamese producers. For example, when loans are extended at “preferential” interest
rates and are challenged through CVD actions, the investigating authority can look to
a surrogate country (that is, a reasonably similar country with a market economy) to
identify what a market interest rate would have been, in order to then identify the
amount of the subsidy implied by the preferential interest rates available in the NME
country.1006
According to the Vietnam’s WTO commitments, the application of the NME
methodology in antidumping proceedings was to endure until at least December 31,
2018.1007 After that date, if Vietnam had established that it has a market economy
satisfying the market economy criteria in accordance with the national law of the
importing WTO member, the NME methodology should no longer be used in
antidumping proceedings.1008 Or, if Vietnam could establish that a particular industry
or sector within Vietnam had prevailing market economy conditions, the NME
methodology should no longer be applied to that industry or sector.1009 Surprisingly,
there was no commitment as to the expiration of non-Vietnamese benchmarks in CVD
actions.1010 In general, under Vietnam’s terms of accession to the WTO, Vietnam was
to remain in NME status until December 31, 2018 (i.e., 12 years from the date of
accession), or until it can satisfy the conditions of market economy treatment set forth
under U.S. law. In other words, the United States was not obligated to designate
Vietnam as a market economy country automatically as of December 31, 2018; rather,
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the NME status of Vietnam must affirmatively be revoked by the United States in
accordance with its current trade laws. In reality, as of today, Vietnam is still regarded
as an NME country in all AD and CVD actions by the United States.

5.2.2. Vietnam’s NME Treatment by the United States
Shortly after the historic U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (“BTA”)
entered into force in 2001, catfish products imported from Vietnam started to appear
more and more in U.S. supermarkets and restaurants, and, with their cheaper prices, the
rapidly became preferred by many American buyers and consumers. In fact, in 2001, a
large quantity of Vietnamese catfish fillets (about 17 million pounds) was imported
into the U.S. market and sold at a retail price of $1.60 per pound, compared with $2.40
for U.S. catfish.1011 The rapid increase in the sale of Vietnamese catfish fillets caused
a threat to the American catfish farmers and processors concentrated in the regions of
Mississippi, Arkansas, and Louisiana, who feared losing their domestic market shares.
Consequently, on June 28, 2002, American catfish farmers and processors filed an
antidumping petition against Vietnamese catfish producers and exporters.1012 This
landmark case over the control of America’s catfish market was known as the first U.S.Vietnam trade war since trade normalization in 1995.
In this catfish antidumping case, Vietnam was for the first time treated as a nonmarket economy country. The subject merchandise in this investigation was referred to
as frozen “basa” and “tra” fillets, as they are commonly called by the Vietnamese
producers and exporters. The U.S. petitioners claimed that the subject merchandise
imported into the U.S. market was sold at less than the normal value and that such
imports caused material injuries or threatened material injuries to the U.S. industry. In
addition, the petitioners alleged that Vietnam was a non-market economy country for
1011
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purposes of the U.S. antidumping law, and, therefore, Vietnam could not provide
specific and reliable information on the production factors of the subject merchandise
in Vietnam.1013
For the purpose of its investigation, Commerce conducted an analysis of
Vietnam’s economic reforms in order to make a decision on the market/non-market
economy status of Vietnam. As required by 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(B), Commerce had
to conduct an extensive analysis of all six factors when making its NME status
determination.1014 Commerce also invited public comment on Vietnam’s economy in
regard to the six factors as set out by the Act.1015 After nearly three months of analyzing
all the comments received from Vietnam and all other interested parties, Commerce
determined that Vietnam had a non-market economy for the purposes of antidumping
and countervailing duty proceedings, effective July 1, 2001.1016 Specifically, in
applying the six factors established by the Act, although Commerce recognized
Vietnam’s positive economic reforms during the period of Doi Moi, Commerce
concluded that Vietnam’s economy remained in transition and, therefore, Vietnam had
not yet become a market economy country.1017
First, in its assessment of Factor 1, the extent to which the currency of the
foreign country is convertible into the currency of other countries, Commerce observed
that Vietnam’s currency (i.e., Vietnam dong, or VND) is not fully convertible for
current account purposes and is practically inconvertible for capital account purposes,
and the exchange rate remains effectively set by the government.1018
1013
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Second, in its analysis of Factor 2, the extent to which wage rates in the foreign
country are determined by free bargaining between labor and management, Commerce
stated that the government of Vietnam retains de jure control over some wage levels,
which could affect free bargaining between employers and employees; consequently,
such control causes an ultimate effect on price formation.1019
Third, in assessment of Factor 3, the extent to which joint ventures or other
investments by firms of other foreign countries are permitted in the foreign country,
Commerce recognized that Vietnam had attracted foreign direct investments (“FDI”)
for the purpose of economic development; however, Vietnam did not show a
willingness to allow FDI to participate in all economic sectors.1020 In addition, the
government of Vietnam used licensing and registration procedures and limitations on
choice of corporate form as the means to direct FDI and implement the government’s
economic development plan.1021
Fourth, in assessment of Factor 4, the extent of government ownership or
control of the means of production, Commerce claimed that the government of Vietnam
(“GOV” preserved an active leading role for state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) and that
competition between the private sectors and public sectors remained limited.1022
Further, it was noted that there was no private land ownership in Vietnam.1023 In other
words, the land is owned by “all the people” and unitedly managed by the state. Thus,
Commerce concluded that the ownership right over private property and private sector
involvement in Vietnam’s economy was greatly limited due to government
intervention.1024
Fifth, in assessment of Factor 5, the extent of government control over the
allocation of resources and over the price and output decisions of enterprises, although
Vietnam has made impressive progress in the development of its private sector, such
1019

Id. at 16.
Id. at 22.
1021
Id.
1022
Id., at 29.
1023
Id. In practice, the government leases land and grants limited land-use rights (or LURs) to individuals
and entities while the transfer and conversion of LURs are subject to government review and approval.
1024
Id.
1020

187

as with the growth of small-and medium-sized businesses, Commerce stated that the
GOV still had considerable control over interest rates and lending policies; and
consequently, the private sector was constrained from access to essential credit for its
business development according to the principles of a market economy.1025 In addition,
Commerce noted that Vietnam still maintained a control over prices in key sectors in
relation to state monopolies (e.g., not only in traditional state monopolies such as
electricity, postal service, and telephone services, but also in cement, steel, iron, other
industrial products and pharmaceuticals, etc.).1026
Sixth, in its broad and flexible assessment of Factor 6, such other factors as the
administering authority considers appropriate, Commerce was free to evaluate
additional issues that it considered relevant to its consideration of market economy
status for Vietnam. Commerce focused on issues such as trade liberalization, rule of
law, and corruption. Specifically, Commerce acknowledged Vietnam’s significant
efforts toward trade liberalization by entering the BTA with the U.S. in 2001, joining
the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (“AFTA”) by 2006, and preparing for accession to
the world trading system (i.e., the WTO).1027 Regarding the other issues, Commerce
stated that the rule of law in Vietnam was still weak and that the levels of corruption in
Vietnam were high, although the GOV was taking steps to address this problem.1028
Commerce admitted, however, that corruption is a major problem in many other
transition economies and even some market economies.1029
By a detailed application of the six factors, Commerce concluded that the
market forces in Vietnam were not yet sufficiently developed to permit the use of prices
and costs to calculate the normal values in its antidumping investigation. Beyond this
conclusion, Commerce also recommended that Vietnam be treated as an NME country
in countervailing duty investigations as well. This NME determination has been
applicable to both antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings and is effective
1025
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from July 1, 2001 to present day. For the purpose of application of the U.S. antidumping
and countervailing duty laws to NME countries, Commerce has published a list of
eleven countries currently designated as nonmarket economy countries, including
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Georgia, Kyrgyz, Moldova, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.1030
In order for an NME country to change its status and be treated as a market
economy country, either it must make a formal request for review, or a respondent from
that country in an antidumping proceeding must claim that its country has market
economy status.1031 Over the years, several NME countries have successfully
“graduated” to become market economy countries, such as Poland in 1993, Russia in
2002, and Ukraine in 2006.1032 Section 5.3 will discuss Commerce’s revocation of its
NME designations for Poland, Russia, and Ukraine, and it will also analyze China’s
failed efforts to change its NME status.

5.3. Other Countries’ Attempts to Escape NME Status
Poland came to be recognized by the United States as a market economy
country as early as 1993. During an antidumping investigation against imports of steel
plates from Poland in 1993, Commerce agreed to revoke Poland’s status as an NME
country (retroactively effective from January 1, 1992) for purposes of applying the U.S.
antidumping law.1033 Commerce’s revocation was based on the finding that Poland’s
economic reforms satisfied the statutory six factors established in 19 U.S.C. §
1677(18)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. In particular, Commerce found that
Poland’s domestic markets, unlike those of a traditional NME, were open to trade and
1030
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foreign investment and were not insulated or protected from external market
influences.1034 In addition, Commerce found that Poland’s economy operated on the
basis of market principles to such an extent that its domestic prices could reasonably
be used as a basis for determining fair market value under the U.S. antidumping law.1035
For these reasons, Commerce determined that, by 1992, Poland’s major economic
reforms , which had begun in 1990, had progressed to the point that 1992 Polish
domestic prices could be considered market-driven.1036
As to the case of Russia, following several formal requests by Russian steel
companies in an AD proceeding on hot-rolled steel products from Russia, Commerce
initiated an inquiry into the status of Russia as an NME country under the AD and CVD
laws in October 2001.1037 As in the case of Poland, Commerce’s overall conclusion
was also based on its analysis of the six factors. Commerce stated that Russia had
generally made the transition to a market economy. Focusing its reasoning on Factor
11038, Commerce opined that the Russian ruble was convertible for investment
purposes, it was fully convertible for trade purposes, and the exchange rate was marketbased.1039 With respect to the internal pricing mechanism in Russia, Commerce found
that prices for the vast majority of goods and services were not subject to price controls
and were based on market forces of supply and demand. Commerce also remarked that
Russian privatization had been comprehensive and had placed the great majority of
industry, property, and assets in the hands of the private sector.1040 Although Commerce
pointed out some unsatisfactory aspects in the Russian economy such as Russia’s tax
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system and its business registration and licensing requirements, which still kept
investment relatively low, and although Russian workers on the whole were paid
relatively low wages, Commerce ultimately accepted that foreign investment was
permitted and encouraged in Russia, and that Russian wages were market-based.1041
Furthermore, Commerce noted that Russian’s banking reforms had lagged, its pace of
industrial restructuring has been slow, and regulated energy prices remained a
significant concern in the economy.1042 Despite those difficulties, Commerce finally
concluded that Russia’s economy overall had become market-based.1043 Based on these
reasons, Commerce revoked Russia’s NME status, effective as of April 1, 2002.1044
In the case of Ukraine, in April 2005, the Government of Ukraine (“GOU”)
formally asked Commerce to conduct a review of Ukraine’s NME status within the
context of a changed circumstances review of the AD order on carbon and certain steel
wire rod from Ukraine.1045 Based on its assessment of the statutory six factors,
Commerce found that Ukraine’s currency (i.e., the hryvnia) was freely convertible and
was subject to market forces.1046 Ukraine’s employees and management could freely
negotiate wages, and workers had trade union rights.1047 Further, Commerce found that
foreign direct investment was encouraged in almost all sectors of Ukraine’s economy,
and foreign-invested enterprises could have an equal treatment as with domestic
enterprises.1048 It is worth noting that Ukraine was able to show its privatization efforts,
as a result of which at least 65% of Ukraine’s GDP was held by the private sector,
whereas there were relatively few large state-owned enterprises remaining.1049 In
addition, Commerce found that land in Ukraine (including land for agricultural use)
could be privately held, and that foreign investors may own the land on which their
1041
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investments are located.1050 With respect to the banking sector and price controls in
Ukraine, Commerce stated that the GOU had withdrawn its previous position as a
primary resource allocator in the economy by privatizing virtually the entire banking
sector and eliminating most price controls.1051 Despite such substantial economic
progress, Commerce recommended that Ukraine continue to enhance such privatization
mechanisms for trade in land, particularly for agricultural land.1052 Based on this
reasoning, Commerce finally concluded that Ukraine’s significant economic reforms
warranted treatment as a market economy country, effective as of February 1, 2006.1053
As for the case of China, pursuing an ME status has been its long-term strategic
target. In 2017, China asked Commerce to revoke China’s NME status, but Commerce
declined that revocation request.1054 In its decision, after an extensive analysis of the
six factors, Commerce concluded that China was still an NME country because “the
state’s role in the economy and its relationship with markets and the private sector
results in fundamental distortions in the Chinese economy.”1055 Specifically, some of
the key findings in Commerce’s six-factor analysis included persistent problems related
to China’s currency convertibility, where Commerce found that the Government of
China (“GOC”) “still maintains significant restrictions on capital account transactions
and intervenes considerably in onshore and offshore foreign exchange market.”1056
With respect to the wages, Commerce found that there remained “significant
institutional constraints on the extent to which wage rates were determined through free
bargaining between labor and management.”1057 In particular, Commerce realized that

1050

Id.
Id.
1052
Id.
1053
Id.
1054
U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Memorandum from Leah WilsOwens, Office of Policy, Enforcement & Compliance, to Gary Taverman, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Antidumping and Countervailing Operations, China’s Status as a Non-Maret Economy, Investigation
No. A-570-053 (October 26, 2017) [hereinafter China’s NME Status Memo], available at
https://enforcement.trade.gov/download/prc-nme-status/prc-nme-review-final-103017.pdf, accessed on
August 18, 2021.
1055
Id. at 7.
1056
Id. at 4.
1057
Id. at 5.
1051

192

the formation of independent trade unions to represent labor was still prohibited, and
workers did not have the right to strike.1058 Regarding China’s foreign investment
regime, Commerce found that there still existed “significant barriers to foreign
investment, including equity limits and local partner requirements, opaque approval
and regulatory procedures, and technology transfer and localization requirements.”1059
With respect to China’s control over production, Commerce found that the GOC
continued to “exert significant ownership and control over the means of production,”
through (1) “the role and prevalence of state-invested enterprises (SIEs)” and (2) “the
system of land ownership and land-use rights.”1060 Firstly, the SIEs overwhelmed other
major economies, and due to the SIEs’ priority in allocation of resources, SIEs were
“not strictly disciplined by market principles of supply and demand.”1061 Secondly, the
GOC owned and controlled all land in China (including both rural and urban land),
which is another key means of production.1062 Regarding China’s control over the
allocation of resources, prices, and the banking sector, Commerce found that the GOC
continued to maintain state planning in its industrial policies to influence economic
outcomes, a high degree of control over essential or strategic prices (e.g., in provision
of electricity), and state ownership and control over the largest commercial banks.1063
Lastly, Commerce found that the legal system in China was used by the GOC and the
CCP to “secure discrete economic outcomes, channel broader economic policy, and
pursue industrial policy goals.” From these key findings, Commerce concluded that
China was not qualified to be deemed a market economy country.
In parallel with China’s efforts to challenge its NME designation directly with
the U.S. Department of Commerce in 2017, China requested consultations with both
the U.S. (in Case DS515) and the EU (in Case DS516) before the WTO in December
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2016.1064 In each dispute, China claimed that according to certain provisions of its
WTO’s Accession Protocol in 2001, China must be recognized as a market economy
after 15 years had elapsed from its accession to the WTO.1065 According to China, the
provisions of Section 15(a)(ii) and Section 15(d) of its Accession Protocol, which had
allowed other WTO members to treat China as an NME in AD investigations, expired
on December 11, 2016 (“Expiry Date”).1066 Section 15 generally allows a WTO
member to disregard Chinese domestic prices and use surrogate prices from a third
country instead, under the NME methodology. Section 15(d) provides that the NME
provision as set forth under Section 15(a)(ii) “shall expire 15 years after the date of
accession.”1067 Thus, based on its simple understanding of Section 15(d), China
interpreted the expiry provision of Section 15(a)(ii) as creating a legal obligation for
1064
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other WTO members to grant China ME status automatically. If China’s interpretation
were commonly accepted, it would benefit Vietnam, because Vietnam had similar
provisions in its WTO Accession Protocol: the provisions regarding the application of
the NME methodology in AD actions against Vietnam was supposed to expire on
December 31, 2018.1068 Accordingly, because of the legal importance of the China
dispute as well as its implications for Vietnam’s related interest, Vietnam also
requested to join the consultations in both cases DS515 and DS516 in December
2016.1069 Notably, at the request of China, a WTO panel was established in the EU case
(DS516) only, but not in the U.S. case (DS515), simply because China did not request
establishment of a panel in that case.1070 The matters that China raised in the EU
consultation were closely related to the ones in the U.S. consultation. The United States,
as a third party in DS516, disagreed with China’s interpretation and stated that
following the expiry of Section 15(a)(ii), China must have “an adequate evidentiary
basis” for a determination to use a methodology that is not based on a strict comparison
with domestic prices or costs in China in determining price comparability in AD
proceedings involving Chinese products that are imported into a WTO member after
December 11, 2016.1071 The United States agreed with the EU that the expiry of Section
15(a)(ii) meant that the particular standard of evidence introduced in that paragraph
was no longer applicable, and that after December 11, 2016, an importing Member
must “fall back” on the standard of evidence generally applicable in AD proceedings—
which does not necessarily mean treatment as an ME country.1072 In May 2019, China
requested the Panel to suspend the proceedings in DS516.1073 That meant that China
1068
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decided temporarily to end its efforts at the WTO battlefield for recognition as a market
economy. One may infer that China withdrew from the WTO dispute to avoid showing
to the world its potential defeat.1074 Another possible explanation for China’s
withdrawal is that the Panel supported the EU’s position that the Expiry Date merely
shifts the burden of proof and does not terminate a member’s substantive right to apply
the NME methodology to China.1075
In sum, the successful examples of Poland, Russia, and Ukraine, as well as
China’s unsuccessful efforts in applying for ME graduation with the United States and
the EU, provide important lessons for Vietnam. So far Vietnam, has not formally asked
Commerce to reconsider Vietnam’s NME label that was attached in 2002. However,
the fact that Poland, Russia, and Ukraine have been recognized by Commerce as market
economies does not depend only on their significant economic reforms, but above all,
upon the diplomatic relations and political factors that also contributed to their success.
For example, in the case of Ukraine, prior to Commerce’s decision on the
reclassification of Ukraine’s NME status, during an official visit to Ukraine, the former
U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, voiced her hope that “the United States
would grant market economy status to Ukraine soon,” and she also said that the United
States “highly values the friendship and its cooperation with Ukraine, a large strategic
partner, and a country of great importance in Europe.”1076 It can be said that this
strategic partnership between Ukraine and the United States substantially helped
Ukraine to succeed in acquiring recognition as a market economy country.

5.4. Case Studies of U.S. CVD Actions Against Vietnam
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This section will discuss and analyze several CVD actions initiated by the
United States against Vietnam. Section 5.3.1 presents the case of polyethylene retail
carrier bags. Section 5.3.2 presents the case of certain welded steel pipe. Section 5.3.3
presents the case of steel wire garment hangers. Section 5.3.4 presents the case of
certain frozen warmwater shrimp. Section 5.3.5 presents the case of steel nails,
laminated woven sacks, and utility scale wind towers. And, finally, Section 5.3.6
present the most recent case, concerning tires for passenger vehicles and light trucks.
Together, these cases span the twelve-year period 2009-2021. As the author will
discuss, the cases show that Vietnamese producers suffer less-favorable outcomes in
these CVD actions because of the application of the NME methodology. Moreover,
despite the presence of market forces in many sectors in Vietnam, Commerce has
consistently found that prices in Vietnam do not reflect market values, with the result
that Vietnamese producers are treated as having received countervailable subsidies in
a wide array of circumstances, such as by obtaining land, credit, or raw materials at
lower prices than, according to Commerce, they could have done in a true market
economy.
5.4.1. Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags
5.4.1.1. Introduction
The analysis of the first CVD investigation involving Vietnam is very important
in understanding the series of Commerce’s CVD cases against Vietnam. This first CVD
case operated as a foundation for Commerce to implement and apply its new CVD
practice in subsequent investigations against Vietnam. In addition, this first CVD case
provides a good lesson for Vietnamese exporters and producers (especially for those
who are exporting to the U.S. market) in understanding Commerce’s investigation
process and its requirements, as well as for preparing to deal with similar cases in the
future.
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Therefore, in this section, the author will focus on analyzing the legal grounds
and reasoning employed by Commerce in applying the CVD law to Vietnam as a
nonmarket economy country. The author will also examine Vietnamese government
programs that Commerce determined for the first time constituted countervailable
subsidies. In addition, this section will clarify how Commerce selected benchmarks to
calculate the benefits that Vietnamese exporters and producers received under each
subsidy program.

5.4.1.2. Case Summary
On April 20, 2009, in a dual antidumping and countervailing duty action
petitioned by U.S. industry, Commerce initiated the first ever CVD investigation
against Vietnamese producers of polyethylene retail carrier bags (“PRCBs”).1077
PRCBs are better known by American consumers as plastic grocery and shopping bags.
In its petition, the U.S. domestic producers of PRCBs including Hilex Poly Co., LLC
and Superbag Corporation (collectively, the “Petitioners”) alleged that the Vietnamese
producers of PRCBs received subsidies from the Government of Vietnam (“GOV”)
and that such imports caused or threatened to cause material injury to domestic U.S.
industry.1078 According to the USITC’s import statistics, in terms of volume, between
2006 and 2008, imports of PRCBs from Vietnam by the U.S. increased by 134.9
percent.1079 In terms of value, subject imports from Vietnam were valued at an
estimated US$79.4 million in 2008, showing a significant increase from US$65.4
million in 2007 and from US$17.5 million in 2006.1080 Therefore, the rapid increase in
1077
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quantity and value of PRCBs imported into the U.S. market is likely the main reason
that the Petitioners initiated this dual trade remedy action.
In its preliminary determination issued on August 28, 2009, Commerce
determined that under U.S. trade law, there was no legal impediment to the application
of the CVD law to imports from Vietnam, which was considered as a nonmarket
economy country. Notably, Vietnam was designated as an NME country in the catfish
antidumping case in 2003. Since that time, the United States has not modified
Vietnam’s status as a nonmarket economy. In this CVD investigation, although
Vietnam had a nonmarket economy, Commerce said that, because Vietnam had
recently undergone many economic reforms, at the time of this proceeding, Commerce
believed that it had the ability to identify and calculate any benefits that the GOV
granted to Vietnamese exporters and producers. Regarding the existence of a subsidy,
Commerce preliminarily found that a number of countervailable subsidies were
provided to Vietnam’s exporters and producers of PRCBs. In March 2010, Commerce
reaffirmed its preliminary determination. Accordingly, based on the benchmarking
methodologies developed by Commerce in previous CVD cases against China,
Commerce calculated the net subsidy rate for the three mandatory respondents that
were individually examined in this CVD proceeding. In particular, Advance Polybag
Co., Ltd. (API), Chin Sheng Company Ltd. (Chin Sheng), and Fotai Vietnam Enterprise
Corp. (Fotai Vietnam) and Fotai Enterprise Corporation (collectively, Fotai) received
final subsidy rates of 52.56 percent, 0.44 percent (de minimis), and 5.28 percent,
respectively.1081 All other producers and exporters from Vietnam (which were not
individually examined) received a final CVD rate of 5.28 percent.1082
Commerce’s determination on the existence of countervailable subsidies was
subsequently affirmed by the USITC. In its final voting, the USITC ruled that U.S.
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industry is threatened with material injury by reason of imports of PRCBs from
Vietnam.1083 As a result, Commerce issued a CVD order on PRCBs imported from
Vietnam, effective as of May 4, 2010.1084
In the simultaneous antidumping investigation against PRCBs from Vietnam,
Commerce assigned to both mandatory respondents API and Fotai the Vietnam-wide
entity rate of 76.11% due to their withdrawal from the AD investigation prior to
Commerce’s preliminary determination.1085 Normally, if a mandatory respondent
withdraws from participation, it is regarded as non-cooperative, and, therefore, it will
be subjected to a total adverse-facts-available (“AFA”) rate, which is the highest
dumping margin alleged by the petitioner. As for Chin Sheng (a mandatory respondent
in the CVD case), because it was not a mandatory respondent in the AD investigation,
it was assigned a separate rate of 52.30%.1086
In sum, as a result of the concurrent AD and CVD investigations, API, Fotai
and Chin Sheng received the combined AD and CVD rates of 128.67%, 81.39%, and
52.74% respectively. From this case study, it is notable that the respondents (either
mandatory or non-mandatory) involved in parallel AD and CVD investigations must
ensure that they are able to succeed in both cases to be allowed to continue their exports
to the U.S. market with a relatively low duty rate or even a zero duty rate. Otherwise,
if they will not be able to withstand hight duty rates, they may have to close their
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manufacturing plants or target other export markets. As in the case of Chin Sheng,
although it achieved a de minimis rate (i.e., zero percent) in the CVD case, it was
subjected to an AD duty rate of 52.30%. Chin Sheng was excluded from a CVD order
on the basis of a de minimis subsidy rate, but its AD rate was no insignificant.
5.4.1.3. Application of the CVD Law to Vietnam
5.4.1.3.1. A Precedent Case from China
As discussed above in Chapter 4, Commerce formerly pursued a long-standing
policy of not applying the CVD law to NME countries. In 1986, in its ruling in
Georgetown Steel, the CAFC affirmed Commerce’s determination that the CVD law
could not apply to NME countries.1087 However, in a controversial action, on November
20, 2006, Commerce still made the decision to initiate a CVD investigation on imports
of coated free sheet paper (“CFS Paper”) from China.1088 This was the first
countervailing duty investigation against China since 1991, when Commerce initiated
investigations against lugnuts and ceiling fans, which had to be terminated before going
to an order.1089 The investigation into CFS Paper from China required Commerce to
review its long-standing policy of not applying the CVD law to NME countries like
China. In that case, Commerce compared China’s economic situation during the period
of investigation in 2006 with the economies that had been at issue in Georgetown Steel.
Through its comparison, Commerce noticed that there was a substantial difference
between the modern economy in China and the 1980s Soviet-style economy in
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Georgetown Steel.1090 As a result, Commerce concluded that its policy that gave rise to
Georgetown Steel’s litigation was inapposite to the investigation of CFS Paper from
China, and therefore, did not bar the application of the CVD law to imports from
China.1091 With this reasoning, on October 17, 2007, Commerce confirmed its
preliminary determination to apply the CVD law to China.1092
5.4.1.3.2. Application of the CVD Law to Vietnam
Just as with China, when the CVD action against PRCBs from Vietnam was
initiated in 2009, because Commerce had never investigated the imposition of any
countervailing duty against Vietnam, Commerce was required to determine whether
the CVD law was applicable to Vietnam. In the petition against PRCBs from Vietnam,
the Petitioners argued that there was no statutory bar to the application of the CVD law
to imports from NME countries like Vietnam.1093 Referring to Georgetown Steel, the
Petitioners pointed out that the CAFC affirmed Commerce’s decision regarding the
application of the CVD law to NME countries.1094 Furthermore, the Petitioners claimed
that the Vietnamese economy, like China’s economy, is significantly different from the
Soviet-style economy analyzed in Georgetown Steel. And for that reason, Commerce
should not have any particular difficulty in determining and calculating NME-related
subsidies.1095 In addition, the Petitioners contended that Vietnam’s economy (at the
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time of this investigation) significantly mirrored China’s present-day economy and is
at least as different from the Soviet-style economy at issue in Georgetown Steel, as
China’s economy was found to be in 2007.1096 The Petitioners also argued that
Vietnam’s integration into the WTO allowed Commerce to apply the CVD law to
imports from Vietnam.1097 The WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Agreement (“SCM Agreement”), similar to U.S. law, permits the imposition of CVDs
on subsidized imports from member countries and nowhere exempts NME imports
from being subject to the provisions of the SCM Agreement.1098 The Petitioners argued
that because Vietnam had agreed to be bound under the SCM Agreement and other
WTO provisions related to the use of subsidies, Vietnam must be subject to the same
rules as other members.1099
On May 27, 2009, when Vietnam submitted its comments to Commerce
regarding whether the CVD law should be applied to imports from Vietnam, the GOV
argued that Commerce should comprehensively examine whether Vietnam’s economy
is fully market oriented to allow Commerce to conduct a CVD action as it did with
China.1100 In addition, the GOV also contended that Commerce’s countervailing duty
initiation was inconsistent with the U.S. law and its WTO obligations. Specifically, the
GOV argued that CAFC’s decision, followed by the U.S. Congress’s failure to overturn
that decision and by Commerce’s policy of not applying the CVD law against NMEs
for 20 years, clearly established that the application of CVD law to NMEs was
inconsistent with U.S. law.1101
To assess whether the CVD law was applicable to Vietnam, Commerce took a
quick review of Vietnam’s economy. Specifically, Commerce looked at recognizable
features or characteristics in Vietnam’s manufacturing, finance, trade, state-owned
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enterprise sector, land administration, and trade and investment mechanisms.1102 Based
on its “snap-shot” examination, Commerce determined that “Vietnam is no longer a
classic style, centrally planned economy as described in Georgetown Steel.”1103
Commerce noted that “the economic space of Vietnam is a mixed landscape of public,
private and foreign ownership,”1104 and that the non-State sector had grown rapidly and
has accounted for an increasing share of production, investment, employment and
trade, although SOEs continued to play a significant role in the economy.1105 However,
Commerce noted that economic reforms in Vietnam were incomplete and that structural
and institutional legacy problems still remained.1106 Although private enterprises
shared the economic space, they did not share it equally or on the same terms and
conditions with the State sector, especially in the important areas of access to credit
and land.1107 Finally, Commerce concluded that, as a result of such developments, it
was possible to determine whether the GOV had bestowed a benefit upon a Vietnamese
producer (i.e., the subsidy could be identified and measured) and whether any such
benefit was specific.1108 Commerce’s rationale was that because it was capable of
applying the necessary criteria set forth in the CVD law, Commerce’s policy that gave
rise to the Georgetown Steel litigation did not prevent it from concluding that the GOV
had bestowed a countervailable subsidy upon a Vietnamese producer.1109
In making its determination on the date of applicability of the CVD law to
Vietnam, Commerce determined that the date from which it is appropriate and
administratively feasible to identify and measure subsidies in Vietnam for the purposes
of CVD actions was January 11, 2007 (i.e., the effective date of Vietnam’s WTO
1102
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accession).1110 The practice of choosing a cut-off date for a CVD investigation was
similarly adopted in China’s CVD final determinations involving imports of welded
pipe, woven sacks, OTR tires, and thermal paper from China, wherein Commerce held
in each case that December 11, 2011 (i.e., the effective date of China’s WTO
accession), was the most appropriate starting date for identifying and measuring
subsidies in China.

5.4.1.4. Use of Benchmarks
Commerce normally uses benchmarks other than actual prices or interest rates
available in Vietnam, and it does so based on Commerce’s findings that the GOV has
taken a predominant role in land ownership and in the provision of loans in Vietnam.
Further, the GOV’s direct intervention in the markets for lending and land-use rights is
claimed to impact prices, rendering those prices inappropriate for determining the
amount of the benefit conferred by a subsidy. Thus, Commerce usually resorts to outof-country benchmarks to measure the benefit of a subsidy in most of its countervailing
duty investigations against Vietnam.

5.4.1.4.1. Interest-Rate Benchmarks
Before choosing benchmarks, Commerce conducted a review of Vietnam’s
banking sector. Based on its findings that “loans provided by Vietnamese banks reflect
significant government intervention in the banking sector and do not reflect interest
rates that would be found in a functioning market,” Commerce determined that it
should use an out-of-country, market-based interest-rate benchmark for the purposes
of determining the benefits provided by the GOV’s preferential lending programs.1111
1110
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For VND-denominated loans, Commerce calculated the external benchmark
based on regression analysis that was previously developed by Commerce in CFS Paper
from China and updated in other subsequent Chinese CVD cases.1112 Technically,
Commerce’s regression analysis bases the benchmark interest rate on the inflationadjusted interest rates of countries with per capita gross national incomes (GNIs)
similar to Vietnam’s, taking into account a key factor involved in interest formation,
that of the quality of a country’s institutions, which is not directly tied to state-imposed
distortions in the banking sector.1113 For USD-dominated loans, Commerce uses
LIBOR rates with some adjustments.1114
In this CVD case, in the preliminary determination, Commerce determined that
the loans provided by the Vietnam Development Bank (VDB) and state-owned
commercial banks (SOCBs) were considered government financial contributions and
conferred a specific benefit because such preferential loans targeted the plastics
industry under the GOV’s Plastic Plan.1115 However, in the final determination,
Commerce concluded that the preferential lending under the Plastics Plan was not used
by PRCBs exporters and producers in Vietnam.1116
For Fotai, unfortunately, it was still assigned an AFA subsidy rate of 2.17% for
the program of preferential lending for exporters.1117 The reason for this was that during
Commerce’s verification of Fotai’s submitted information and data, Commerce was
unable to verify the accuracy and completeness of Fotai’s reported short-term loan
information.1118 In particular, during the verification, Commerce found that the actual
figures in Fotai’s books and records were different numbers than reported on Fotai’s
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initial responses.1119 Thus, Commerce concluded that Fotai failed to cooperate to the
best of its ability and that the AFA was applicable to Fotai.1120

5.4.1.4.2. Land Benchmarks
Commerce’s regulations set forth the basis for identifying comparative
benchmarks to assess whether a government good or service is provided for “less than
adequate remuneration” (LTAR).1121 In other words, Commerce employs the threetiered benchmark approach to determine whether the government provides land rent
for LTAR. Specifically, Commerce may use market prices from actual transactions
within Vietnam (a Tier-1 Benchmark). When actual prices in Vietnam cannot be used
due to government intervention, Commerce resorts to world market prices that would
be available to purchasers in Vietnam (a Tier-2 Benchmark). In cases where there are
no world market prices available to purchasers in Vietnam, Commerce goes forward to
assess whether the government prices are consistent with market principles (a Tier-3
Benchmark).1122
Based on its separate research and analysis of the land markets in Vietnam,
Commerce concluded that “the purchase of land-use rights in Vietnam is not conducted
in accordance with market principles.”1123 In fact, Commerce stated that the GOV’s
dominance of the land market in Vietnam distorted the market for provision of land
rent; consequently, no non-distorted benchmarks could be selected.1124 Commerce’s
conclusion was based on the facts that the GOV was involved in the allocation, access,
and pricing of land.1125 Such involvement, according to Commerce, restricted the
development of a market-based land system because the GOV maintained a
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predominant role in Vietnam’s land market.1126 Commerce acknowledged that there
may be land transactions via sub-leasing of land-use rights between private parties;
however, access to these rights and the parameters within which these transactions were
permitted to operate were also set by the GOV.1127 Accordingly, Commerce determined
that it could not use in-country transactions as a benchmark because land prices in
Vietnam were distorted.
In evaluating which source was appropriate to use for an external land
benchmark to apply to the case of Vietnam, following the precedential cases involving
China, Commerce focused on the factors of per capita GNI and population density.1128
Based on that methodology, Commerce chose to use average rental rates for industrial
property in the cities of Pune and Bangalore in India as surrogate rates because these
two cities were determined by Commerce to have the closest match in terms of per
capita GNI and population density, noting that the per capita GNI for India is $1,070,
compared to $890 for Vietnam, even though the Philippines was found to be a closer
match in terms of population density to Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam than the two Indian
cities.1129
In this CVD investigation, Fotai was found to have received a countervailable subsidy
from the program of land rent exemption for exporters. Specifically, Fotai was exempt
from land rent because its project was in “the list of special encouragement” and Fotai’s
value of exported products reached the rate of 90%.1130 For these reasons, Commerce
determined that the portion of land use rights provided to Fotai exempted from land
rental fees was specific as an export subsidy.1131 In addition, Commerce determined
that there was a financial contribution because the rented land use rights constituted the
provision of a good or service.1132 As a result, Commerce determined that there existed
a benefit to the extent that these land use rights were provided to Fotai for less than
1126
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adequate remuneration (LTAR).1133 In calculating the benefit that Fotai received,
Commerce multiplied the Indian benchmark land rental rate by the area of Fotai’s
exempted portion of land use rights.1134 Then, Commerce divided that amount by
Fotai’s export sales to calculate a countervailable subsidy rate of 0.71%% ad valorem
for Fotai.1135
5.4.1.5. Analysis of Other Countervailable Subsidies
5.4.1.5.1. Income Tax Preferences for Encouraged Industries
The Petitioners further alleged that the foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) operating in
industries and business sectors that are either “encouraged” or “specially encouraged”
by the State are eligible for income tax preferences.1136 The Petitioners gave an example
that the FIEs are eligible for preferential rates of 10 or 15 percent, for up to 15 years, if
they satisfy one or more criteria including operating a project identified in the GOV’s
list of encouraged projects.1137 During its investigation, Commerce found that one of
the mandatory respondents, Chin Sheng Company, Ltd., benefited from a corporate
income tax rate reduction for the tax return filed during the POI.1138
Specifically, Commerce noted that Chin Sheng qualified for its tax preferences because
of its investment in an encouraged industry (i.e., a new investment project in plastic
doors and plastic bags).1139 Accordingly, Commerce determined that this type of
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subsidy (i.e., income tax reduction and exemption) satisfies the conditions of (i)
specificity to a group of industries and (ii) being a financial contributions in the form
of revenue foregone by the government, and (iii) providing a benefit to Chin Sheng
Company, Ltd., in the amount of the tax savings.1140 Thus, Commerce concluded that
this subsidy program was countervailable.
5.4.1.5.2. Income Tax Preferences for FIEs
The Petitioners further claimed that the GOV treated FIEs differently from other
similarly situated enterprises during the period of investigation (“POI”).1141 For this
allegation, Commerce found that Fotai received countervailable income tax preferences
under the Income Tax Preferences for FIEs program.1142 Specifically, Fotai benefited
from a reduction in the standard corporate income tax rate for the tax return filed during
the POI because of its FIE status.1143 Such preferences were found by Commerce to be
specific (as a matter of law) to a group of enterprises, FIEs; they were found to be a
financial contribution in the form of revenue foregone by the government; and
provision of a benefit to Fotai in the amount of tax savings.1144 Thus, this subsidy
program was determined as a countervailable subsidy.
5.4.1.5.3. Import Duty Exemptions for Imported Raw Materials for Exported
Goods
In its initial Petition and in new subsidy allegations lodged on June 25, 2009, the
Petitioners claimed that companies in Vietnam were entitled to exemptions from import
duties on raw materials if they were FIEs or located in industrial zones.1145 While both
API and Fotai were in fact exempt from paying duties on imported raw materials, their
1140
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exemptions stem from Article 16 of the Law on Import Tax and Export Tax, Law No.
45/2005/QH-11, June 14, 2005, included as Exhibit 43 of the GOV’s July 8, 2009
questionnaire response.1146 Article 16 states that “Goods imported for processing for a
foreign party which are then exported” are exempt from import duties.1147 According
to the GOV, the FIE exemption program was part of a terminated law and there was no
exemption program for industrial zones.1148
At the preliminary stage of investigation, Commerce determined that API received
countervailable benefits under this program to the extent that it imported materials not
consumed in exported products.1149 Commerce clarified that these exemptions are
specific as export subsidies because they are contingent upon export performance.1150
As to Fotai, Commerce noted that Fotai also had imports of materials under this
program, but it was unclear to Commerce whether all of these materials were consumed
in the exported products.1151 Chin Sheng reported that its imports were subject to a zero
rate under the normal tariff schedule, and therefore, it did not benefit from the
program.1152 In making its final determination, Commerce gathered more information
regarding how the GOV established and verified which goods were consumed in the
production of exported products and how it reconciled imports and exports under these
exemptions.1153
During the final stage of investigation, since API dropped out of the investigation,1154
Commerce requested both Chin Sheng and Fotai to report imports of all raw materials
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and other materials used in production of the exported product on which the company
received import duty exemption.1155 Chin Sheng reported that it had not received any
import duty exemption on any of its raw materials or other materials; Fotai reported
that it had received such exemptions on both raw materials and other materials.1156
Commerce carried out verification at the final stage of investigation and found that the
GOV did not have in place a system to confirm which inputs were consumed in the
production of exported products and in what amounts, including a normal allowance
for waste.1157 Finally, Commerce determined that the duty exemptions on raw materials
imported under this program during the POI provided countervailable benefits.1158
Commerce further explained that in order to find import duty exemptions on raw
materials non-countervailable, the government in question must have a system in place
to confirm which inputs are consumed in the production of the exported product,
including a normal allowance for waste; however, the GOV did not have such a system
and companies were, in fact, allowed to choose their own yield rates within a range
established by the GOV.1159 Thus, the duty exemptions on raw materials for exports
were found to be fully countervailable.1160
5.4.1.5.4. Exemption of Import Duties on Imports of Spare Parts and Accessories
for Industrial Zone Enterprises
Commerce found that Fotai received import duty exemptions during the POI on
imported spare parts and accessories and that Fotai qualified for such exemptions
because one of its plants was located in an industrial zone.1161 Commerce stated that
exemptions from import duties are normally treated as a recurring subsidy.1162 In
addition, spare parts and accessories are imported on a regular basis and, presumably,
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Fotai could expect exemptions on such imports on an ongoing basis from year to
year.1163 Commerce then determined that benefits under this program were specific
because the exemptions were limited to enterprises located within a designated
geographical region (i.e., industrial zones) within the jurisdiction of the authority
providing the subsidy.1164 Further, Commerce determined that a financial contribution
existed because the exempted duties represented revenue foregone by the GOV.1165

5.4.1.6. Conclusion
Commerce’s findings regarding the subsidized programs granted to the
Vietnamese exporters and producers of PRCBs was the first-ever affirmative CVD
determination against imports from Vietnam. It marked a turning point from the outset
that Commerce found Vietnam had undergone certain economic reforms to the extent
that, at the time of this CVD initiation, Commerce was able to identify and measure
Vietnam’s subsidy benefits. Although Commerce acknowledged that Vietnam had
taken steps toward economic reforms, but Commerce still noted that such “economic
reforms are incomplete and structural and institutional legacy problems remain.” Those
are the main reasons cited by Commerce to apply the CVD law to Vietnam.
In this CVD case, Commerce used external benchmarks to calculate the amount
of the benefits received from government loans and preferential land rents. First,
Commerce rejected Vietnam’s local bank interest rates because these rates were
claimed to be controlled by the GOV. Instead, Commerce relied on the average
commercial bank lending rates in the World Bank’s pool of “lower middle income
countries” (excluding nonmarket-oriented countries). Second, Commerce went over
the border of Vietnam to use surrogate data of land rents in India to calculate the land
rents in Vietnam. Commerce’s rationale was based on the conclusion that the GOV has
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controlled all land prices in Vietnam; and as a result, the land prices in Vietnam were
not reliable enough to be selected as a market-based benchmark for calculating the
benefits received from the land rent program.
In addition to the preferential lending program (which Commerce ultimately
concluded to be inapplicable to PRCB exporters and producers in Vietnam) and the
land rent reduction/exemption program, the program of import duty exemptions for
imported raw materials for exported goods was also of equal importance. Fotai was
determined to have received a countervailable subsidy from an import duty exemption
for imported raw materials with a CVD rate of 2.17%, accounting for 41% of its total
CVD rate (5.28%). In order for Commerce to find that this program was not
countervailable, Commerce cautioned that the GOV “must have a system in place to
confirm which inputs are consumed in the production of the exported product,
including a normal allowance for waste.” At the time of this conclusion, the GOV did
not have such a system in place.
5.4.2. Circular Welded Carbon-Quality Steel Pipe
5.4.2.1. Introduction
The PRCBs CVD case became a precedent that other U.S. petitioners could rely
on to initiate other CVD investigations against Vietnamese exporters and producers.
Normally, after the final affirmative determination of a CVD case, the government
under investigation has not had enough time to change its policies and regulations in
response to Commerce’s adverse findings. If the CVD investigations quickly continue
case after case, however, the government under investigation will face even more
challenges in adjusting its policies and subsidy programs to avoid having them
determined to be countervailable subsidies.
The second CVD action against Vietnamese steel pipes was an example of a
U.S. petitioner that quickly took the opportunity to attack steel pipes imported from
Vietnam. However, in this second CVD case, both of the mandatory respondents
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successfully overturned Commerce’s preliminary determination and obtained a final
determination by Commerce that they had not in fact received countervailable
subsidies. This provides insight into arguments that Vietnamese producers may wish
to make in future cases in order to avoid a CVD affirmative determination.
5.4.2.2. Case Summary
The U.S. domestic producers of circular welded carbon-quality steel pipe
(“Steel Pipe”) filed a CVD petition against imports of the same product from India,
Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam on October 26, 2011.1166 The U.S.
domestic producers of Steel Pipe are comprised of Allied Tube and Conduit, JMC Steel
Group, Wheatland Tube, and United States Steel Corporation (collectively,
“Petitioners”).1167
On December 15, 2011, Commerce selected SeAH Steel VINA Corp. (‘‘SeAH
VINA’’) and Vietnam Haiphong Hongyuan Machinery Manufactory Co., Ltd.
(‘‘Haiphong Hongyuan’’) as mandatory respondents.1168
In this CVD proceeding, Commerce reaffirmed that the CVD law was
applicable to Vietnam as an NME because on March 13, 2012, Public Law 112-99 (or
the NME Act) was enacted, making clear that Commerce was officially permitted to
apply it.1169 As with the PRCBs case, Commerce used the date of January 11, 2007, the
date on which Vietnam became an official WTO Member, as the date from which
Commerce would identify and measure subsidies in Vietnam for purposes of CVD
investigations.1170
1166

Circular Welded Carbon-Quality Steel Pipe from India, the Sultanate of Oman, the United Arab
Emirates, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations, 76 FR
72173 (November 22, 2011) [hereinafter Steel Pipe CVD Initiation].
1167
Id.
1168
Circular Welded Carbon-Quality Steel Pipe from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Preliminary
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment of Final Countervailing Duty
Determination with Final Antidumping Duty Determination, 77 FR 19211 (March 30, 2012) [hereinafter
Steel Pipe CVD Prelim Affirmative Determination].
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Public Law 112-99 applies to this CVD case because it can apply retroactively to all proceedings
initiated on or after November 20, 2006.
1170
Steel Pipe CVD Prelim Affirmative Determination, supra note 1169, at 19214.
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In the preliminary determination, Commerce concluded that Haiphong
Hongyuan and SeAH VINA received countervailable subsidies from the following
subsidized programs: (i) Import Duty Exemptions for Imported Raw Materials for
Exported Goods; (ii) Import Duty Exemptions for Imported Fixed Assets, Spare Parts,
and Accessories for Export Processing Enterprises or Export Processing Zones; and
(iii) Import Duty Exemptions for Imported Fixed Assets, Spare Parts, and Accessories
for Encouraged Projects.1171 Haiphong Hongyuan was determined to have received
benefits from programs (i) and (ii) with respective calculated CVD rates of 8.04% and
0.02%.1172 SeAH VINA was determined to have received a countervailable subsidy of
0.04% under program (iii).1173
At the on-site verification, both mandatory respondents succeeded in
persuading Commerce that they did not receive countervailable subsidies under the
preliminary determination. As a result, Commerce determined that the Petitioners’
alleged countervailable subsidies were not provided to Vietnamese producers and
exporters of Steel Pipe.1174 Therefore, the CVD investigation against Steel Pipe
imported from Vietnam was terminated because Commerce had reached a final
negative determination.
5.4.2.3. Use of benchmarks
Commerce have reviewed all evidence on record and determined that neither
respondent received preferential financing in the steel industry.1175 With respect to
SeAH VINA’s land, Commerce found that SeAH VINA obtained its land-use rights
prior to the cut-off date (January 11, 2007). Thus, Commerce concluded that SeAH
1171

Id. at 19215-16.
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Circular Welded Carbon-Quality Steel Pipe from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Final Negative
Countervailing Duty Determination, 77 FR 64471, 64472 (October 22, 2012) [hereinafter Steel Pipe
CVD Final Negative Determination].
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Memorandum to Paul Piquado, Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the
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1172

216

VINA did not receive countervailable benefits. With respect to Haiphong Hongyuan’s
land, in the preliminary determination, Commerce found that Haiphong Hongyuan’s
land price and terms of its lease were established through negotiations between
Haiphong Hongyuan and an industrial development company (Hai Phong Do Son
Industrial Joint Venture Company).1176 At the verification stage, Commerce further
affirmed its finding that the authority to negotiate the price and enter into land use
contracts in the Hai Phong Do Son Industrial Zone rests with the Hai Phong Do Son
Industrial Zone Joint Venture Company.1177 As such, the provision of land-use rights
within the industrial zone is not limited to an enterprise or industry located within a
designated geographic zone.1178 Therefore, Commerce determined that Haiphong
Hongyuan did not receive a benefit, and did not use this program.
Because Commerce determined that both mandatory respondents did not
benefit from policy lending and preferential land rent reduction/exemption programs,
Commerce did not reach the issues of appropriate interest rate and land benchmarks.
5.4.2.4. Analysis of Countervailable Subsidies
5.4.2.4.1. Import Duty Exemptions on Imported Raw Materials for Export
Processing Enterprises and Export Processing Zones
Under this program, SeAH VINA verified that it paid the applicable import
tariffs on its imported raw materials.1179 Therefore, SeAH VINA could prove that this
program was not applicable to SeAH VINA. As for Haiphong Hongyuan, it reported to
Commerce that it did not pay import duties on the imported raw materials used to
produce exported goods because Haiphong Hongyuan was an export processing
enterprise (i.e., a non-tariff area).1180 In fact, Haiphong Hongyuan is located in an
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export processing zone that is considered as a non-tariff area under the Vietnamese
laws and regulations.1181 Pursuant to the GOV’s regulations, because Haiphong
Hongyuan is an export processing enterprise, its imported goods from foreign countries
into non-tariff zones for use only in non-tariff zones are not liable for import duties.
Therefore, Haiphong Hongyuan did not pay any import duties on its imported raw
materials in the first place and could not be said to have received an import duty
exemption.1182 Accordingly, Commerce accepted that Haiphong Hongyuan did not
receive a financial contribution from its duty-free imports of raw materials.
For the above reasons, this program was non-countervailable as to both
mandatory respondents.
5.4.2.4.2. Import Duty Exemptions for Imported Fixed Assets, Spare Parts and
Accessories for Export Processing Enterprises and Export Processing Zones
This program was also determined not to be countervailable. Haiphong
Hongyuan was an export processing enterprise and, as such, it qualified for the GOV’s
regulations applicable to non-tariff areas.1183 Following the same principle that
Haiphong Hongyuan’s imports of raw materials were not subject to duties, its imports
of fixed assets, spare parts, and accessories were also not subject to duties.1184 Thus,
Commerce determined that Haiphong Hongyuan did not receive a financial
contribution from import duty exemption under this program.
5.4.2.4.3. Import Duty Exemptions for Imported Fixed Assets, Spare Parts and
Accessories for Encouraged Projects
During the on-site verification, Commerce found that SeAH VINA did not
receive any import duty exemptions under this program, although its investment
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certificate made it eligible to import these items duty free.1185 Instead, Commerce
verified that SeAH VINA had paid the applicable duties for its imports of fixed assets,
spare parts, and accessories.1186 Therefore, Commerce determined that SeAH VINA
did not benefit from this duty exemption program.
5.4.2.5. Conclusion
Among all CVD investigations against Vietnam up to this present time, this is
the only CVD case where Commerce found that neither of the two Vietnamese
mandatory respondents received countervailable subsidies. In this CVD case, both
mandatory respondents were 100% foreign-owned enterprises. SeAH VINA is a
wholly owned subsidiary of SeAH Steel Corp., based in South Korea. And Haiphong
Hongyuan is wholly owned by MAT Holdings, Inc., which is located in the United
States. Being foreign-owned enterprises was a positive factor for them in this CVD
investigation. One of the reasons for their success in this case is that both of these
companies maintained clear and transparent accounting bookkeeping and data related
their sales and production. This was demonstrated by the fact that both companies could
successfully meet on-site verifications by Commerce. Both respondents and the GOV
worked closely in responding Commerce’s questions, and all actively participated up
to the final stage of the investigation.
The fact that SeAH VINA and Haiphong Hongyuan both did not receive
benefits from the government loans and land rent exemption/reduction program was
also a great advantage leading to their success. Accordingly, they could eliminate the
risk of using external benchmarks that most of respondents in other CVD investigations
cannot control due to the uncertainty and unpredictability of surrogate benchmarks.
Vietnamese producers can derive lessons from this case. First, maintaining clear
and transparent accounting will help to avoid an AFA determination during an
investigation. Second, a respondent should, if possible, try to demonstrate that benefits
1185
1186
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such as land-use rights were received prior to the cut-off date for applying the CVD
law. Third, a respondent should consider declining government benefits where
accepting them could result in the imposition of external benchmarks in a potential
CVD investigation.
5.4.3. Steel Wire Garment Hangers
5.4.3.1. Introduction
Steel wire garment hangers were not among the key export products of Vietnam
until 2008. After steel wire garment hangers from China were subject to Commerce’s
AD order in 2008,1187 Vietnam’s export of steel wire garment hangers to the U.S.
market began to increase. Unfortunately, in May 2010, M&B Metal Products Co., Inc.
(“Petitioner”), asked Commerce to initiate and conduct an anti-circumvention inquiry
into two Vietnamese companies to determine whether certain hangers, which were
allegedly products of China exported from Vietnam, were circumventing the China AD
order.1188 Commerce accepted the Petitioner and initiated an anti-circumvention
inquiry in July 2010. Following its inquiry, Commerce finally affirmed that there was
circumvention of the China AD order as a result of Angang’s assembly of China-origin,
semi-finished hangers into finished garment hangers in Vietnam for export to the
United States.1189
Because of arrangements like this, it is inevitable that Vietnam will be the next
target for the Petitioner’s request to initiate a concurrent antidumping and
countervailing duty investigation against steel wire garment hangers from Vietnam.
1187

Notice of Antidumping Duty Order: Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the People’s Republic of
China, 73 FR 58111 (October 6, 2008). In this AD case, the two mandatory respondents Shanghai Wells
Hanger Co., Ltd. and Shaoxing Gangyuan Metal Manufactured Co., Ltd., received AD duty rates of
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the PRC-Wide rate is 187.25%.
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Inquiry, 75 FR 42685 (July 22, 2010).
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Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the People’s Republic of China: Affirmative Final Determination
of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty Order, 76 FR 66895 (October 28, 2011).
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5.4.3.2. Case Summary
In January 2012, Commerce officially initiated a parallel investigation for
antidumping and countervailing duties against steel wire garment hangers fabricated
from carbon steel wire (“Garment Hangers”) from Vietnam.1190 For the CVD case,
Commerce continued to confirm that the CVD law is applicable to Vietnam as an NME
country.1191
The Petitioner alleged that the imports of Garment Hangers from Vietnam were
benefiting from countervailable subsidies and that such imports caused, or threatened
to cause, material injury to the U.S. industry.1192 The following programs were alleged
as countervailable subsidies: preferential lending to exporters; the provision of goods
or services for LTAR such as land rent reduction/exemption for FIEs, land rent
reduction/exemption for an exporter, and land preferences for enterprises in
encouraged industries or industrial zones; grants under the export promotion program;
and tax programs such as income tax preferences for FIEs and enterprises in industrial
zones, an income tax refund for reinvestment by FIEs, and import duty exemptions on
imports of goods for encouraged projects and for raw materials for exported goods.1193
In

its

final

affirmative

determination,

Commerce

concluded

that

countervailable subsidies were provided to the exporters and producers of Garment
Hangers from Vietnam.1194 As a result, the CVD rate of 31.58% was assigned to
Hamico Companies (including South East Asia Hamico Export Joint Stock Company
(SEA Hamico), Nam A Hamico Export Joint Stock Company (Nam A), and Linh Sa
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Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of Countervailing
Duty Investigation, 77 FR 3737 (January 25, 2012) [hereinafter Garment Hangers CVD Initiation].
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Hamico Company Limited (Linh Sa)); the highest CVD rate of 90.42% was assigned
to the Infinite Companies (including Infinite Industrial Hanger Limited (Infinite) and
Supreme Hanger Company Limited (Supreme)) due to the use of adverse facts
available (“AFA”).1195 Infinite Companies received an AFA rate due to its noncooperation during Commerce’s verification of information provided. Just before the
verification, Infinite Companies withdrew and explained that “the level of the
antidumping preliminary determination (i.e., 135.81%) and the reasons for that
determination made [it] impossible to continue shipment and it is economically
impossible to continue to participate in these investigations.”1196 For that reason,
Infinite Companies received the highest CVD rate in this case.
5.4.3.3. Analysis of Countervailable Subsidies
Commerce finally found the following programs were countervailable: (i)
preferential lending to exporters (or loan subsidies); (ii) land preferences from
enterprises in encouraged industries or industrial zones (or land subsidies); and (iii)
other tax programs such as corporate income tax reductions for newly established
investment projects and import duty exemptions or reimbursements for raw
materials.1197
5.4.3.3.1. Loan Subsidies
One of the lending institutions in Vietnam, Vietnam Joint Stock Commercial
Bank for Industry and Trade (VietinBank), was found to have provided loans under an
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Letter of Withdrawal from Proceeding filed on August 03, 2012, by Barnes, Richardson & Colburn,
the law firm that represents Infinite, Case No. C-552-813. See also Steel Wire Garment Hangers from
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and
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“export loan program” to SEA Hamico and Linh SA.1198 Under this export loan
program, these two companies received preferential interest rates from VietinBank for
their exporting activities.1199 VietinBank was regarded as a state-owned commercial
bank (“SOCB”) because at the time of investigation VietinBank was 80% owned by
the GOV.1200 Therefore, as in the preceding CVD cases, Commerce determined that the
GOV provided a specific financial contribution to these companies through this
preferential lending program. In order to calculate the benefit granted by this program,
Commerce was required to calculate the difference between what the companies paid
on the loans provided by VietinBank and the amount the companies would have paid
on comparable, commercial loans.1201 This methodology is called adoption of an
interest-rate benchmark. Pursuant to the CVD law, Commerce normally uses
comparable commercial loans reported by the companies in question as a benchmark.
If there are no comparable commercial loans during the period of investigation,
Commerce would use “a national average interest rate for comparable commercial
loans.” The benchmark to be used should be a market-based rate.1202 However, in the
Garment Hangers case, Commerce chose to use an external, market-based benchmark
interest rate to calculate the loan subsidies because it believed that the loans provided
by VietinBank were distorted by a significant government intervention and, therefore,
did not reflect the market interest rates. In other words, Commerce rejected the use of
in-country loan benchmarks but used an external, market-based out-of-country
benchmark interest rate. Specifically, Commerce used the same methodology that it
had developed in its previous CVD investigations against China (e.g., in the CFS Paper
and Thermal Paper cases) to calculate external benchmark interest rates based on the
interest rates of those countries that were classified by the World Bank as lower-middle
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income countries having a gross national income similar to Vietnam.1203 As a result,
Commerce used external benchmark interest rates to calculate the benefit from each
loan that each company received from VietinBank.

5.4.3.3.2. Land Subsidies
In its subsidy analysis, Commerce found that the exemption of annual land rent
applied to those companies which are located in “encouraged” industrial zones is a
specific land subsidy.1204 This type of subsidy is provided under the form of a provision
of a good that confers a benefit under the U.S. CVD law. Since Commerce believed
that the land prices in Vietnam were not based on market principles, it used an external,
market-based land rent benchmark to calculate the benefit conferred by this program.
Specifically, Commerce analyzed “comparable market-based prices in another country
at a comparable level of economic development within the geographic vicinity of
Vietnam.”1205 By this analysis, Commerce selected the cities of Pune and Bangalore in
India and then used “a simple average of all rental rates for industrial property in both
cities” to use as the appropriate land benchmark for Vietnam.1206 This land benchmark
methodology was previously used in PRCBs case. By using this methodology,
Commerce calculated a net CVD rate of 25.41% for Hamico Companies, which
occupies more than 80% of its total CVD rate.1207

5.4.3.3.3. Other countervailable subsidies
Commerce found that SEA Hamico received a 50% reduction in its income
taxes payable in 2010.1208 Export performance was a condition to receive these
incentives. Thus, Commerce determined that the income tax reduction and exemption
1203
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Id.
1205
Id.
1206
Id.
1207
Id. see also Garment Hangers CVD Final Determination, supra note 1195.
1208
Garment Hangers CVD Final Determination Memo, supra note 1196.
1204

224

were financial contributions in the form of revenue foregone by the government, and
they provide a benefit to SEA Hamico in the amount of tax savings.1209
Commerce also found that SEA Hamico and Linh Sa received duty exemptions
on imported raw materials.1210 Under the Vietnamese law, import duty exemptions or
reimbursements for imported raw materials are granted to the following cases of
import: “raw materials and supplies used for manufacture of equipment and
machinery,” “raw materials, supplies and accessories imported for production activities
of investment projects on the list of domains where investment is particularly
encouraged or the list of geographical areas meeting with exceptional socio-economic
difficulties,” “goods imported for processing for foreign partners then exported or
goods exported to foreign countries for processing for Vietnam then re-imported under
processing contracts”, and “raw materials or supplies imported for the production of
export goods.”1211 In particular, SEA Hamico and Linh Sa received duty exemptions
on raw materials for exported goods. In this case, Commerce repeated its finding in
PRCBs case that “the GOV does not have in place a system to confirm which inputs
are consumed in the production of the exported products and in what amounts,
including a normal allowance for waste.”1212 As a result, Commerce determined that
the import duty exemptions on raw materials conferred a benefit equal to the total
amount of the duties exempted.1213 Based on that analysis, Commerce calculated a
CVD rate of 4.46% for Hamico Companies.1214
5.4.3.4. Conclusion
It is surprising that from the beginning of the investigation, Vietnam did not
hire any international trade counsel. Vietnam Competition Authority (VCA), under the
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Ministry of Industry and Trade (MOIT), on behalf of the GOV, directly participated,
prepared, and responded to all questionnaires and supplemental questionnaires issued
by Commerce during this CVD investigation.1215 Undoubtedly, VCA had to do a lot of
work in this case. For example, for only for the original questionnaire response, VCA’s
submission consisted of nearly 4,000 pages, including 103 exhibits.1216 One of the
selected mandatory respondents, Hamico Companies, also did not hire any counsel to
help them. Right at the beginning of the investigation, Barnes, Richardson & Colburn
filed a letter to Commerce to withdraw its representation for Hamico Companies and
asked Commerce to send all future correspondence to Hamico Companies directly.1217
What is even more surprising is that Hamico Companies decided to fight alone without
hiring a counsel in the parallel antidumping investigation.1218 In the AD investigation,
Hamico Companies was finally assigned a duty rate of 220.68% as a Vietnam-Wide
entity due to its non-cooperation.1219 When combined with the CVD rate, Hamico
Companies received the worst total rate of any case against Vietnam: 252.26% for both
AD and CVD.
In sum, the strategies that the mandatory respondents and VCA pursued for this
CVD proceeding should be reconsidered. This case was an expensive lesson for
Vietnamese exporters as well as management authorities in terms of the importance of
coordination and cooperation with Commerce.
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5.4.4. Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp
5.4.4.1. Introduction
Shrimp imports from Vietnam into the U.S. market have increased significantly
since 2009.1220 According to U.S. import statistics, the value of Vietnam’s frozen
warmwater shrimp imports into the United States increased from US$369 million in
2009 to US$493 million in 2011.1221 Besides Vietnam, the United States has also
imported shrimp from many other countries such as China, Ecuador, India, Indonesia,
Thailand, and Malaysia.1222 These countries are also large shrimp exporters to the U.S.
market. In 2011 alone, Indonesia’s shrimp exports to the U.S. market were valued
nearly US$667.7 million.1223 Ecuador and India also exported at significant values to
the U.S., reaching US$523.6 million and US$511.7 million, respectively.1224
Among the above exporting countries, China, India, Thailand, and Vietnam
have been subject to antidumping duty orders since 2005.1225 Normally, the continued
increase in shrimp imports into the U.S. market is a threat to American domestic shrimp
processors. However, although those exporting countries with large quantities of
shrimp imported to the U.S. market have been subject to AD orders (except for
Indonesia and Malaysia), their AD duty rates are not high enough to reduce or stop
their continued exports to the U.S. market. This, of course, has not satisfied the
1220
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competing domestic shrimp processors. For example, in 2011, Vietnamese shrimp
exporters, under Commerce’s administrative review for the period of 2009-2010,
received very low cash deposit rates (effective as of September 12, 2011) in the range
of 0.83 percent to 1.15 percent.1226 Similarly, Chinese exporters received the dumping
margins of 0.04 percent and 0.00 percent from their own administrative review by
Commerce.1227 Indian shrimp exporters similarly received a very low dumping margin
of 1.69 percent for the same period of review.1228
As a result of the increase of shrimp imports from other countries into the U.S.
market, along with the very low antidumping duty rates that some export countries have
enjoyed, American shrimp producers unsurprisingly decided to initiate another trade
remedy fight.

5.4.4.2. Case Summary
On December 28, 2012, the Coalition of Gulf Shrimp Industries (“Petitioner”),
an American business association representing its members who are producers and
wholesalers of shrimps, filed a CVD petition to allege that China, Ecuador, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam provided subsidies to their exporters and
producers of frozen warmwater shrimps.1229
In its petition, the Petitioner accused Vietnam of maintaining 20 subsidy
programs.1230 In addition to the GOV’s mandatory participating role, Minh Qui
Seafood Co., Ltd. (Minh Qui), and Nha Trang Seaproduct Company (Nha Trang) were
selected as two mandatory respondents because, in terms of quantity and value
1226
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imported into the U.S. market, they were the two largest exporters and producers of
shrimp in Vietnam during the period of investigation.1231
In its final determination, Commerce determined that both Minh Qui and Nha
Trang had received several countervailable subsidies from government programs. In
particular, Minh Qui was subjected to a CVD rate of 7.88%, up from 5.08% in the
preliminary determination,1232 and Nha Trang received a CVD rate of 1.15%,1233 which
was significantly reduced from 7.05%.1234 All other companies finally received the “all
others” rate of 4.52%, which is an average based on the final rates of Minh Qui and
Nha Trang.1235
In its separate investigations, Commerce determined that Indonesia and
Thailand’s producers received no countervailable subsidies.1236 On the other hand,
Vietnam and the other four countries including China, Malaysia, India, and Ecuador all
received final affirmative determinations. However, at the final stage of USITC
proceeding, all five countries successfully persuaded USITC to make a negative injury
determination. Specifically, USITC determined that no industry in the United States
was materially injured or threatened with material injury, and the establishment of the
shrimp industry in the United States was not materially impaired by reason of frozen
warmwater shrimp imports from China, Ecuador, India, Malaysia, and Vietnam.1237 As
a result of the USITC’s final ruling, Commerce did not issue CVD orders.

1231

Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Final Affirmative
Countervailing Duty Determination, 78 FR 50387 (August 19, 2013) [hereinafter VN Shrimp CVD Final
Determination].
1232
Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Preliminary
Countervailing Duty Determination, 78 FR 33342 (June 4, 2013) [hereinafter VN Shrimp CVD Prelim
Determination].
1233
VN Shrimp CVD Final Determination, supra note 1232.
1234
VN Shrimp CVD Prelim Determination, supra note 1233.
1235
VN Shrimp CVD Final Determination, supra note 1232.
1236
Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Republic of Indonesia: Final Negative Countervailing
Duty Determination, 78 FR 50383 (August 19, 2013); Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from
Thailand: Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination, 78 FR 50379 (August 19, 2013).
1237
U.S. ITC, Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from China, Ecuador, India, Malaysia, and Vietnam,
Investigation Nos. 701-TA-491-493, 495, and 497 (Final), Publication 4429 (October 2013).

229

5.4.4.3. Use of Benchmarks
5.4.4.3.1. Interest Rate Benchmarks
Based on an analysis of Vietnam’s banking sector, Commerce believed that
Vietnam’s domestic interest rates were not market-determined but rather were distorted
by the GOV’s predominant role in the banking sector.1238 Commerce pointed out that
Vietnam’s predominant role was manifested through indirect and direct ownership of
commercial banks, and also through other means such as interest rate control, policy,
plans and administrative guidance.1239 From this analysis, Commerce determined that
Tier-1 benchmarks were not appropriate, and, therefore, Commerce went on to select
an external, market-based benchmark interest rate.1240
Counsel for the GOV and mandatory respondents (“VN Counsel”) objected to
Commerce’s determination, arguing that Commerce’s analysis did not compare the
GOV’s interventions in the banking system in Vietnam with interventions conducted
by other central banks.1241 Further, VN Counsel stated that absent an objective standard,
Commerce could not make a judgment on whether Vietnam’s banking sector or that of
a country used for an external benchmark was market based.1242 Therefore, VN Counsel
claimed that Commerce’s analysis was not a proper analysis because it ignored the
assessment of central bank interventions in other countries.1243 Interestingly, VN
Counsel raised the questions of whether there was an interest rate market in the United
States when “the Federal Reserve has manipulated interest rates to low single digits”
and “held them at that level for nearly five years,” or in India, “a country which has a
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Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation
of Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 78 ITADOC 33342 (May
28, 2013) [hereinafter VN Shrimp CVD Prelim Memo], at 13.
1239
Id.
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Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP, Case Brief on Behalf of the GOV, MPG, and NTSF:
Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Vietnam, Investigation Case No.: C-552-815, Public Version
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history both of controlling interest rates and of state ownership of a majority of the
banking sector.”1244
In response to VN Counsel’s arguments, Commerce stated that neither the CVD
law nor Commerce’s regulations require it to compare the interventions of the SBV in
its financial market to the actions of the central banks of other countries.1245 Commerce
further explained that it deals only with the issues in this case and only for the parties
involved in this investigation.1246 Finally, Commerce was silent on VN Counsel’s
questions about whether there was an interest rate market in the United States or India.
5.4.4.3.2. Land Benchmarks
Commerce referred to the PRCBs case for the proposition that it could not rely
on a Tier-1 Benchmark to determine whether the GOV was receiving adequate
remuneration for land.1247 In this case, Commerce reiterated that the GOV retained
ultimate ownership of all land in Vietnam and that all land prices in Vietnam were
determined by the government through decrees and regulations.1248 Although
Commerce was aware of some sub-leasing transactions between private parties, it
found that the GOV had placed restrictions on those leasing rights.1249 Also, Commerce
found that the GOV had significant control over the supply of land in the market
through conversions and that the GOV (not the market) decided the allocation of land
in Vietnam.1250
From the above analysis, Commerce continued to adopt the same methodology
of external benchmarking that it used in PRCBs case to measure the benefit from
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Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty
Investigation of Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp From Vietnam, 78 ITADOC 50387 (August 19,
2013) [hereinafter VN Shrimp CVD Final Memo], at Comment 5.
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industrial land leased from the GOV.1251 In particular, Commerce selected Hyderabad
in India as a surrogate source for choosing rental rates for industrial property.1252
Commerce explained that it selected Hyderabad because it had the closest population
density to the areas in which the respondents under this investigation are located.1253
With respect to aquacultural land leased from the GOV, since Commerce could not
find any related Indian rate, it relied on “ranged publicly available data on agricultural
land prices” in Ecuador.1254
VN Counsel of course objected to the use of external benchmarking for land in
Vietnam. VN Counsel proposed that Commerce use a Tier-1 Benchmark for the
following reasons: (i) record evidence established that land-use rights in Vietnam were
sold based on market principles, and (ii) land rents charged by the GOV were based on
market prices for comparable transactions involving only private parties.1255
Notwithstanding VN Counsel’s arguments, Commerce has consistently affirmed its
Preliminary Determination that Tier-3 Benchmarks should be used to measure the
benefit from the provision of land rents in Vietnam.

5.4.4.4. Analysis of Countervailable Subsidies
Commerce found the GOV had targeted its aquaculture and seafood processing
industries for development.1256 To achieve this development goal, the state-run
commercial banks under the GOV’s control provided loans to companies operating in
these industries.1257 According to Commerce, such loans confer benefits on the
companies and are, thus, countervailable subsidies. Accordingly, Commerce used
external benchmark interest rates to calculate the subsidies that the respondents had
received. Minh Phu Group was calculated at 0.71% and Nha Trang Seafood Group was
1251
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at 0.26%.1258 In addition, Minh Phu Group was found to have participated in an export
lending program provided by VietinBank.1259 This program is regarded as an export
loan that confers a specific benefit to Minh Phu Group. By comparing the interest rate
benchmark to this export loan, Minh Phu Group was calculated to have received a net
subsidy of 1.17%.1260
Besides the above lending programs, such programs as income tax preferences,
import duty exemptions/reimbursements for imported raw materials for exported
goods, and farmer subsidies were found to be countervailable subsidies. Among these
subsidy programs, only Minh Phu Group received the highest CVD rate at 8.34% for
the program of import duty reimbursement for imported raw materials for exported
goods. This subsidy program has often appeared in previous cases. In previous
investigations, Commerce always concluded that the GOV does not have in place a
system to confirm which inputs are consumed in the production of the exported
products and in what amounts, including a normal allowance for waste.1261 In this case,
Commerce continued to find that the GOV’s system does not account for resalable
waste, because such waste is exempt from duties.1262 As a result, Commerce continued
to determine that this program was a countervailable subsidy.
5.4.4.5. Conclusion
The negative determination by the USITC marked a great victory for the shrimp
industry in Vietnam after nearly a year pursuing the proceeding before both Commerce
and the USITC. This was also the second success following the Steel Pipe case, wherein
the USITC has also issued a negative determination of injury or threat to the U.S.
domestic steel pipe industry. The success of Vietnam and other countries in the ITC’s
final decision proves that the U.S. domestic shrimp industry has not suffered any
1258
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adverse effects from imported shrimp into the U.S. market. Moreover, the case shows
that continued participation in the investigation by the producers and the GOV, coupled
with capable counsel litigating the question of injury, is instrumental to a favorable
outcome in a CVD proceeding.
5.4.5. Steel Nails, Laminated Woven Sacks, and Utility Scale Wind Towers
5.4.5.1. Introduction
Following the final determination in the Frozen Warmwater Shrimp CVD case,
from 2014 to 2019, Commerce initiated three other CVD investigations against
Vietnamese exporters and producers in the industries of steel nails (“Steel Nails”),
laminated woven sacks (“LWS”), and utility scale wind towers (“USWT”).1263 These
three CVD investigations were all accompanied by parallel antidumping investigations
concerning the same products.1264 Like previous CVD investigations, the exporters and
producers of steel nails, laminated woven sacks, and utility scale wind towers were
found to have received benefits from a range of government subsidies such as income
tax preferences; preferential lending policies; import duty exemptions; and
reimbursements for imported raw materials for exported goods, land rent exemptions,
and provision of utilities for LTAR in industrial zones.1265
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Certain Steel Nails from India, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Sultanate of Oman, Taiwan, the
Republic of Turkey, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of Countervailing Duty
Investigations, 79 FR 36014 (June 25, 2014); Laminated Woven Sacks from the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 83 FR 14253 (April 3, 2018); Utility Scale
Wind Towers from Canada, Indonesia, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of
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Certain Steel Nails from India, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Sultanate of Oman, Taiwan, the
Republic of Turkey, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of Less-Than-FairValue
Investigations, 79 FR 36019 (June 25, 2014); Laminated Woven Sacks from the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam: Initiation of Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigation, 83 FR
14257 (April 3, 2018); Utility Scale Wind Towers from Canada, Indonesia, the
Republic of Korea, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation
of Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigations, 84 FR 37992 (August 5, 2019).
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See ITA, Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Determination in the Countervailing Duty
Investigation of Certain Steel Nails from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (October 27, 2014); ITA,
Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation
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5.4.5.2. Steel Nails
In the Steel Nails case, Commerce preliminarily found that certain government
subsidies benefited the two subject producers and exporters in Vietnam, namely Region
Industries Co., Ltd. (“Region”), and United Nail Products Co., Ltd. (“United Nail”).
The CVD rates were preliminarily calculated at very low rates of 8.35% and 0.17% for
Region and United Nail, respectively.1266 Region was subjected to a higher rate than
United Nail because Region received the benefits from the program of import duty
exemptions and reimbursements for imported raw materials for exported goods. For
this specific subsidy program of exemptions and reimbursements, Region received a
CVD rate of 8.34% (the remaining 0.01% came from rent exemptions, discussed
below). This program of import duty exemptions and reimbursements had also been
determined to be a countervailable subsidy in other previous cases. It is important to
understand why this particular program has repeatedly been regarded as a government
subsidy. Under Commerce’s regulations, an import duty exemption on raw materials
for exported goods cannot exceed the amount of duty levied; otherwise, the excess
amount exempted confers a countervailable benefit.1267 Further, Commerce instructed
that the foreign government under investigation must have a system or procedure to
confirm which inputs are consumed in production and in what amounts, and such
system or procedure must be reasonable, effective for the purposes intended and based
on generally accepted commercial practices in the country of export; otherwise, the
exemptions confer a benefit equal to the total amount of duties exempted.1268 After
reviewing the responses and supporting documents submitted by the mandatory
of Laminated Woven Sacks from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (April 4, 2019) [LWS Final IDM];
ITA, Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty
Investigation of Utility Scale Wind Towers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (June 29, 2020)
[Wind Towers Final IDM].
1266
Certain Steel Nails from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing
Duty Determination and Alignment of Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Final Antidumping
Duty Determination, 79 FR 65184 (November 3, 2014).
1267
See 19 CFR 351.519(a)(1)(i); Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Determination in the
Countervailing Duty Investigation of Certain Steel Nails from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 79
ITADOC 65184 (October 27, 2014) [hereinafter Steel Nails CVD Prelim Memo], at 18.
1268
See 19 CFR 351.519(a)(4); Steel Nails CVD Prelim Memo, supra note 1269.
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respondents and the GOV, Commerce concluded that the GOV does not have in place
an adequate system to confirm which inputs are consumed in production of the exported
products and in what amounts, including a normal allowance for waste.1269 In addition,
Commerce stated that the government of Vietnam does not account for resalable waste
because such waste is exempt from duties.1270 Therefore, firstly, the program of import
duty exemptions on raw materials was deemed to confer a benefit equal to the total
amount of the duties exempted. Secondly, because the import duty exemptions on raw
materials are contingent upon export performance, such exemptions were concluded to
be specific and constituted a financial contribution in the form of forgone revenue.1271
With respect to the land rent exemption, Region was found to have received a specific
benefit under this program. The reason Region received a very low CVD rate (0.01%)
for this subsidy is that, under the land contract, Region was not required to pay lumpsum payments at the time the land contract was signed.1272 Instead, the land contract
called for annual rent payments, which the GOV exempted for Region.1273 Because
such an annual rent exemption constitutes a recurring subsidy, Commerce allocates the
benefit accruing from the rent exemption only to the year in which the exemption was
received.1274
As for United Nail, Commerce determined that United Nail received certain
benefits from income tax reductions and preferential lending from the Bank for
Investment and Development of Vietnam (or BIDV).1275 With respect to the
preferential lending program, like in previous cases, Commerce maintained the position
it took in Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Vietnam that the domestic interest rate in
Vietnam is distorted due to GOV’s continued control of the banking sector through
direct and indirect ownership and through other means such as control of interest rate,
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policy, plans and administrative guidance.1276 Therefore, Commerce continued to use
an external, market-based benchmark interest rate in calculating the benefit received
by United Nail under the preferential lending program. As a result, United Nail’s VND
loans from BIDV was determined to be a countervailable subsidy, resulting in a CVD
rate of 0.10%.1277
In general, the total CVD rate of 0.17% was a successful outcome for United
Nail because this de minimis rate will be treated as zero.1278 However, because this
CVD investigation was accompanied by a parallel antidumping investigation for the
same steel nails products manufactured and exported by United Nail, the antidumping
results also impacted whether Steel Nail could avoid a trade remedy altogether. In the
parallel AD investigation, on December 29, 2014, Commerce preliminarily decided
that the dumping margins for Region and United Nail were 103.88% and 93.42%,
respectively.1279 The other Vietnamese companies that were not selected as mandatory
respondents received the rate that was applicable to a Vietnam-Wide Entity:
323.99%.1280 Needless to say, Region and United Nail were extremely disappointed
with such high AD margins. As a result, on January 5, 2015 and January 8, 2015, United
Nail and Region respectively informed Commerce that they wanted to withdraw from
the CVD investigation.1281 In the withdrawal letters, the two companies did not explain
why they withdrew. However, the reasonable inference is that they did not want to
expend more financial resources when they foresaw high antidumping duty rates that
would effectively preclude future exports to the United States. Because both mandatory
respondents withdrew their participation during the post-preliminary stage, Commerce
1276
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applied adverse facts available to calculate the subsidy rates for them. In the final
determination, Region received a subsidy rate of 288.56% and United Nail received a
rate of 313.97%.1282 Their withdrawal from the CVD proceeding negatively influenced
the results calculated for the other companies that were not selected as mandatory
respondents. All other companies received an average rate of 301.27%.1283
The CVD rates calculated for Region, United Nail and other companies in the
preliminary and final stages are summarized in the table below.
Table 1: Preliminary Calculation Data for Region1284
Program Name
Land Rent Exemption
Import Duty Reimbursement for Imported Raw Materials
for Exported Goods
Total

Preliminary Rate
0.01%
8.34%
8.35%

Table 2: Preliminary Calculation Data for United Nail1285
Program Name

Preferential Lending
Income Tax, Decree 24
Income Tax, Decree 60
Import Duty Exemption
Total

Preliminary Rate

0.10%
0.02%
0.01%
0.04%
0.17%

Table 3: Final Calculation Data for Region, United Nail and All-Others
Rate1286
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Certain Steel Nails from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty
Determination, 80 FR 28962-01 (May 20, 2015).
1283
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Attachment List Excel File, Region Industries Co., Ltd.: Preliminary Calculation Memorandum,
ITA, US Department of Commerce, Investigation No. C-552-819, AD/CVD OI: SB, PUBLIC
VERSION, October 27, 2014.
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Attachment 1, United Nail Products Co., Ltd. Preliminary Calculation Memorandum, ITA, US
Department of Commerce, Investigation No. C-552-819, AD/CVD I: TES, PUBLIC VERSION, October
27, 2014.
1286
Final Calculation Memorandum for Region Industries Co., Ltd., United Nail Products Co., Ltd., and
the All-Others Rate, ITA, US Department of Commerce, Investigation No. C-552-819, AD/CVD I: TES,
Public Document, May 13, 2015.
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Program Name

AFA Rate

Export
Subsidies

Preferential Lending to Exporters
Income Tax Preferences

1.17%
25.00%

1.17%

Import Duty Exemptions and Reimbursements for
Imported Raw Materials for Exported Goods

4.46%

4.46%

Import Duty Exemption on Equipment and Machinery
Imported to Create Fixed Assets for Preferred Industries
Provision of Wire Rod for Less Than Adequate
Remuneration (LTAR)
Land Rent Exemptions Under Decision 189
Export Factoring
Financial Guarantees
Export Credits from the Vietnam Development Bank
Interest Rate Support Program under the State Bank of
Vietnam (SBV)
Export Promotion Program
Land Preferences for Enterprises in Encouraged Industries
or Industrial Zones under Decree 142
Land Rent Reduction/Exemption for Exporters
Land Use Fees or Leases Exemptions/Reductions (Article
26 of Decree 108)
Import Duty Exemption on Equipment and Machinery
Imported to Create Fixed Assets in Designated Geographic
Areas
Land-Use Levy Exemption/Reduction (Article 17 of
Decree 51)
Land-Rent Exemption/Reduction (Article 18 of Decree 51)
Land Use Tax Exemptions/Reductions (Article 19 of
Decree 51)
Investment Support (Article 30 of Decree 51)
Infrastructure Development Investment Support (Article 8
of Decree 51)
Land Preferences for Enterprises in Encouraged Industries
or Industrial Zones
United
Region
All Others

0.03%
25.41%
25.41%
1.17%
1.17%
0.21%

1.17%
1.17%
0.21%

0.05%
25.41%

25.41%

25.41%
25.41%
25.41%
0.03%
25.41%
25.41%
25.41%
1.17%
25.41%
25.41%
313.97%
288.56%
301.27%

33.59%
33.59%
33.59%

From the above tables, at the preliminary stage, United Nail successfully
received a de minimis rate of zero percent. The major subsidy programs that both
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Region and United Nail received are related to import duty reimbursements or
exemptions and the land rent exemptions. Region, however, received a higher CVD
rate due to its receiving benefits from import duty reimbursements for imported raw
materials for exported goods.
5.4.5.3. Laminated Woven Sacks and Utility Scale Wind Towers Cases
Due to the scope of this study, the author briefly lists below the subsidy
programs and corresponding CVD rates as determined by Commerce in the Laminated
Woven Sacks and Utility Scale Wind Towers cases.
5.4.5.3.1. Laminated Woven Sacks from Vietnam
The two mandatory respondents in the Laminated Woven Sacks case were
Duong Vinh Hoa Packaging Company (“DVH”) and Xinsheng Plastic Industry
Company (“Xinsheng”).
Table 4: Preliminary and Final Calculation Data for DVH1287
Countervailable Subsidy Programs
Preferential Lending to Exporters
Income Tax Preferences to Companies in Special
Zones
Import Duty Exemptions on Imports of Raw Materials
for Exporting Goods
Total

Preliminary
Ad Valorem
Rate
1.60%
0.51%

Final Ad
Valorem Rate

1.13%

1.13%

3.24%

3.02%

1.38%
0.51%

1287

Countervailing Duty Investigation of Laminated Woven Sacks from the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam: Preliminary Calculation Memorandum for Duong Vinh Hoa Packaging Company Limited,
ITA, Department of Commerce, Investigation C-552-824, Public Version, E&C/OIV: AG, August 6,
2018; Countervailing Duty Investigation of Laminated Woven Sacks from the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam: Final Calculation Memorandum for Duong Vinh Hoa Packaging Company Limited, ITA,
Department of Commerce, Investigation C-552-824, Public Version, E&C/OIV: AG, April 4, 2019.
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Table 5: Preliminary Calculation Data for Xinsheng1288
Countervailable Subsidy Programs
Preferential Lending to Exporters
Income Tax Preferences to Companies in Special Zones
Import Duty Exemptions on Imports of Raw Materials into
"NonTariff Export Processing Zones"
Import Duty Exemptions on Imports of Spare Parts and
Accessories into Industrial Zones
Total

Ad Valorem Rate
0.00%
0.08%
6.06%
0.01%
6.15%

Table 6: Final Calculation Data for Xinsheng1289
Program
Preferential Lending and Export Credits
from the Vietnam Development Bank
Preferential lending to exporters
Interest rate support program
Export factoring
Financial guarantees for export activities
Land rent reductions or exemptions for
plastic producers
Land rent exemptions for exporters
Land rent exemptions for foreign-invested
enterprises
Land rent exemptions for enterprises
located in special zones
Provision of utilities for LTAR in
industrial zones

Income tax preferences for exporters
Income tax preferences for companies in
special zones
Income tax preferences for small and
medium sized enterprises

Selected
AFA
Rate
1.38%
1.38%
1.38%
1.38%
1.38%

25.41%

Source

DVH’s calculated rate

Calculated for the Hamico
Companies in Certain Steel Wire
Garment Hangers from the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam:
Final Affirmative Countervailing
Duty Determination and Final
Affirmative
Critical
Circumstances Determination, 77
FR 75973 (December 26, 2012)
(Hangers from Vietnam) for the
“Land Preferences for Enterprises
in Encouraged Industries or
Industrial Zones” program
Vietnam Tax Rate - See
Memorandum,
“Countervailing
Duty Investigation: Laminated
Woven Sacks (LWS) from the

1288

Countervailing Duty Investigation of Laminated Woven Sacks from the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam: Preliminary Calculation Memorandum for Xinsheng Plastic Industry Co., Ltd., ITA,
Department of Commerce, Investigation C-552-824, Public Version, E&C/OIV: AG, August 6, 2018.
1289
Attachment I, Countervailing Duty Investigation of Laminated Woven Sacks from the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam: Final Calculation Memorandum for Xinsheng Plastic Industry Co., Ltd., ITA,
Department of Commerce, Investigation C-552-824, Public Document, E&C/OIV: TEM, April 4, 2019.
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Income tax exemptions and reductions for
business expansion and intensive
investment
Preferential income tax programs for
foreign invested entities
Import duty exemptions on imports of raw
materials for exporting goods
Import duty exemption on imports of
spare parts and accessories for companies
in industrial zones
Import duty exemptions for foreigninvested entities
Import duty Exemptions on Imported Raw
Materials
for
Export
Processing
Enterprises and Export Processin
Export Promotion Program

Total

25.00%

Socialist Republic of Vietnam;
Verification
Report:
The
Government of the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam,” dated
October 25, 2018 at 3.

1.13%

DVH’s calculated rate
Calculated for the Hamico
Companies in Hangers from
Vietnam for the “Import Duty
Exemptions or Reimbursements
for Raw Materials” program

4.46%

25.41%

Calculated for the Hamico
Companies in Hangers from
Vietnam for the “Land Preferences
for Enterprises in Encouraged
Industries or Industrial Zones”
program

198.87%

In this case, DVH received very low CVD rates at both the preliminary and
final stages. The two subsidy programs that account for the highest proportion of the
final CVD rate for DVH are (1) preferential lending to exporters and (2) import duty
exemptions on imports of raw materials for exported goods.
In the case of Xinsheng, at the preliminary stage, Xinsheng received a total
CVD rate of 6.15%. The subsidy programs from which Xinsheng received the most
benefits were import duty exemptions on imports of raw materials into “non-tariff
export processing zones.” However, at the final stage of Commerce’s investigation,
Xinsheng withdrew its participation from the CVD investigation. Consequently,
Xinsheng was subject to an AFA rate of 198.87% because of its non-cooperation.
5.4.5.3.2. Utility Scale Wind Towers from Vietnam
In this CVD investigation, Commerce selected only one mandatory respondent,
CS Wind Vietnam.
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Table 7: Preliminary and Final Calculation Data for CS Wind Vietnam1290
Subsidy Programs
Income Tax Preferences under Chapter V of Decree
24
Import Duty Exemptions on Imports of Spare Parts
and Accessories in Industrial Zones
Import Duty Exemptions on Imports of Raw Materials
for Exporting Goods
Total

Preliminary
CVD Ad
Valorem Rate
0.29%

Final CVD Ad
Valorem Rate

0.02%

0.40%

2.12%

2.16%

2.43%

2.84%

0.29%

Based on the above table of results, the final CVD rate calculated for CS Wind
Vietnam was 2.84 percent. As in other previous cases, the program of import duty
exemptions on imports of raw materials for exported goods accounts for a very large
portion of the total subsidies that the respondent received.
5.4.5.4. Conclusion
In summary, through these three CVD investigations, one lesson learned is that
a respondent must carefully consider the potential economic impact of withdrawal from
cooperation with Commerce in a CVD investigation. Moreover, a respondent must
consider the potential impact of its withdrawal on other companies. In addition, in a
CVD case, the role of the GOV is crucial to the outcome of an investigation. It is
extremely important for the GOV to respond promptly, timely, and accurately to
Commerce’s questionnaires. The GOV must coordinate well with those companies that
are selected as mandatory respondents to develop and carry out a consistent strategy
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Attachment I, Preliminary Calculations, Public Information, Preliminary Determination of
Countervailing Duty Investigation of Utility Scale Wind Towers from Vietnam: Calculation
Memorandum for CS Wind Tower Co., Ltd., ITA, Department of Commerce, Investigation C-552-826,
Public Version, E&C O/IV: DF, December 6, 2019; Attachment I, Final Calculations, Public
Information, Final Determination of Countervailing Duty Investigation of Utility Scale Wind Towers
from Vietnam: Calculation Memorandum for CS Wind Vietnam Co., Ltd., ITA, Department of
Commerce, Investigation C-552-826, Public Version, E&C/OIV: DF, June 29, 2020.
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for engaging in the proceeding, in order to achieve the best results for the mandatory
respondents, and also, to some extent, for the best interests of all industry in Vietnam.

5.4.6. Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires
5.4.6.1. Introduction
This case is important because, as of October 2021, it is the most recent case
that Commerce has concluded on the existing subsidy programs provided by the GOV.
It is also very useful for the GOV to understand why Commerce has repeatedly
determined some programs to be countervailable subsidies. Importantly, in this CVD
investigation presented the first instance in which Vietnam was found to have provided
Vietnamese exporters and producers with a new type of subsidy, a so-called currency
undervaluation (or currency manipulation, as alleged by the U.S. Government). As with
prior cases, the author will focus on key issues of this CVD investigation such as
countervailable subsidy programs and Commerce’s selection of internal or external
benchmarks in measuring each specific subsidy. The author also analyzes the issues
related to Commerce’s determination regarding the GOV’s currency-undervaluation
subsidy and its implications for Vietnam.
5.4.6.2. Case Summary
Following a petition filed by the U.S. Petitioner (representing the United Steel,
Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service
Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC (commonly known as the United
Steelworkers)) in May 2020, Commerce initiated a CVD investigation against Vietnam
in June 2020, concerning imports of passenger vehicle and light truck tires (“Passenger
Tires”), which are classified as new pneumatic tires, of rubber, with a passenger vehicle
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or light truck size designation.1291 This CVD case was accompanied by a concurrent
investigation concerning whether Passenger Tires from Vietnam and other countries
such as Korea, Taiwan and Thailand were dumped on the U.S. market.1292
Six years earlier, the same U.S. Petitioner had also requested for concurrent AD
and CVD actions against Passenger Tires from China; and as a result, Chinese exporters
and producers of Passenger Tires have been subject to both AD and CVD orders since
August 2015.1293
In relation to the CVD investigation of Passenger Tires from Vietnam,
Commerce selected the top two exporters and producers of Passenger Tires that were
exported for consumption into the U.S. market. According to Commerce, in light of
resource constraints, it could not examine all exporters and producers from
Vietnam.1294 Thus, Kumho Tire (Vietnam) Co., Ltd. (“KTV”), and Sailun (Vietnam)
Co., Ltd. (“Sailun”), the two top exporters or producers by volume of the Passenger
Tires under investigation, were selected as mandatory respondents for individual
examination.1295 For those companies that were not selected as respondents, because
they were not individually examined, Commerce determines an estimated all-others
rate. Such a rate is normally called All-Others Rate, which is an amount equal to the
weighted average of the estimated subsidy rate established for individually examined
respondents KTV and Sailun, excluding any zero and de minimis rates and any rates
based entirely under section 776 of the Act.1296 As observed in previous CVD cases,
1291

Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of
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the role of the GOV in a CVD proceeding is very important. To achieve a favorable
outcome, the mandatory respondents and the GOV must fully cooperate with
Commerce in all stages of the proceeding. For instance, if either the GOV or any
mandatory respondent fails to cooperate or disregards any questions asked by
Commerce, or fails to submit information timely, that non-cooperation or untimely
filing could result in a very high CVD rate due to the application of AFA.
The legal grounds for Commerce to continue the application of the CVD law to
imports from Vietnam as an NME country were based mainly on its arguments in
PRCBs from Vietnam, and as permitted by the Nonmarket Economies Act of 2012.1297
Since Vietnam has been designated an NME country, in this Passenger Tires CVD case,
Commerce continued to use the NME methodology for calculating the CVD rates for
the individually examined mandatory respondents. That means Commerce continued
to use interest rate benchmarks, input benchmarks and land benchmarks to calculate
the benefits conferred to KTV and Sailun as mandatory respondents.
In May 2021, Commerce announced its final affirmative determination that
Passenger Tires from Vietnam benefited from a range of government subsidies,
including income tax benefits, import duty exemptions on imports of raw materials for
exported goods, exemption of import duties for imports into industrial zones, and
preferential rent for areas with difficult socioeconomic conditions.1298 In addition,
Commerce determined that KTV and Sailun both received benefits from provision of
natural rubber for less than adequate remuneration.1299 More importantly, it is the first
time Commerce has reached a conclusion that Vietnam’s currency undervaluation is a
countervailable subsidy.1300 According to Commerce, “This finding includes
1297
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Commerce’s first affirmative findings regarding a currency-related subsidy involving
the conversion of U.S. dollars into Vietnamese dong at an undervalued exchange
rate.”1301 But the GOV’s counsel reiterated that “the U.S. lacked the authority to treat
currency undervaluation as a subsidy.”1302 He also claimed that “the calculation of a
precise rate of benefit from a so-called undervalued currency is arbitrary and capricious
as there is no universally accepted methodology for quantifying how much a currency
is undervalued on a bilateral basis.”
Under the final determination, KTV and Sailun received respective final CVD
rates of 7.89% and 6.23%, and the other non-selected companies received an All Others
Rate of 6.24%.1303 In the companion AD final determination, KTV, Sailun and four
other companies (including Kenda Rubber (Vietnam) Co., Ltd.; Bridgestone
Corporation; Bridgestone Tire Manufacturing Vietnam LLC; and The Yokohama
Rubber Co., Ltd.) all received a rate of zero percent.1304 However, the other companies
eligible for a Vietnam-wide entity rate received an AFA rate of 22.27% (after
adjustment for a subsidy offset).1305 These companies were assigned with an AFA rate
because Commerce found that they withheld information, failed to provide information
timely, and impeded the proceeding by not submitting Quantity and Value information
requested by Commerce.1306
Below, the author presents a table showing the final CVD rates for KTV and
Sailun with corresponding ratios for each subsidy program from which each respondent
benefited. The objective is to show the level of importance of each subsidy program in
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contributing to the total aggregated CVD duty for each mandatory respondent in this
investigation.

Subsidy Programs

KTV

KTV
Ratio

Sailun

Sailun
Ratio

1. Import Duty Exemptions on Imports of Raw
Materials for Exporting Goods

0.52%

7%

2.78%

45%

2. Exemption of Import Duties for Imports into
Industrial Zones

0.04%

1%

0.01%

0%

3. Natural Rubber for LTAR

0.06%

1%

0.11%

2%

4. Preferential Rent for Areas with Difficult
Socio-Economics Conditions

5.16%

65%

2.14%

34%

5. Currency Undervaluation

1.69%

21%

1.16%

19%

6. Income Tax Benefits

0.42%

5%

n/a

7. Tax Benefits for New Investments
Total

n/a
7.89%

100%

2.78%

45%

6.23%

100%

From the above table, one observes that the programs related to tax benefits,
import duty exemptions, preferential land rent, and currency undervaluation account
for a high proportion of all countervailable subsidy programs that the mandatory
respondents received. Typically, Commerce uses benchmarks to calculate the amount
of a benefit in the following categories of subsidies: (i) grants, loans, and loan
guarantees (see section 3.2.1.2.2) and (ii) provision of goods or services at LTAR (see
section 3.2.1.2.3). Referring to the above Table, the two subsidy programs including
natural rubber for LTAR and preferential rent for areas with difficult socioeconomic
conditions fall into category (ii): provision of goods or services at LTAR. To measure
the benefits received from these two subsidy programs, Commerce used input
benchmarks and land benchmarks. In this Passenger Tires CVD case, for the first time,
Commerce decided to use an internal benchmark to calculate the net subsidy rate
related to provision of natural rubber at LTAR. Nevertheless, like in other CVD cases,
Commerce still used out-of-country benchmarks in calculating the net countervail-able
subsidy related to provision of preferential land rent in Vietnam. Finally, KTV and
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Sailun were not found to have received any countervailable subsidy under category (i):
grants, loans, and loan guarantees.

5.4.6.3. Use of Benchmarks
5.4.6.3.1. Interest Rate Benchmarks
As a matter of practice, Commerce usually selects an external market-based
interest rate benchmark instead of using internal interest rates of Vietnam. Commerce
has reasoned that domestic interest rates in Vietnam are distorted due to the
predominant role of the GOV in the banking sector through (i) its direct and indirect
ownership, and (ii) its interest rate control, policy, plans, and administrative
guidance.1307 To come to such a conclusion, Commerce conducted a separate analysis
of Vietnam’s financial system1308. From its findings in this comprehensive review,
Commerce concluded that interest rates in Vietnam are still largely set or influenced
by the GOV and cannot be used as a benchmark for CVD purposes.1309
Notably, Commerce compared the current Vietnamese banking sector with the
actual situation in 2013, when Commerce conducted the first review of the Vietnamese
banking sector in the Frozen Warmwater Shrimp CVD case (“2013 Review”).
Specifically, Commerce found that the number of state-owned commercial banks
(“SOCBs”) operating in Vietnam has not significantly changed since the 2013 Review
and that the share of loans provided by SOCBs in the Vietnamese banking sector has
1307
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remained constant over the preceding six years.1310 In fact, the number of SOCBs has
decreased from five to four following the 2013 Review; currently there are four big
SOCBs: Agribank, the Vietnam Joint Stock Commercial Bank of Industry and Trade
(VietinBank), the Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam
(Vietcombank), and the Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam (BIDV).1311
However, Commerce found that such SOCBs still have some degree of government
ownership and continue to play a dominant role in the commercial banking sector.1312
Accordingly, through its major ownership of each of Vietnam’s SOCBs and policy
banks, the GOV was found to control 47% of the banking sector.1313 With respect to
the interest rates in Vietnam, Commerce continued to reaffirm its conclusion in the
2013 Review that Vietnamese interest rates are not market-determined.1314 In
particular, the GOV, through its ministerial agency, State Bank of Vietnam (“SBV”),
still used its administrative orders such as circulars, decrees and decisions in order to
impose interest rate controls on banks and to allocate credit throughout Vietnam.1315
For example, the SBV’s imposed an interest rate cap of 5.5% on all VND denominated
demand and short-term deposits (1-6 months), which was found to cause distortion.1316
In addition, the SBV has also controlled commercial lending rates via direct lending
rate caps.1317 For instance, the SBV’s Circular No. 39 provides that the rate set by both
parties in a loan agreement shall not exceed the maximum interest rate decided by the
SBV’s governor to meet certain funding demands.1318 According to Commerce, this
regulation means that the SBV has full discretion to set interest rate caps at any time.1319
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Id. at 2.
Id. at 7 and 9. The decrease came in 2015 when BIDV acquired Bank of Mekong Delta, one of the
SOCBs listed in the 2013 review.
1312
Id. at 9.
1313
Id.
1314
Id., at 14-20.
1315
Id. at 14.
1316
Id. at 15.
1317
Id. at 16.
1318
Id. See also Circular of the State Bank of Vietnam prescribing lending transactions of credit
institutions and/or foreign bank branches with customers” (No. 39/2016/TT-NHNN), Article 13, Section
1.
1319
Id. at 17.
1311

250

Further, Commerce found that the GOV imposed controls over sector-specific lending
rates as well.1320 For example, there have been specific regulations on determining
lending rates based on priority sectors such as agriculture, export goods, business
operations serving high tech enterprises, business operations serving production, and
business operations of small and medium enterprises (“SMEs”).1321 As of 2019, the
short-term interest rate of 6.5% has been applied to such priority sectors, and the rates
of 6.8% to 9% have applied to other non-priority sectors.1322 Finally, Commerce
realized that the GOV has implemented certain reforms in stabilizing the Vietnamese
banking sector and meeting macro-economic growth targets.1323 However, according
to Commerce, it is more important for Vietnam to conduct an institutional change and
reduce the chronic and systemic state intervention in the banking sector or otherwise
make the banking sector more market-determined.1324 Unfortunately, such a reform is
not seen anywhere in the GOV’s most recent roadmap for the development of
Vietnam’s banking sector from 2018 to 2025 with an orientation to 2030.1325 Under
this plan, the GOV’s goal is to maintain the dominant role of SOCBs in the 2018 to
2025 period as one of a “key and dominant force in scale, market share and ability to
regulate the market.”1326 The state will continue to have a “dominant role” in the
management of SOCBs and maintain its government ownership of at least 65% of their
total voting shares.1327
In summary, at this time the GOV’s continued significant intervention in the
banking sector as analyzed by Commerce makes it difficult to prove that the interest
rates for commercial loans in Vietnam are based on market-determined principles.
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Thus, it is likely that Commerce will continue to use external interest rate benchmarks
for this CVD proceeding and for future CVD actions against Vietnam in general.

5.4.6.3.2. Input Benchmarks
Ordinarily, Commerce uses benchmarks within the exporting country to
measure whether a government-procured good, service, or land has been provided for
less than adequate remuneration (LTAR). Commerce regards such in-country
benchmarks as Tier-One benchmark.1328 But Commerce almost always finds NMEbased benchmarks unreliable or not reflective of a functioning market. Thus,
Commerce usually goes to Tier Two, which are global benchmarks.1329 However, too
often, Tier-Two benchmarks are not specific and result in uncertainty and opportunities
for distortion. And, in the case of goods or services such as land and electricity,
Commerce often resorts to Tier-Three external benchmarks, which are essentially
benchmarks in a single surrogate country. Tier-Three external benchmarks also allow
Commerce to measure the adequacy of remuneration by assessing whether the
exporting government price is consistent with market principles.1330 Unfortunately, the
U.S. laws and regulations do not provide any specific guidelines for application of TierThree external benchmarks. So, Commerce has a broad discretion in its assessments to
determine whether adequate remuneration has been paid in one country based on
market forces in an entirely different country.
In this Passenger Tires CVD case, both mandatory respondents purchased
natural rubber as an input material for manufacturing the subject merchandise.1331 So,
the question is which benchmark is to be used to measure the benefit of the provision
of natural rubber. During the investigation, it was found that the supplier of natural
rubber to the respondents was a state-owned company, namely Vietnam Rubber Group
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(VRG), making natural rubber arguably a “government-procured good”.1332 Although
VRG is a state-owned company, however, the GOV successfully proved that the market
for natural rubber is not distorted by government predominance in the market, and that
the GOV does not intervene in the natural rubber market.1333 Based on the GOV’s
submitted information, Commerce determined that the market for natural rubber is not
distorted through the GOV’s predominant role in the market via VRG, and nor does
the GOV intervene in the market, specifically by implementing controls on imports and
exports. Accordingly, Commerce determined that market prices from actual
transactions within Vietnam may serve as a Tier-One benchmark. This was notable
because it marked the first time that Commerce agreed to use an internal benchmark to
calculate the benefit from the provision of an input sourced in Vietnam.
Based on the selected Tier-One benchmark, Sailun’s actual prices paid for
purchasing natural rubber from VRG were admitted and it finally got a countervailable
subsidy rate of 0.11% ad valorem.1334 With respect to KTV, Commerce preliminarily
found that KTV had no purchases of natural rubber from private producers, nor did
KTV import any natural rubber.1335 In the preliminary stage, KTV reported all its
purchases of natural rubber were from a producer that is majority-owned by entities
controlled by the GOV.1336 Then, Commerce selected UN Comtrade import data, which
was submitted by KTV, as the appropriate benchmark for KTV. At the final
determination, Commerce continued to use the UN Comtrade import prices submitted
by KTV on the record as the basis for the benchmark, but have added 5 percent VAT
1332
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and 3 percent of import duties, to calculate the benefit received by KTV.1337
Accordingly, KTV finally received a subsidy rate of 0.06% ad valorem for provision
of natural rubber for LTAR.1338

5.4.6.3.3. Land Benchmarks
The three-tier benchmark analysis is also used by Commerce in determining the
extent of any countervailable benefit received from provision of land at LTAR. In its
practice, Commerce concluded that it could not use any Tier-One Vietnamese land
prices or Tier-Two world market prices for purposes of benchmarking land-use rights
in Vietnam. Instead, Commerce routinely uses out-of-country benchmarks or TierThree external benchmarks to measure the subsidy benefit from the provision of land
to Vietnamese producers under investigation. The application of Tier-Three external
benchmarks is usually based on the conclusion that the GOV controls all land use rights
in Vietnam, and therefore, the land prices in Vietnam are not market-determined
benchmarks.1339 Commerce had previously reached the same conclusions in the PRCBs
and Frozen Warmwarter Shrimp CVD cases.1340 In the previous cases, Commerce
found that (i) the GOV had placed restrictions on leasing rights, (ii) the GOV had
significant control over the supply of land on the market through conversions, and (iii)
the GOV (but not the market) determined land allocations.1341
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In this Passenger Tires CVD case, Commerce also conducted a separate
analysis of Vietnam’s land market subsequent to 2009 (“Land Analysis Memo”).1342
According to the Land Analysis Memo (consisting of 400 pages), Commerce found
that, although modest reforms had taken place (e.g., improvements in the use-rights of
some landholders, although rights of rural landholders remain severely restricted), the
reforms have not addressed the fundamental institutional factors that underlie the
GOV’s monopoly control over land use, which precludes landholders from putting their
land to best use and realizing the market value of their landholdings.1343 Commerce
reaffirmed that all land in Vietnam is still owned by the Vietnamese government.1344
Accordingly, the GOV is the sole supplier of land-use rights in the primary land market
and directly sets those prices on a non-commercial basis.1345 In addition, the GOV was
found to indirectly distort prices of land in the secondary market through restrictions
and limitations on land-use and land-use transfers.1346 Thus, the GOV ultimately
decides whether and how land is used in Vietnam under a unified but decentralized
land planning system.1347 Such factors, according to Commerce, do not reflect the
market outcomes in Vietnam. For such reasons, Commerce determined that it cannot
use any Tier-One, domestic Vietnamese land prices for purposes of benchmarking the
government provision of land-use rights in Vietnam.1348 Further, Commerce
determined that since land located and sold outside of Vietnam is not simultaneously
available to an in-country purchaser, Tier-Two global prices are not suitable as
benchmarks for land-use rights either.1349 So, when the global prices are inapplicable,
according to the Tier-Three approach, Commerce will normally measure the adequacy
1342
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of remuneration by assessing whether the government price is consistent with market
principles.1350 When applying this rule, Commerce found that the legal procedures for
government land valuation are vague by design and there is thus significant scope for
government discretion in their implementation.1351 The result is that governmentdetermined prices are not consistent with market principles, but rather with the
government’s controlling and allocating land use on an administrative basis in the
pursuit of policy objectives, which do not reflect commercial considerations.1352 From
such findings, Commerce finally determined to use land-use prices outside Vietnam as
an appropriate basis to determine the extent to which land-use rights are provided for
LTAR in Vietnam.1353
In selecting a benchmark for land, Commerce analyzed comparable marketbased prices in another surrogate country at a comparable level of economic
development within the geographic vicinity of Vietnam.1354 Commerce decided to use
the land prices in India, which were provided by CBRE Group, Inc., for valuing land
rents in this Passenger Tires CVD investigation.1355 In particular, for KTV, Commerce
selected Kolkata, which is in West Bengal, as the location with the “closest population
density” to Binh Duong, the province in which KTV’s head office and tire production
facility are located.1356 For Sailun, Commerce selected Hyderabad, which is in Andhra
Pradesh, as the location with the “closest population density” to Tay Ninh, the province
in which Sailun is located.1357 In the final determination, Commerce affirmed its
preliminary determination that KTV and Sailun received preferential rent as a result of
their locations in areas with difficult or especially difficult socioeconomic
conditions.1358 Consequently, by using the selected land benchmarks as explained
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above, Commerce calculated the benefit from the preferential rent by comparing the
rent that either KTV or Sailun paid to a benchmark rate from the Indian surrogate city.
Finally, Sailun received a net countervailable subsidy rate of 2.14% ad valorem
(accounting for 34% of its total CVD rate), and KTV received a net countervailable
subsidy rate of 5.16% ad valorem (accounting for 65% of its total CVD rate).1359
In certain situations, the selection of Tier-3 benchmark is not accurate. For
example, in the case of KTV, Commerce used rental rates for one Indian city, Kolkata,
as Tier-3 benchmark for measuring the benefit from KTV’s land-use rights. According
to KTV’s counsel, Kolkata was selected because it is located in the Indian state of West
Bengal, which has the “closest population density” to Binh Duong province in
Vietnam.1360 However, instead of using average land-rental rates for the entire state of
West Bengal, Commerce used rental rates for a single city, whose population density
is many multiples of that of the province and town in which KTV’s facility is
located.1361 Another piece of evidence potentially showing the risk of inaccuracy is that
the population density of Kolkata is approximately 39 times that of Binh Duong
province, and approximately 20 times that of Ben Cat Town.1362
5.4.6.4. Other Countervailable Subsidies
Besides the subsidy programs pertaining to preferential land rents and the
provision of natural rubber for LTAR, import duty exemptions on imports of raw
materials for exported goods were also determined to be a countervailable subsidy. This
subsidy program has repeatedly been found in most of the CVD investigations against
Vietnam. In practice, import duty reimbursements for imported raw materials for goods
to be exported are governed by several Vietnamese laws and regulations. Under the
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program, import duty exemptions are provided for imported raw materials that are
incorporated into exported goods or are directly used in the processing of such
goods.1363 The GOV reported to Commerce that KTV and Sailun received import duty
exemptions under this program.1364 In prior investigations, Commerce always
concluded that the GOV does not have in place a system to confirm which inputs are
consumed in the production of the exported products and in what amounts, including a
normal allowance for waste.1365 During this investigation, the GOV conceded that it
had not made any changes to that system since the last time it was investigated in 2017;
however, the GOV stated that this situation differs from those in prior determinations
regarding this program because in this case the GOV conducted an inspection of actual
inputs involved to confirm which inputs were consumed in the production of the
exported product.1366 Nevertheless, Commerce continued to find that the GOV’s
system does not meet Commerce’s regulatory requirements under 19 CFR §
351.519(a)(4)(i) for calculating a benefit on an amount other than the total amount of
exempted duties.1367 Finally, Commerce determined that the import-duty exemptions
used by KTV and Sailun are countervailable because they confer a benefit equal to the
total amount of the duties exempted.1368
Another program found to be a countervailable subsidy was corporate income
tax preferences. Under this program, the GOV provided tax preferences to support
newly established investment projects of certain sectors or satisfying certain criteria
under the GOV’s corporate income tax regulations.1369 One mandatory respondent,
Sailun, was found to have received tax benefits under this program. On this basis,
Sailun was subjected to a CVD rate of 2.78%.1370
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5.4.6.5. Currency Undervaluation Subsidy
Four months before the CVD investigation of Passenger Tires from Vietnam
was initiated, Commerce issued its Modification of Regulations Regarding Benefit and
Specificity in Countervailing Duty Proceedings (“Final Rule”).1371 Commerce’s new
regulations have paved the way for it to investigate a foreign government’s “currency
undervaluation” as a countervailable subsidy for purposes of CVD proceedings. The
Final Rule is controversial because it has been promulgated by Commerce itself
without any amendment to the U.S. CVD law. Notably, Commerce acknowledged that
neither the Tariff Act of 1930 (as amended) nor Commerce’s existing CVD regulations
specify how to determine the existence of a benefit or specificity when Commerce is
examining a potential subsidy resulting from the exchange of currency under a unified
exchange rate system.1372 The controversy of Commerce’s new regulations will be
discussed in the conclusion below.
Notably, the Final Rule clarifies how Commerce “determines the existence of
a benefit resulting from a subsidy in the form of currency undervaluation,” and clarifies
that “companies in traded goods sector of an economy can constitute a group of
enterprises for the purposes of determining whether a subsidy is specific.”1373 The Final
Rule is applicable to all segments of proceedings initiated on or after April 6, 2020.1374
The “all segments of proceedings” language means that the Final Rule can be applied
to all CVD initial investigations and administrative reviews or new shipper reviews as
of April 6, 2020.
Technically, Commerce added a new regulation providing that Commerce will
determine that a countervailable currency undervaluation subsidy benefit exists where:
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(1) a country’s currency is undervalued during the relevant period; (2) there has been
government action on the exchange rate that contributes to a currency undervaluation;
and (3) the amount of local currency a firm receives in exchange for U.S. dollars is
greater than the amount the firm would have received if the country’s nominal, bilateral
U.S. dollar exchange rate were consistent with the equilibrium real effective exchange
rate (“REER”).1375 In essence, these new regulations established a methodology to
identify whether a foreign manufacturer benefited from its government’s actions that
led to the currency undervaluation.
With the publication of Commerce’s new regulations on currency
undervaluation at this time, it is likely that U.S. petitioners representing domestic
industries will be willing to make use of it in their new subsidy allegations or even in
CVD administrative reviews against subject foreign exporting countries, especially
against NME countries such as China and Vietnam, where their banking sectors are
still controlled by their governments.
In fact, in its petition against Vietnam in the Passenger Tires CVD case
submitted in May 2020, the U.S. Petitioner, among other allegations, claimed that the
GOV provides countervailable subsidies to exporters of Passenger Tires from Vietnam
by undervaluing its currency through government action on the exchange rate between
the U.S. dollar and the Vietnamese dong.1376 Specifically, the U.S. Petitioner affirmed
that Commerce’s new regulations, which are effective on or after April 6, 2020, apply
to this subsidy investigation.1377
In its final determination, Commerce came to an affirmative determination that
the GOV committed an act of undervaluing its currency, and that such undervaluation
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constituted a financial contribution, that is specific and provided a benefit.1378
Commerce’s determination is based on the following key findings.
Financial contribution: Commerce mentioned that in prior CVD cases, it has
found Vietinbank and Vietcombank to be state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs).1379
Further, the GOV’s submitted documents on record show that Vietinbank and
Vietcombank are SOCBs with 64.46% and 74.8% majority government ownership,
respectively.1380 In addition, Commerce’s Memorandum of Vietnam’s Financial Sector
also shows that state ownership and control has been observed at the highest level of
SOCBs’ corporate structures.1381 Thus, Commerce concluded that the GOV is able to
control the decisions of these SOCBs through a board of members appointed by
Communist Party of Vietnam, and the banks are vested with government authority.1382
Accordingly, for all foreign currency exchange transactions involving Vietinbank and
Vietcombank, Commerce found a direct financial contribution by an “authority” under
the CVD law in the form of a direct transfer of funds.1383
With respect to private banks, notably, Commerce found that through the
GOV’s various laws and regulations, private banks, like GOV state-owned banks, must
exchange USD for dong for any party wishing to do so, and the rates for that exchange
must be within the rate of +/-3 percent to +/-1 percent as established by the State Bank
of Vietnam (SBV).1384 In other words, the SBV sets the official exchange rate within
this narrow band.1385 Therefore, aside from the direct financial contribution through
SOCBs, Commerce found that based on the GOV’s implementation of laws and
decrees, the GOV requires private banks to exchange currency within a narrow
exchange rate, thereby entrusting or directing private banks to provide dong at an
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undervalued rate.1386 Accordingly, Commerce concluded that the GOV entrusts or
directs private banks to provide this financial contribution.1387
As a result, Commerce determined that (i) the exchange of currency by
authorities under section 771(5)(B) of the Act and (ii) the exchange of currency by
private Vietnamese and/or foreign owned banks, entrusted or directed by the GOV
under section 771(5)(B)(iii) of the Act, constituted financial contributions in the form
of direct transfers of funds to both mandatory respondents KTV and Sailun.1388
Specificity: Commerce found that the subsidy is predominantly used by the
group of enterprises constituting the traded goods sector.1389 As explained by
Commerce, due to the GOV’s inability to provide certain data which Commerce
requested for its evaluation, Commerce relied upon the data submitted to the IMF by
the SBV to analyze whether the exchange of foreign currency is disproportionately or
predominantly used by the traded goods sector.1390 Based on the IMF data, Commerce
estimated the total proportion of USD inflows Vietnam has received in the POI through
the following four major channels of exchange: (a) exports of goods, (b) exports of
services, (c) various forms of portfolio and direct investment, and (d) earned income
from abroad.1391 Additionally, in order to account for USD inflows which may not have
resulted in currency conversion, Commerce discounted Vietnam’s exports of goods by
the amount of intermediary goods inputs.1392 After such an adjustment, Commerce
found that among the four channels, the vast majority (71.94 percent) of USD inflows
coming into Vietnam during the POI came from exports of goods.1393 As a result,
Commerce determined that enterprises that buy or sell goods internationally are the

1386

Id.
Id.
1388
Id.
1389
Id. at 23.
1390
Id.
1391
Id. at 23-24.
1392
Id.
1393
Id. at 24. See also Memorandum, “Countervailing Duty Investigation of Passenger Vehicle and Light
Truck Tires from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Calculation Based on USD Inflows Calculation,”
dated concurrently with Passenger Tires CVD Prelim IDM.
1387

262

predominant users of the GOV’s currency undervaluation subsidy, and thus, this
program is de facto specific under the CVD law.1394
Findings of undervaluation, government action and benefit: Pursuant to the
Final Rule, normally Commerce will make an affirmative finding of undervaluation
only if there has been government action on the exchange rate that contributes to that
undervaluation.1395 In other words, finding of a government action on the exchange rate
that contributed to the undervaluation is a prerequisite to the finding of undervaluation.
In its next step, after making such an affirmative finding of undervaluation, Commerce
will determine the existence of a benefit after examining the difference between the
“nominal, bilateral United States dollar rate consistent with the equilibrium REER,”
and the “actual nominal, bilateral United States dollar rate during the relevant time
period, taking into account any information regarding the impact of government action
on the exchange rate.”1396 Pursuant to the Final Rule, the U.S. Department of Treasury
(“Treasury”) will be asked by Commerce to provide an evaluation and conclusion
regarding the issues of undervaluation, government action, and the U.S. dollar rate
gap.1397 Commerce acknowledges that Treasury has considerable experience and data
that are relevant to such an analysis of currency undervaluation.1398 Treasury explained
that in 2019 there was a gap between Vietnam’s REER and its equilibrium REER.1399
Further, Treasury found that the GOV’s actions on the exchange rate had the effect of
undervaluing the dong relative to the U.S. dollar by 4.7 percent.1400 With respect to
government action, Treasury also concluded that Vietnam’s undervaluation in the POI
was exclusively a result of government action.1401 Consequently, based on Treasury’s
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evaluation and conclusion, Commerce determined that Vietnam’s currency vis-à-vis
the U.S. dollar was undervalued during the POI by 4.7 percent.1402
Calculating the amount of benefit: Based on the provision of the Final Rule,
Commerce calculated “the difference between the amount of currency the firm received
in exchange for United States dollars and the amount of currency that firm would have
received absent the difference referred to in paragraph (b)(1) of this section” by
applying the 4.7 percent undervaluation reported by Treasury to each currency
exchange transaction reported by KTV and Sailun during the POI.1403 For each
respondent, Commerce then aggregated the total benefits in USD based on the sum of
these individual transactional during the POI.1404 Using this benefit as a numerator,
Commerce then calculated a subsidy rate for the exchanges of currency by dividing the
benefits obtained by each respondent during the POI by that respondent’s total sales
conducted in USD.1405 On that basis, Commerce determined a net countervailable
subsidy rate of 1.69% ad valorem for KTV and a net countervailable subsidy rate of
1.16% ad valorem for Sailun during the POI.1406
The Government of Vietnam has strongly rebuked Commerce’s determination
that Vietnamese exporters of passenger tires were subsidized by a currency
undervaluation. Immediately after the release of Commerce’s final determination,
Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Le Thi Thu Hang said that “Vietnam doesn’t dump nor
subsidize its automobile tires for exports and doesn’t manipulate currency to gain unfair
advantage in international trade.”1407 The most critical issue that the GOV raised is the
statutory authority of Commerce to promulgate the Final Rule in order to countervail
the exchange of currency. This is also one of the controversial issues that some legal
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experts have commented on in the process of Commerce’s making the Final Rule.1408
The GOV argued that Commerce lacks legal authority to investigate and countervail
this so-called currency-undervaluation program.1409 A GOV’s representative in the
public hearing argued that currency undervaluation cannot be characterized as a
countervailable subsidy under the WTO’s Subsidies Agreement because of three
reasons: (1) the undervaluation of currency is not a financial contribution under the
Subsidies Agreement; (2) the undervaluation of currency does not create a benefit
under the Subsidies Agreement; (3) undervaluation of currency, if any, is not a policy
under Article 2 of the Subsidies Agreement.1410 Further, the GOV’s counsel argued that
Commerce lacks statutory authority due to the fact that numerous legislative attempts
to amend the Act to provide such authority have all failed.1411 This counsel explained
that if the Act already provided statutory authority to treat an undervalued currency as
a countervailable subsidy, then it would not have been necessary to make numerous
attempts to revise the law to provide such authority.1412 Thus, the counsel argued,
Commerce’s unilateral actions to promulgate the Final Rule for treating an undervalued
currency as a specific subsidy and setting out the method for calculating a benefit from
currency undervaluation are unlawful and void.1413 However, Commerce rejected all of
these arguments and found that Commerce was acting in accordance with the U.S. CVD
law, specifically the Act and Commerce’s regulations. Commerce confirmed that the
CVD law fully implements the United States’ obligation under the Subsidies
Agreement. Further, Commerce reiterated that it is the Act and Commerce’s regulations
1408
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that have direct legal effect under U.S. law, and not the WTO Agreements or WTO
reports.1414 As a result, Commerce said the GOV’s WTO-related arguments had no
merit in the proceeding.1415 Commerce rejected the arguments that the legislative
attempts to amend the Act supported the conclusion that Commerce lacks the statutory
authority to treat currency undervaluation as a countervailable subsidy.1416
Commerce’s position relied upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling that “Congressional
inaction lacks persuasive significance because several equally tenable inferences may
be drawn from such inaction, including the inference that the existing legislation
already incorporated the offered change.”1417 Therefore, Commerce determined that the
fact that there have been such legislative attempts that failed is not relevant to
Commerce’s interpretation of the Act as it currently stands.1418 From this reasoning,
Commerce continued its arguments that Congress authorized it, through the CVD law,
to countervail injurious subsidies, regardless of what form they take.1419 Also, the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 authorized Commerce to administer CVD investigations, and
therefore, Congress intended for Commerce to have the authority to address currency
undervaluation.1420 In other words, Commerce sought to establish that it has broad
discretion within its administration of the CVD law in order to promulgate new
regulations including currency-undervaluation regulations.
Another important and controversial point was Commerce’s finding of
specificity. Commerce found that the GOV’s currency-undervaluation subsidy is
predominantly used by a group of enterprises that buy or sell goods internationally,
constituting the traded goods sector. And as a result, Commerce found this program is
de facto specific. The GOV did not agree with this finding and argued that “the traded
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goods sector is too broad to constitute a specific group of enterprises.”1421 In particular,
the GOV explained that the traded goods sector accounts for a significant portion of
the Vietnamese economy. According to GOV, since members of the traded goods
sector are in virtually all industries of the Vietnamese economy, any alleged subsidy
provided to such a group would be spread throughout the entire Vietnamese economy,
rendering it non-specific.1422 However, Commerce rejected the GOV’s arguments and
stated that “there need not be shared characteristics among the enterprises that comprise
a group,” and therefore, “it does not matter if these enterprises represent unrelated
industries.”1423
In sum, Commerce’s finding that the undervaluation of currency is a
countervailable subsidy is a controversial determination. Commerce’s determination
could be appealed at the U.S. Court of International Trade, or challenged at the WTO.
Vietnam or China or any other country similarly targeted, would have plausible claims
that Commerce’s determination with respect to a currency-undervaluation subsidy is
inconsistent with the WTO’s Subsidies Agreement.

5.4.6.6. Conclusion
In this case, Commerce continued to use external benchmarks to measure the
benefits of the land rents. With respect to the land system in Vietnam, Commerce
continued to conclude that the GOV controls all land use rights and influence all land
prices, and therefore, there is no useable market benchmark from within Vietnam.
But, notably, Commerce for the first time agreed to use an in-country Tier-One
benchmark to calculate the benefit received from the provision of natural rubber (a raw
material for goods to be exported) that a respondent, Sailun, purchased from a stateowned enterprise. The reason that Sailun was able to succeed in convincing Commerce
to accept a Tier-One benchmark is that the GOV offered’ close cooperation in
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providing persuasive records and data for Commerce’s review during the CVD
investigation. Specifically, the GOV provided data indicating that the volume of natural
rubber produced by the sole state-owned rubber company was relatively small
compared to the volume produced by all producers in Vietnam and compared to the
volume of imports of rubber into Vietnam. Furthermore, the GOV established the
absence of laws, policies, controls or government interventions with regard to the
production, import, and export of natural rubber. Thus, Commerce determined that
market prices for natural rubber transactions within Vietnam may serve as Tier-One
benchmarks. While this is only one case, it nevertheless stands in contrast to
Commerce’s repeated determinations to not rely on domestic prices as tier one
benchmarks in CVD investigations against China. This shows that the GOV’s strong
cooperation in a CVD investigation is crucial to a favorable outcome for the
respondent.
As for which interest rate benchmarks to select, Commerce conducted an
analysis of Vietnam’s banking system to see whether there is still government
intervention as to or dominance in the operations of state-owned banks and private
banks. From its analysis, Commerce continued to conclude that the GOV still maintains
substantial intervention and dominance in the banking sector. Thus, the interest rates
used for commercial loans in Vietnam are not considered market-determined rates. As
a result, Commerce decided to continue the use of external interest rate benchmarks in
measuring benefits received from lending programs in current and future CVD
investigations. With respect to the alleged lending programs in this CVD investigation,
Commerce did not find any related countervailable subsidies provided to Sailun and
KTV.
Some programs such as import duty exemptions on imports of raw materials for
exported goods and corporate income tax benefits for new investments are frequently
and repeatedly treated by Commerce as countervailable subsidies. It is puzzling that
Vietnam seems to be slow to adapt to Commerce’s regulatory requirements for these
programs to reduce the CVD rates for the exporting companies under investigation.
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Another possibility is that Vietnam gives greater priority to attracting foreign
investments than to such adaptation, or that it seeks the best possible way to support
both foreign and Vietnamese investors that engage in import and export activities.
Lastly, Commerce’s determination on currency undervaluation is an important
ruling for Vietnam as well as other countries currently exporting to the United States
market. Those countries with a similar policy related to undervaluing currencies could
become targets for potential CVD investigations by Commerce. Commerce’s
modification of its regulations regarding an undervalued-currency subsidy,
accompanied with its affirmative finding of countervailable undervalued-currency
subsidy in this CVD case against Vietnam, could trigger future legal disputes at both
U.S. judicial courts and international dispute settlement bodies. In fact, on September
8, 2021, KTV filed a complaint at the U.S. Court of International Trade to challenge
Commerce’s final determination.1424 KTV contested that Commerce’s determination to
impose CVDs to address a foreign-government’s currency practices was “arbitrary and
capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”1425 This litigation will unfold in the coming months. It is
inevitable that this and similar litigation will drag on for years because the issue of a
currency-undervaluation subsidy is a rather new and complicated one that requires the
participation of many experts and professionals with high expertise in banking and
financial sectors.
Particularly in Vietnam, those enterprises involved in exporting activities to the
U.S. market are potentially subjects affected by Commerce’s affirmative
determination. Especially for those exporters that are subject to U.S. AD and CVD
orders, they will face the risk of being accused of benefiting from Vietnam’s currencyundervaluation subsidies.
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Chapter 6. Recommendations

6.1. Vietnam’s Trajectory Towards a Market Economy
After more than 30 years of Doi Moi, Vietnam has transformed itself from a
centrally planned economy towards a globally integrated, “socialist-oriented” market
economy. Vietnam’s commitment to pursue and perfect its socialist-oriented market
economy was affirmed by the Communist Party of Vietnam (“CPV”) in 2017.1 426 To
unify the perception of this socialist-oriented market economy within Vietnam, CPV
clarified that in a socialist-oriented market economy, “the State plays a role of
orienting, building and perfecting economic institutions; creates a fair, transparent and
healthy competitive environment; uses tools, policies and resources of the State to
orient and regulate the economy, promote production and business, and protect natural
resources and the environment; [and] develops cultural and social fields.”1 427 CPV
further explained that “the market plays a key role in effectively mobilizing and
allocating resources, which is the main driving force for releasing productive power;
State resources are allocated according to strategies, master plans and plans in line with
the market mechanism.”1 428 Importantly, CPV also insisted on the requirement to
“clearly define and properly implement the position, role, function and relationship of
the State, the market and the society in accordance with the market economy; ensure
the socialist orientation.”1429 Thus, the relationship among the State, the market, and
the realization of a socialist-oriented market economy in Vietnam is tied to the ongoing
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economic transition; this is major relationship that needs to be carefully considered,
and its maintenance is “a strategic task to perform.”1 430
Following Vietnam’s accession to the WTO in 2007, as of June 2020, Vietnam
has been recognized by 71 other countries around the world as a country with market
economy.1431 The recognition of market economy status awarded by these countries
supports the position that Vietnam has been regarded as an economy in which market
prices are determined by free competition. Concurrently, Vietnam has also
demonstrated to many countries that it has been making impressive economic
transformations, although such an economy may not be deemed a full-fledged market
economy according to the concept of a free-market economy employed by the United
States. Indeed, with the United States, although it is an important trading partner of
Vietnam, there have been many difficulties stemming from the government-influenced
nature of Vietnam’s economic institutions as well as from the relationship between the
State and the market, all of which may discourage the United States from reclassifying
Vietnam as a country with a market economy. To be sure, the Government of Vietnam
(“GOV”) has the objective of being recognized by the United States as a market
economy country, a designation that would have great economic impact along
Vietnam’s course of bilateral trade normalization between the two countries. The
following sections will set forth various recommendations for the GOV to undertake in
order to aid its long-term goal of being recognized as a market economy country by the
United States.
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6.2. Vietnam’s Quest for Market Economy Status in the United States
As discussed in Section 5.2.2, U.S. trade law provides a basis for treating
Vietnam as a market economy country. Congress has delegated great discretion to
Commerce to make such a decision. To that end, the author recommends that the GOV
continue to strengthen its diplomatic and trade relations with the U.S., and particularly
that in diplomatic discussions, the GOV voice its desire that the U.S. confer market
economy status upon it.
The U.S. and Vietnam established diplomatic relations 25 years ago, trade
normalization has been in progress 2001, and the current relationship remains
essentially a comprehensive partnership. In a visit to Vietnam this year, Vice President
Harris reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to “a strong, prosperous, and
independent Vietnam, as well as free, open, healthy, and resilient Indo-Pacific
region.”1432 The Vice President launched a new CDC Southeast Asia Regional Office
in Hanoi and emphasized the U.S. government’s efforts to promote economic and
opportunity.1433 These are promising steps towards the development of the sort of
relationship that may ultimately enable Vietnam to receive market economy treatment.
Indeed, Vietnam has established strategic partnerships with other countries such
as Japan (2006), South Korea (2009), the U.K (2010), and Germany (2011).1434 In 2010,
the then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proposed the idea of a bilateral strategic
partnership with Vietnam, that idea resurfaced in 2021.1435 The GOV should consider
taking this opportunity to develop such a partnership.
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Of course, under the current trade regime, it is ultimately Commerce that must
determine that Vietnam has a market economy. And, as discussed in Section 5.2.2,
despite Vietnam’s economic transformation, Commerce currently takes the position
that Vietnam’s economy does not operate on market principles, and that prices and
costs in Vietnam are not market-driven. So, the GOV should take certain steps,
discussed below, in order to persuade Commerce that Vietnam has sufficient
characteristics of a market economy country to warrant that designation. As discussed
in Section 5.3, although Russia and Ukraine have had their fair share of difficulties
during their economic transitions, they were still granted market economy status by
Commerce, so it is not implausible that Vietnam could realize the same. And China’s
failed efforts at seeking market economy status also provides a profound lesson for
Vietnam in choosing its strategy: China focused on winning disputes in the WTO,
essentially hoping that by winning a dispute with the EU, the result of that dispute
would in turn cause the U.S. to bestow market economy status. But the global trade
regime is not so easily overcome: Vietnam should instead position itself to request a
changed-circumstances review directly with Commerce, presuming that Vietnam has
taken certain steps to increase the likelihood of a favorable result from that review.
In Section 5.2.2, the author discussed Commerce’s application of the six-factor
test to determine market economy status. If Commerce applies the six factors strictly
as it has in the past against Vietnam and China, it is unlikely that Vietnam would
receive market economy status in the near future. But Vietnam should focus on certain
factors that it can more easily control, such as by taking steps to improve currency
convertibility and reducing state control over the allocation of resources, particularly
within the banking sector and as pertains to land transactions.
Regarding currency manipulation or undervaluation, Vietnam is already taking
some steps. Commerce’s finding of currency undervaluation in the PVLT Tires case
was discussed in Section 5.4.6; apart from that, the USTR also launched a Section 301
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investigation to decide whether any trade action should be taken against Vietnam.1436
However, Vietnam quickly reacted to the Section 301 investigation and successfully
entered into an agreement with the U.S. Department of the Treasury, promising to the
U.S. that the State Bank of Vietnam would henceforth allow Vietnam’s currency to
move in line with the development of Vietnam’s financial and foreign exchange market
and with Vietnam’s economic fundamentals.1437 This cooperation is emblematic of the
relationship that Vietnam should continue to cultivate with the USTR and the Treasury
Department regarding Vietnam’s currency valuation. This relationship will help
Vietnam both in the context of specific CVD investigations and in its long-term goal
of attaining market economy status.
The author also recommends that Vietnam continue to take steps to permit
privatization, although the Government of Vietnam prefers to call it “equitization,” the
idea being that the GOV has converted state-owned entities (“SOEs”) into joint stock
companies in which the state remains a majority shareholder.1438 As required under its
international commitments, especially under free trade agreements, Vietnam is
committed to create a level playing field for all forms of business. Therefore, Vietnam
has attempted to decentralize its government control and cut its state ownership in
SOEs (e.g., under CPTPP).1439
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Dung Nguyen, and Farhad Taghizadeh-Hesary, “State-Owned Enterprise Reform in Vietnam: Progress
and Challenges”, ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 1071, January 2020, available at
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/562061/adbi-wp1071.pdf, accessed on October 26,
2021.
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CPTPP is the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is a
free trade agreement with eleven members, including Australia, Brunei, Darussalam, Canada, Chile,
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Vietnam should consider changing the concept of “equitization.” In practice,
Vietnam has attempted to unwind direct ownership in key sectors, but the process of
privatization is still sluggish and behind schedule. Some obstacles that the SOEs under
an equitization schedule may face pertain to land-use rights. This is important because
land-use rights are a key factor in determining an SOE’s valuation for investors during
the process of equitization. For example, Agribank (one of the largest state-owned
commercial banks) has encountered obstacles in getting approval from the Ministry of
Finance to continue to use its real property throughout the equitization process due to
its large size.1440 Thus, Vietnam should consider providing an expedited privatization
process by easing regulations and procedures pertaining to the valuation of land-use
rights.
Vietnam’s state ownership in SOEs is still significant, accounting for 28% of
GDP, and if including state-owned commercial banks (“SOCBs”), it accounts for 34%
of GDP; while foreign enterprises account for 18% of GDP, and private enterprises
accounts for less than 10%.1441 Speeding up the privatization process would help
Vietnam compare more favorably to other market economy countries.
In the modern market economy, the role of the state remains very important.
But the role should be to stabilize the macroeconomy (not microeconomy), to establish
a legal framework and enforcement apparatus for the market to function well, and to
overcome defects and failures of the market in order to ensure equal development

Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. Under CPTPP, Vietnam made a
commitment that SOEs must operate under market mechanisms. See Vietnam Investment Review, “SOE
divestment a priority in CPTPP era,” January 30, 2019, available at https://vir.com.vn/soe-divestmenta-priority-in-cptpp-era-65586.html, accessed on October 27, 2021.
1440
Luu Huong, “Divestment slow off the blocks for banks,” Vietnam Investment Review, April 13,
2021, available at https://vir.com.vn/divestment-slow-off-the-blocks-for-banks-83651.html, accessed on
October 26, 2021.
1441
Trung Kien, Tiếp tục hiện đại hoá nền kinh tế, phát triển kinh tế tư nhân [Continuing to modernize
the economy, developing the private economy], Electronic News Portal of Ho Chi Minh City Party
Committee, February 15, 2021, available at https://hcmcpv.org.vn/tin-tuc/tiep-tuc-hien-dai-hoa-nenkinh-te-phat-trien-kinh-te-tu-nhan-1491874739, accessed on October 26, 2021. The data and
information in this news article is from an interview with Professor Vo Dai Luoc, former director of the
Institute of World Economy, Academy of Social Sciences, talked to the website portal of the Party
Committee of Ho Chi Minh City on this issue.
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opportunities for every business entity. The state can still achieve such goals without
holding a large proportion of state ownership in SOEs and SOCBs.
Notably, under the Constitution of Vietnam, land is public property owned by
the entire people and managed by the State; land is also considered a “special resource
of the nation.”1442 Vietnam’s land law stipulates that the land is owned by the entire
people and is uniformly managed by the State on behalf of the owners.1443 Through a
system of State agencies, land price frameworks are issued every five years for each
type of land and for each region.1444 The land price frameworks serve as the basis for
each province or city to determine appropriate land price tables as a reference for land
users and for the purpose of land management (e.g., for calculation of land use fees,
land use tax, land allocation, and land rents).1445 However, in reality, market land prices
are always higher than the state’s land price frameworks.1446 There are also temporal
limitations upon land allocation, limits for the scale of land allocation, and fixed
restrictions regarding the purpose of land use. These restrictions on land use were
integral to CVD determinations discussed in Sections 5.4.1.4.2 and 5.4.6.3.3. In order
to continue on its quest for market economy status, Vietnam needs to change its land
pricing evaluation mechanism. To that end, Vietnam should reform the system of land
pricing to be based on marketable supply and demand of land rather than on Stateissued frameworks and tables. Importantly, because all land is stipulated as being
owned by the people, land rents and land allocation should be transparent and based on
voluntary agreements between land users and the State, or, in the event that business
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The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, passed on November 28, 2013, by the 13th
National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, at its 6th session [hereinafter 2013 Vietnam
Constitution], at Articles 53-54.
1443
Land Law No. 45/2013/QH13 promulgated by the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam on November 29, 2013 [hereinafter Vietnam Land Law], at Article 4.
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Id. at Article 113.
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Id. at Article 114.
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VVFC, Vietnam Appraisal, Những bất cập và hệ lụy [Inadequacies in land prices and consequences],
available at http://www.vvfc.vn/tin-nganh/nhung-bat-cap-trong-gia-dat-va-he-luy.html; see also Viet
Hoa, TP.HCM: Kiến nghị Thủ tướng bỏ khung giá đất [Ho Chi Minh City: Proposing that the Prime
Minister repeal land price frameworks], Phap Luat News, September 14, 2020, available at
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enterprises gain greater land-use rights, agreements between such enterprises and
farmers, for instance.
In short, Vietnam needs to develop its conceptualization of itself. Although
private ownership of land will be at odds with Vietnam’s concept of socialism, Vietnam
will struggle to achieve market economy status if it does not more clearly delineate
private land-use rights and permit market factors to determine land rents and the
parameters for land transactions. Regardless, Vietnam should continue to clarify what
it means to have a socialist-oriented market economy. Doing so will only help Vietnam
as it continues its progress from a transition economy to a full-fledged economy.

6.3 The Market-Oriented Industry & Mix-and-Match Approaches
Section 4.3.2.4.1.2 discussed the market-oriented industry (“MOI”) theory,
which, if employed by Commerce, would permit the use of a market economy
methodology in calculating CVD against Vietnamese producers within certain
industries even if Vietnam on the whole lacks market economy status. However,
Commerce’s current test for recognizing an MOI is too strict: it is “all-or-nothing,” that
is, market-determined prices must be paid for all significant inputs within the industry.
One may hypothesize an example that could pass this test: if Apple, for instance,
opened a factory in an export processing zone in Vietnam, at which it manufactured
phones and laptops for exporting back to the U.S., it might be able to pass the test
because within export processing zones there is much less state control within the
markets, and Commerce might then be able to conclude that all significant inputs (even
land and labor) were paid at market prices. To increase the likelihood that Commerce
will employ the MOI test, Vietnam should continue to ensure that export processing
zones are home to market-driven prices and costs. Vietnamese producers in a CVD
investigation may also consider arguing the extent to which individual inputs are
“significant”; although the MOI test requires all significant inputs to be at market
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prices, there is some discretion built into Commerce’s determination as to what is a
significant input.
Even better would be if Commerce were to adopt the “mix and match”
approach, as it appeared to do in the Tires case when it applied Tier-1 (in-country)
benchmarks to natural rubber as an input because the respondents showed that the
market for that specific input was not distorted by government intervention.1447 To
successfully persuade Commerce to use this approach in future cases, Vietnamese
exporters and producers should develop a strategy of sourcing inputs from suppliers at
prices that are demonstrably market-driven; or, when sourcing inputs from a SOE, they
should, as with the natural rubber in the Tires case, show that the government’s
presence in the input market did not have the effect of distorting it.

6.4. The Use of Tier-3 Benchmarks
The author further recommends that Commerce cease the use of Tier-3
benchmarks, because these benchmarks may be inaccurate and, in any event, their use
is always uncertain and unpredictable. Vietnamese enterprises can plan for the
possibility of the imposition of ADD and CVD, but it is very difficult to anticipate the
CVD rates that Commerce may decide to impose if Commerce looks to Tier-3
benchmarks to calculate them. This in turn makes it difficult for an enterprise to know
whether it is worth exporting goods to the U.S. market in the first place, or perhaps
whether it is worthwhile to participate in a CVD proceeding once one has begun. This
has further consequences that the GOV should take into consideration because one
enterprise’s decision not to participate in a CVD proceeding may result in an
unfavorable determination that then harms other potential entrants to the market who
are at least preliminarily subject to that same CVD determination against their exports
to the U.S.

1447

See supra, Section 5.4.6.3.2.
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Imposing CVD rates using Tier-3 benchmarks also goes beyond the purpose of
the CVD law; the CVD law is meant to ensure fairness in the global trade arena, but
using unpredictable third-country benchmarks borders on punitive. Nor is the rationale
behind such use very strong: Commerce reasons that in nonmarket economies, prices
may be subject to distortion, but there is distortion from tax breaks and subsidies even
within market economies as well.

6.5. Recommendations for Vietnamese Enterprises
Finally, the author provides certain recommendations for Vietnamese
enterprises. First, they should be cautious with Chinese investors who move factories
to Vietnam for the purpose of exporting products similar to those that are currently
subject to AD or CVD order against China. In the past, there have been several
circumvention cases that result in unfavorable AD or CVD determinations for the
exporter.1448 Second, when exporting to the U.S. market, Vietnamese enterprises should
consider hiring trade counsel to advise on strategies and plans and to prevent potential
risks (such as unfavorable or overly costly AD or CVD proceedings) early on. Trade
counsel can help exporters to develop business practices that will make compliance
with a U.S. investigation easier, less costly, and more likely to result in a favorable
outcome. Third, even businesses that have not been sued or investigated should
maintain clear and transparent accounting systems that are independently audited. As
seen in the Circular Welded Carbon-Quality Steel Pipe case, maintaining books to
American standards permitted easy onsite verification of the respondents’ submitted
data, which in turn helped to facilitate a determination that the respondents had not
received countervailable subsidies.1449

1448

See supra, Section 5.4.3. Products that are subject to AD/CVD orders from certain countries can be
investigated by Commerce for circumvention where those products were made from parts from a subject
country and completed or assembled in a third country or the United States.
1449
See supra, Section 5.4.2.5.
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Fourth, Vietnam’s Trade Remedy Authority has put in place an “early warning
system” for potential trade remedy actions.1450 Businesses should ensure that they
receive frequent updates from this system to be well prepared for any imminent
investigations. And when an investigation occurs, businesses should promptly consult
with trade counsel to answer Commerce’s questionnaires in a timely and cooperative
manner. As seen in the Steel Wire Garment Hangers, Steel Nails, and Laminated
Woven Sacks cases, failure to cooperate with Commerce in an AD or CVD
investigation can have unfavorable consequences for the respondents. The litigation
process may last for 12 to 18 months, but businesses should remain involved until the
final determination to avoid being subject to the use of adverse facts available (“AFA”)
or being subject to a Vietnam-Wide Entity rate rather than a more favorable rate that
would have resulted from continued participation in the proceedings.1451
Fifth, businesses should ensure that they participate in both Commerce’s
proceedings and in the parallel injury proceedings in the ITC. As seen in the Certain
Frozen Warmwater Shrimp case, even if Commerce finds the existence of a
countervailable subsidy, the ITC may still determine that there is no actual or
threatened injury to American industry. The business under investigation should
consult with trade counsel to determine which investigation has better odds of a
favorable outcome, in order to efficiently allocate resources that are available to
litigating the proceeding.
Sixth, in a CVD proceeding, businesses should recognize the importance of the
role of the GOV in explaining and proving the nature of alleged subsidy programs. That
means that when an investigation commences, businesses must work together with
other respondents and must call upon the GOV to help produce a coordinated and
cooperative response that clearly conveys the extent to which government programs
may, for example, be generalized rather than industry-specific and thus not subject to
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Trade Remedies Authority of Vietnam, TIN CẢNH BÁO SỚM (EARLY WARNING NEWS),
available at http://www.trav.gov.vn/default.aspx?page=news&do=browse&category_id=116d0b731399-4d78-91d9-bd883c1421c8, accessed on October 26, 2021).
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See supra, Section 5.4.3.4.
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CVD.1452 Relatedly, the GOV should hire professional trade counsel to prepare legal
briefs, participate in hearings, and coordinate with respondents’ counsel.
Seventh, businesses should avoid participating in government programs that
have been determined to provide countervailable subsidies. As discussed in Sections
5.4.1, 5.4.3, 5.4.5, and 5.4.6, programs such as preferential land rents, import duty
reimbursement for imported raw materials for Exported goods, and preferential rent for
areas with difficult socio-economics conditions are frequently deemed to provide
countervailable subsidies. Businesses should weigh the potential short-term benefits of
participating in such programs against the potential long-term cost of being subject to
a higher CVD rate as a result.
Eighth, and finally, enterprises that export to the U.S. market should consider
diversifying their debt portfolio and taking loans from an array of domestic commercial
banks rather than only from one or two SOCBs. This will reduce the likelihood that
terms-of-credit will be treated as a countervailable subsidy in a CVD proceeding.
In sum, businesses and the GOV should work with Commerce during any CVD
proceeding, both to produce a favorable result from that proceeding and to encourage
Commerce to use a more favorable methodology in carrying out the proceeding. The
author hopes that Commerce will employ greater use of the “mix and match” approach
rather than categorically employing the nonmarket economy methodology in
calculating CVD rates. And in the longer run, the author hopes that, as the GOV
continues to make economic transformations, Commerce will recognize the existence
of market-oriented industries within Vietnam. In time, with strengthened diplomatic
and trade relations, perhaps it is possible that Vietnam may receive market economy
treatment by the United States.

1452

See supra, Section 5.4.5.4.

281

Bibliography

BOOKS
BHALA, RAI, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK,
VOLUME 3, REMEDIS (Fifth Edition, Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic
Press 2019).
BIDWELL, PERCY W., THE INVISIBLE TARIFF (Council of Foreign Relations 1939).
BOWMAN, GREGORY W., COVELLI, NICK, GANTZ, DAVID A, AND UHM, IHN HO,
TRADE REMEDIES IN NORTH AMERICA (Global Trade Law Series, Volume 27,
Kluwer Law International 2010).
CHUNG, JAE WAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE: U.S.
TRADE LAW, POLICY, AND SOCIAL COST (Lexington Books 2006).
COPPENS, DOMINIC, WTO DISCIPLINES ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING
MEASURES: BALANCING POLICY SPACE AND LEGAL CONSTRAINTS (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 2014).
GREGORY, PAUL R. AND STUART, ROBERT C., COMPARING ECONOMIC SYSTEMS IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Seventh Ed., Houghton Mifflin Company 2004),
HORLICK,

GARY N., WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ANTIDUMPING, SUBSIDIES AND TRADE AGREEMENTS (World Scientific Publishing

Co. Pte. Ltd. 2014).
JACKSON JOHN H. AND DAVEY, WILLIAM J., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT (2nd ed., West 1986).
JACKSON, JOHN H., THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2nd ed., MIT 1997).

AND

POLICY

OF

JACKSON, JOHN H., DAVEY, WILLIAM H., AND SYKES, ALAN O., LEGAL PROBLEMS
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT (5th ed.,
West 2008).
JACOBSON, HAROLD KARAN, THE SOVIET UNIOIN, THE UN
(Volume 11, Issue 3, The Western Political Quarterly 1958).

AND

WORLD TRADE

282

LAW AND PRACTICE OF UNITED STATES REGULATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
(Volume I, Thomson Reuters 2016).
PATTISON, JOSEPH E., ANTIDUMPING
Edition, Thomson Reuters 2016).

AND

COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS (2016

RAMBURES, DOMINIQUE DE, WHAT IS THE SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY? THE
CHINA DEVELOPMENT MODEL BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE MARKET (Palgrave
Macmillan UK 2015).
ZHANG, BIN, THE EVOLUTION OF THE NON-MARKET ECONOMY TREATMENT IN THE
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM (Springer, Singapore 2018).

REVIEW ARTICLES
Alford, William P., When is China Paraguay? An Examination of the Application
of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws of the United States to China
and Other “Nonmarket Economy” Nations, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 79 (1987).
Arkin, Robert David, Countervailing Duty Law after Zenith: Unanimity Can be
Beguiling, The, 18 VA J. INT’L L. 245 (1978).
Barceló III, John J., Subsidies and Countervailing Duties - Analysis and a Proposal,
9 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 779 (1977).
Barceló III, John J., A History of GATT Unfair Trade Remedy Law - Confusion of
Purposes, CORNELL LAW FACULTY PUBLICATIONS, Paper 517 (1991).
Barceló III, John J., Subsidies, Countervailing Duties and Antidumping After the
Tokyo Round, 13 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 257 (1980).
Barth, Mark H. & Nemmers, Barry H., A Roadmap to the Trade Act, 8 LAW &
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 125 (1976).
Bello, Judith Hippler, Current Subsidy and Antidumping Issues after the Trade and
Tariff Act of 1984, 21 STAN. J. INT’L L. 299 (1985).
Bello, Judith H., Holmer, Alan F., and Preiss, Jeremy O., Searching for Bubbles of
Capitalism: Application of the U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws to
Reforming Nonmarket Economies, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 665 (1992).
Bellocchi, Luke P., The Effects of and Trends in Executive Policy and Court of
International Trade (CIT) Decisions Concerning Antidumping and the Nonmarket

283

Economy (NME) of the People’s Republic of China, 10 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 177
(1997).
Bentes, Pablo M. et al., International Trade Edited by: Joseph A. Laroski, Jr. and
Valentin A. Povarchuk, 45 INT’L LAW. 79 (2011).
Beshkar, Mostafa & Chilton, Adam S., Revisiting Procedure and Precedent in the
WTO: An Analysis of U.S. - Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China),
15 WORLD TRADE REV. 375 (2016)
Bialos, Jeffrey P., Tritell, Randolph W., and Applebaum, Martin S., Trading with
Central and Eastern Europe: The Application of the U.S. Unfair Trade Laws to
Economies in Transition, 7-AUT INT’L L. PRACTICUM 69 (1994).
Bogard, Lawrence J., 1 Law and Practice of US Reg. of International Trade §
1:125, Law and Practice of United States Regulation of International Trade,
Publisher’s Editorial Staff, Chapter 1. Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, III.
Material Injury in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases (Westlaw),
accessed on October 20, 2020.
Butler, William et al., The Role of the Nonmarket Economies in the New Round of
Trade Negotiations, 81 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 224 (1987)
Cichanowicz, David James, Countervailing Duties and Non-Market Economies:
The Case of the Peoples Republic of China, 10 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 405
(1983).
Cowan, Kevin M., Cold War Trade Statutes: Is Jackson-Vanik Still Relevant?, 42
U. KAN. L. REV. 737 (1994)
Cuneo, Donald L., and Charles B. Manuel, Roadblock to Trade: The StateControlled Economy Issue in Antidumping Law Administration, 5 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 277 (1981).
Dinh, Viet D., Financial Reform and Economic Development in Vietnam, 28 LAW
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 857 (1997).
Durling, James P., Encountering Rocky Shoals: Application of the CVD Law to
China, 2010 WL 956090, *4 (2010).
Ehrenhaft, Peter D., Protection Against International Price Discrimination: United
States Countervailing and Antidumping Duties, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 44 (1958).
Eid, Richard N., The Effect of Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States on
Nonmarket Economy Imports, 3 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 65 (1988).

284

Feldman, Elliot J. & Burke, John J., Testing the Limits of Trade Law Rationality:
The GPX Case and Subsidies in Non-Market Economies, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 787
(2013).
Gantz, David A., Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags: Non-Market Economy Status
and U.S. Unfair Trade Actions Against Vietnam, 36 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
85 (2010).
Garfinkel, Eric, Export Subsidies: Countervailing Duties, 11 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L
L. 187 (1979).
Granet, Lloyd, ITC Injury Determination in Countervailing Duty Investigations, 15
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 987 (1983).
Grimmett, Jeanne J., U.S. Trade Remedy Laws and Nonmarket Economies: A Legal
Overview, Congressional Research Service (March 9, 2012).
Grzybowski, Kazimierz, United States-Soviet Union Trade Agreement of 1972, 37
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 395 (1972).
Grzybowski, K., Socialist Countries in GATT, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 539 (1980).
Feller, Peter Buck, Mutiny against the Bounty: An Examination of Subsidies,
Border Tax Adjustments, and the Resurgence of the Countervailing Duty Law, 1
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 17 (1969).
Holmer, Alan F. & Bello, Judith Hippler, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series #7:
The Countervailing Duty Law’s Applicability to Nonmarket Economies, 20 INT’L
LAW. 319 (1986).
Horlick, Gary N. & Shuman, Shannon S., Nonmarket Economy Trade and U.S.
Antidumping/Countervailing Duty Laws, 18 INT’L LAW. 807 (1984).
Hartmann, Stephanie E., Putting the Specter of Double Counting to Rest: How
Public Law 112-99 Resolves the Issue of Double Counting in Concurrent
Countervailing and Non-Market Economy Antidumping Investigations, 10 BYU
INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 139 (2014).
Hoyt, Robert Franklin, Comment: Implementation and Policy: Problems in the
Application of Countervailing Duty Laws to Nonmarket Economy Countries, 136
U. PA. L. REV. 1647 (1988).
Ianni, Edmond M., State Trading: Its Nature and International Treatment, 5 NW.
J. Int’l L. & Bus. 46 (1983).

285

Jameson, Paul W., The Administration of the U.S. Countervailing Duty Laws with
Regard to Domestic Subsidies: Where It’s Been, Where It Is, Where It May Go, 12
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 59 (1985).
King, D.B., Countervailing Duties - An Old Remedy with New Appeal, 24 BUS.
LAW. 1179 (1969).
King, Neil Jr., U.S. Decides to Grant Russia Status of ‘Market Economy, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL, June 7, 2002
Lantz, Robert H., The Search for Consistency: Treatment of Nonmarket Economies
in Transition under United States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 10
AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 993 (1995).
Leigh, Monroe, Countervailing Duty Law-Applicability to Nonmarket Economy
Countries, 80 AM. J. INT’L. L. 359 (1986).
Lockridge, Richard, Doubling down in Non-Market Economies: The Inequitable
Application of Trade Remedies against China and the Case for a New WTO
Institution, 24 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 249 (2014).
MacDaniel, Christopher Blake, Sailing the Seas of Protectionism: The
Simultaneous Application of Antidumping and Countervailing Duties to Nonmarket
Economies - An Affront to Domestic and International Laws, 38 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 741 (2010).
Meszaros, James A., Application of the United States’ Law of Countervailing
Duties to Nonmarket Imports: Effects of the Recent Foreign Reforms, 2 ILSA J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 463 (1996).
Neeley, Jeffrey S., Nonmarket Economy Import Regulation from Bad to Worse, 20
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 529 (1989).
O’Brien, Karen A., The Applicability of the United States Countervailing Duty Law
to Imports from Nonmarket Economy Countries, 9 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 596 (1985).
O’Neill, Philip D. Jr., United States Countervailing Duty Law: Renewed, Revamped
and Revisited--Trade Act of 1974, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 832 (1976).
Ortwine, Bruce A., Injury Determinations under United States Antidumping Laws
before and after the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 1076
(1981).
Palmer, Claire Rickard (Miller & Chevalier Chartered), What Next for
Countervailing Duties on Imports from Non-Market Economies in the United

286

States?, North American Free Trade & Investment Report, Vol. 22, No. 2, Thomson
Reuters/World Trade Executive (January 31, 2012).
Panzarella, Jay L., Is the Specificity Test Generally Applicable, 18 LAW & POL’Y
INT’L BUS. 417 (1986).
Pearson, McKay M., Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws: The Quest to
Control Nonmarket Economy Countries, 1989 BYU L. REV. 717 (1989).
Polouektov, Alexander, Non-Market Economy, Issues in the WTO Anti-Dumping
Law and Accession Negotiations: Revival of a Two-tier Membership?, 36(I) J.
WORLD TRADE 1, (2002).
Prusa, Thomas J., NMEs and the Double Remedy Problem, 16 WORLD TRADE
REVIEW 619 (2017).
Reed, Patrick C., Access to Judicial Review of Customs Duties: The Overlooked
Constitutional Rights, 29 FED. CIR. B.J. 1 (2019).
Skypes, Alan, Sykes, Alan O., An Economic Perspective on As Such/facial Versus
as Applied Challenges in the WTO and U.S. Constitutional Systems, 6 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 1 (2014).
Snyder, Francis, The Origins of the Nonmarket Economy: Ideas, Pluralism and
Power in EC Anti-Dumping Law about China, 7 EUR L.J. 369 (2001).
Spak, Gregory J., Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States: Applying the
Countervailing Duty Law to Imports from Nonmarket Economy Countries, 18 LAW
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 313 (1986).
Stauch, Thomas R., The United States and Vietnam: Overcoming the Past and
Investing in the Future, 28 INT’L LAW. 995 (1994).
Tran-Trong, Ky, A Would-Be Tiger: Assessing Vietnam’s Prospects for Gaining
Most Favored Nation Status from the United States, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1583
(1997).
Tu-Anh Vu-Thanh, Does WTO Accession Help Domestic Reform? The Political
Economy of SOE Reform Backsliding in Vietnam, 16 WORLD TRADE REV. 85
(2017).
Vera, Thorstensen, Ramos, Daniel, Muller, Carolina, and Bertolaccini, Fernanda,
WTO - Market and Non-Market Economies: The Hybrid Case of China, 1 (2) LATIN
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (July 2013).

287

Wang, Sanghan, U.S. Trade Laws Concerning Nonmarket Economies Revisited for
Fairness and Consistency, 10 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 593 (1996).
Whitney, Frank DeArmon, Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States: The Federal
Circuit Addresses Countervailing Duties against Nonmarket Economy Imports, 12
N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 303 (1987).
Wilczynski, J., Dumping in Trade between Market and Centrally Planned
Economies, Vol. g, No. 3, Printed in Norway (1966).
Zhao, Longyue & Wangr, Yan, Trade Remedies and Non-Market Economies:
Economic Implications of the First U.S. Countervailing Duty Case on China
(World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4560, 2008).
Zheng, Wentong, The Pitfalls of the (Perfect) Market Benchmark: The Case of
Countervailing Duty Law, 19(1) MINN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010).
Zheng, Wentong, Trade Law’s Responses to the Rise of China, 34 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 109 (2016).

WTO LEGISLATION
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S.
187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [GATT 1994].
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, concluded on April 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T.
513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, 1186 U.N.T.S. 204 [Subsidies Code].
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Annex 1A, Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994, reprinted in H.R. Doc.
No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1533 (1994) [Subsidies Agreement or SCM
Agreement].
WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432
(November 10, 2001) (incorporating the Report of the Working Party on the
Accession of China, P150, WT/ACC/CHN/49 (October 1, 2001)) [China’s
Accession Protocol].

288

U.S. LEGISLATION
Tariff Act of 1890, para. 237, sched. E, 26 Stat. 567, 583 (1890).
Tariff Act of 1894, para. 182, sched. E, 28 Stat. 521 (1894).
Tariff Act of 1897, para 205, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205 (1897).
Tariff Act of 1909, § 6, ch.6, 36 Stat. 11 (1909).
Tariff Act of 1913, para. E, § IV, 38 Stat. 114 (1913).
Tariff Act of 1922, Ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858 (1922).
Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1951, Public Law No. 50, Chapter 141, H.R.
1612, 48 Stat. 943 (June 16, 1951).
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Public Law 87-794, H.R. 11970, 76 Stat. 872
(October 11, 1962).
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978.
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (1979).
Trade and International Economic Policy Reform Act of 1987, H.R. 3 § 157, 100th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1987).
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107 (1988).
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
(1994).
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. Doc
No. 103-316 (1994) (“SAA”).
The Nonmarket Economies Act of 2012, Public Law 112-99, 112 Congress. 126
Stat. 265 (2012).
USTR, Developing and Least-Developed Country Designations under the
Countervailing Duty Law, 63 FR 29945-02 (June 2, 1998).
USTR, Designations of Developing and Least-Developed Countries Under the
Countervailing Duty Law, 85 FR 7613-03 (February 10, 2020).

289

19 C.F.R. Part 351, Countervailing Duties; Final Rule, 63 FR 65348.
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Handbook, 14th Edition, Publication 4540,
USITC, June 2015, at II-33.
Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, “Modification of
Regulations Regarding Benefit and Specificity in Countervailing Duty
Proceedings”, 85 FR 6031, February 4, 2020, 19 C.F.R. § 351.502.

UNITED STATES – VIETNAM BTA:
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam on Trade Relations, available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USVietNam-BilateralTradeAgreement.pdf.

WTO DISPUTES
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by China, United States - Definitive AntiDumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/2
(Dec. 12, 2008) [Panel Request].
WTO, Report of the Panel, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/R (Oct. 22,
2010) [DS379-Panel Report].
WTO, United States - Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on
Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R (March 11, 2011) [DS379-AB
Report].
WT/DS379/AB/R of 11 March 2011, US - Definitive Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China.
WTO, United States - Countervailing and Anti-dumping Measures on Certain
Products from China - Request for consultations by China, WT/DS449/1, Sept. 20,
2012.
WTO, United States - Countervailing and Anti-dumping Measures on Certain
Products from China, WT/DS449/2, Nov. 20, 2012 [DS449-Panel Request].
WTO, United States - Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain
Products from China, AB-2014-4, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS449/AB/R
(July 7, 2014) [DS449-AB Report].

290

Request for Consultations by China, United States--Measures Related to Price
Comparison Methodologies, WTO Doc. WT/DS515/1 (Dec. 15, 2016) [hereinafter
US - Price Comparison Methodologies (DS515)], available at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds516_e.htm.
Request for Consultations by China, European Union - Measures Related to Price
Comparison Methodologies, WTO Doc. WT/DS516/1 (December 15, 2016)
[hereinafter EU - Price Comparison Methodologies (DS516)], available at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds515_e.htm.
WT/DS516/13, EU - Price Comparison Methodologies, Communication from the
Panel
(June
17,
2019),
available
at
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/WT/DS/51613.pdf&Open=True.

U.S. COURT CASES:
Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903).
United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 562 F.2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977), aff’d, 437
U.S. 443, 98 S. Ct. 2441, 57 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1978).
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978).
Carlisle Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834 (Ct. Int’l Trade
1983).
Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1985).
Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 517 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1992).
Consol. Int'l Auto., Inc. v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (Ct. Int’l Trade
1992).
Lasko Metal Prod., Inc. v. United States, 810 F. Supp. 314 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1992),
aff’d, 43 F.3d 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Royal Thai Gov't v. United States, 30 C.I.T. 1072 (2006).
GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 780 F.3d 1136; 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3940;
36 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1433.

291

Gov’t of People’s Republic of China v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 2d. 1274 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2007).
GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 32 C.I.T. 1183
(November 12, 2008).
GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1389, 32 C.I.T. 1516
(December 30, 2008).
GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 2009 WL 362136, 33 C.I.T. 114 (February
12, 2009).
GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 33 C.I.T. 1368
(September 18, 2009) [GPX I].
GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 34 C.I.T. 945, 951 (Aug. 4, 2010) [GPX II].
GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 34 C.I.T. 1307 (Oct. 1, 2010).
GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 666 F.3d 732 (Dec. 19, 2011) [GPX III].
GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 678 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012) [GPX IV].
GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 37 C.I.T. 19 (January
7, 2013) [GPX V].
GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 780 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2015) [GPX VI].
Guangdong Wireking Housewares & Hardware Co. v. United States, 745 F.3d 1194
(Fed. Cir. 2014).
Kumho Tire (Vietnam) Co., Ltd. v. United States, 1:21CV00397 (C.I.T. 2021).

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE’S DETERMINATIONS:
Natural Menthol from the People’s Republic of China; Antidumping: Preliminary
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Suspension of Liquidation, 46
FR 3258 (January 14, 1981) [Natural Menthol Prelim].
Natural Menthol from the People's Republic of China; Antidumping: Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 46 FR 24614 (May 1, 1981)
[Natural Menthol Final].

292

Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations; Certain Steel Products
from Belgium, 47 FR 39304 (September 7, 1982).
Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations; Textiles, Apparel, and Related
Products from the People’s Republic of China, 48 FR 46600-01 (October 13, 1983)
[China Textile Case Initiation].
Textiles, Apparel, and Related Products from the People’s Republic of China;
Termination of Countervailing Duty Investigations, 48 FR 55492 (December 13,
1983) [China Textile Case, Termination].
Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia; Initiation of Countervailing Duty
Investigation, 48 FR 56419 (December 21, 1983) [Initiation of CSWR from
Czechoslovakia].
Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia; Preliminary Negative Countervailing
Duty Determination, 49 FR 6773, February 23, 1984 [Czechoslovakia Prelim
Determination].
Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland; Preliminary Negative Countervailing Duty
Determination, 49 FR 6768, February 23, 1984 [Poland Prelim Determination].
Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czechoslovakia: Final Negative Countervailing Duty
Determination, 49 FR 19370 (May 7, 1984).
Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland; Final Negative Countervailing Duty
Determination, 49 FR 19374 (May 7, 1984).
Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland; Final Negative Countervailing Duty
Determination, 49 FR 19374 (May 7, 1984).
Potassium Chloride from the Soviet Union; Rescission of Initiation of
Countervailing Duty Investigation and Dismissal of Petition, 49 FR 23428 (June 6,
1984) [Potash cases].
Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans from the People’s Republic of China; Initiation
of Antidumping Duty Investigations, 55 FR 49320 (November 27, 1990).
Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans from the People’s Republic of China;
Preliminary Determinations of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 56 FR 25664 (June
5, 1991) [Fans AD Prelim].
Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts from the People’s Republic of China; Initiation of
Antidumping Duty Investigation, 55 FR 49548 (November 29, 1990).

293

Chrome-plated Lug Nuts from the People’s Republic of China; Preliminary
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 56 FR 15857 (April 18, 1991)
[Lug Nuts AD Prelim].
Amendment to Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and
Amendment to Antidumping Duty Order: Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts from the
People’s Republic of China; 57 FR 15052 (April 24, 1992) [Amended Lug Nuts
AD Final].
Antidumping Duty Orders and Amendments to Final Determinations of Sales at
Less Than Fair Value: Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans from the People’s
Republic of China, 56 FR 64240 (December 9, 1991).
Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations: Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans
from the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), 56 FR 57616 (November 13, 1991)
[Fans CVD Initiation]; Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation: ChromePlated Lug Nuts and Wheel Locks from the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”),
57 FR 877 (January 9, 1992) [Lug Nuts CVD Initiation].
Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Sulfanilic Acid from
the People’s Republic of China, 57 FR 9409 (March 18, 1992) [Sulfanilic Acid
Prelim].
Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Certain Steel Products
from Belgium, 58 FR 37273, 37276 (July 9, 1993).
Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Certain Cut-to-Length
Carbon Steel Plate from Poland, 58 FR 37205 (July 9, 1993) [Poland’s ME Status
Determination].
Stainless Steel Plate in Coils from Belgium: Final Results of Countervailing Duty
Administrative Review, 66 FR 45007 (August 27, 2001).
Notice of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation: Certain Softwood
Lumber Products from Canada, 66 FR 21332 (Apr. 30, 2001).
Notice of Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination,
Preliminary Affirmative Critical Circumstances Determination, and Alignment of
Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Final Antidumping Duty
Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 66 FR 43186
(Aug. 17, 2001) (Lumber IV Prelim).
Notice of Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Negative
Critical Circumstances Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from
Canada (Lumber IV), 67 FR 15545 (Apr. 2, 2002).

294

Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Dynamic Random
Access Memory Semiconductors from the Republic of Korea, 68 FR 16766 (April
7, 2003).
Notice of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations: Coated Free Sheet Paper
from the People’s Republic of China, Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea, 71 FR
68546-01 (November 27, 2006) [CFS Paper Case Initiation].
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from the Republic of Korea:
Preliminary Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review, 73 FR 52315
(September 9, 2008).
Laminated Woven Sacks from the People's Republic of China: Final Affirmative
Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Affirmative Determination, in Part,
of Critical Circumstances, 73 FR 35639 (June 24, 2008).
Lightweight Thermal Paper from the People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative
Countervailing Duty Determination, 73 FR 57323 (October 2, 2008).
Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from the People’s Republic of China: Final
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, Final Negative Critical
Circumstances Determination, 74 FR 64045 (December 7, 2009).
Countervailing Duty Investigation of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck
Tires from the People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative Determination, and
Final Affirmative Critical Circumstances Determination, in Part, 80 FR. 34888
(June 18, 2015).
Countervailing Duty Investigation of Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires
from India: Final Affirmative Determination, and Final Affirmative Critical
Circumstances Determination, in Part, 82 FR 2946 (January 10, 2017).
Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People’s Republic of China:
Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 72 FR 71360 (Dec.
17, 2007) (“Preliminary Determination”).
Certain New Pneumatic Off-The-Road Tires from the People’s Republic of China:
Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Partial
Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances, 73 FR 40485 (July 15, 2008)
(“Final Determination”).
Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People’s Republic of China:
Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Affirmative
Determination of Critical Circumstances, 73 FR 31966 (June 5, 2008).

295

Petroleum Wax Candles from the People’s Republic of China; Final Determination
of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 51 FR 25085 (July 10, 1986) [Candles case].
Certain Headwear from the People’s Republic of China; Final Determination of
Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 54 FR 11983 (March 23, 1989) [Headwear case].
Tapered Roller Bearings from the People’s Republic of China; Final Determination
of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 52 FR 19748 (May 27, 1987).
Sparklers from the People’s Republic of China; Initiation of Antidumping Duty
Investigation, 55 FR 31088 (July 31, 1990).
Sparklers from the People’s Republic of China; Preliminary Determination of Sales
at Less Than Fair Value, 55 FR 51743 (December 17, 1990) [Sparklers Prelim].
Preliminary Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Oscillating and Ceiling
Fans from the People’s Republic of China, 57 FR 10011 (March 23, 1992) [Fans
CVD Prelim].
Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Oscillating and Ceiling Fans
from the People’s Republic of China, 57 FR 24018 (June 5, 1992) [Fans CVD
Final].
Rescission of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation and Dismissal of
Petition: Chrome-Plated Lug Nuts and Wheel Locks from the People’s Republic of
China, 57 FR 10459 (March 26, 1992).
Notice of Initiation of Inquiry into the Status of the Russian Federation as a NonMarket Economy Country Under the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws,
66 FR 54197 (October 26, 2001).
Memorandum for Faryar Shirzad, Assistant Secretary, Import Administration,
Inquiry into the Status of the Russian Federation as a Non-Market Economy
Country Under the U.S. Antidumping Law, Case No. A-821-816, Inquiry, Public
Document (June 6, 2002) [Russia’s ME Status Determination].
Final Results of Inquiry into Ukraine's Status as a Non-Market Economy Country,
71 FR 9520 (February 24, 2006) [Ukraine’s ME Status Determination].
Notice of Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations: Coated Free Sheet Paper
from the People’s Republic of China, Indonesia, and the Republic of Korea, 71 FR
68546 (November 27, 2006) [CFS Paper CVD Initiation].

296

Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigations: Coated Free Sheet Paper from
Indonesia, the People’s Republic of China, and the Republic of Korea, 71 FR 68537
(November 27, 2006) [CFS Paper AD Initiation].
Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, and Affirmative
Critical Circumstances, in Part: Certain Lined Paper Products from the People’s
Republic of China, 71 FR 53079 (September 8, 2006).
Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China: Amended
Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 72 FR 17484 (April
9, 2007) [CFS Paper Prelim].
Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative
Countervailing Duty Determination, 72 FR 60645 (October 25, 2007) [CFS Paper
Final].
Notices of International Trade Commission, Investigation Nos. 701-TA-444-446
(Final) and 731-TA-1107-1109 (Final), Coated Free Sheet Paper from China,
Indonesia, and Korea, 72 FR 70892 (December 13, 2007).
Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People’s Republic of China:
Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Negative
Determination of Critical Circumstances, 73 FR 40480 (July 15, 2008) [OTR Tires
CVD Final].
Certain New Pneumatic Off-The-Road Tires from the People’s Republic of China:
Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Partial
Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances, 73 FR 40485 (July 15, 2008)
[OTR Tires AD Final].
Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People’s Republic of China:
Notice of Amended Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair
Value and Antidumping Duty Order, 73 FR 51624 (September 4, 2008).

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE’S DETERMINATIONS IN
VIETNAM’S CASES:
Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigation: Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 67 FR 48437 (July 24, 2002) [Catfish Initiation
Notice].
Notice of Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, Affirmative
Preliminary Determination of Critical Circumstances and Postponement of Final

297

Determination: Certain Frozen Fish Fillets from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,
68 FR 4986 (January 31, 2003) [Catfish Prelim Notice].
Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation
of Countervailing Duty Investigation and Request for Public Comment on the
Application of the Countervailing Duty Law to Imports from the Socialist Republic
of Vietnam, 74 FR 19064 (April 27, 2009) [PRCBs CVD Initiation].
U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Import
Administration, Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 75 FR 16428
(Thursday, April 1, 2010) [PRCBs Final CVD Determination].
Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam:
Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment of
Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Final Antidumping Duty
Determination, 74 FR 45811 (September 4, 2009) [PRCBs Preliminary CVD
Determination].
Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam:
Countervailing Duty Order, 75 FR 23670 (May 4, 2010).
Circular Welded Carbon-Quality Steel Pipe from India, the Sultanate of Oman, the
United Arab Emirates, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of
Countervailing Duty Investigations, 76 FR 72173 (November 22, 2011) [Steel Pipe
CVD Initiation].
Circular Welded Carbon-Quality Steel Pipe from the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam: Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and
Alignment of Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Final Antidumping
Duty Determination, 77 FR 19211 (March 30, 2012) [Steel Pipe CVD Prelim
Affirmative Determination].
Circular Welded Carbon-Quality Steel Pipe from the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam: Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination, 77 FR 64471, 64472
(October 22, 2012) [Steel Pipe CVD Final Negative Determination].
Notice of Antidumping Duty Order: Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the People’s
Republic of China, 73 FR 58111 (October 6, 2008).
Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the People’s Republic of China: Initiation of
Anti-Circumvention Inquiry, 75 FR 42685 (July 22, 2010).

298

Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the People’s Republic of China: Affirmative
Final Determination of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty Order, 76 FR
66895 (October 28, 2011).
Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of
Countervailing Duty Investigation, 77 FR 3737 (January 25, 2012) [Garment
Hangers CVD Initiation].
Certain Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam:
Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment of
Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Final Antidumping Duty
Determination, 77 FR 32930 (June 4, 2012).
Certain Steel Wire Garment Hangers from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Final
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Affirmative Critical
Circumstances Determination, 77 FR 75973 (December 26, 2012) [Garment
Hangers CVD Final Determination].
Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam:
Preliminary Countervailing Duty Determination, 78 FR 33342 (June 4, 2013) [VN
Shrimp CVD Prelim Determination].
Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Final
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 78 FR 50387 (August 19, 2013)
[VN Shrimp CVD Final Determination].
Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from the Republic of Indonesia: Final Negative
Countervailing Duty Determination, 78 FR 50383 (August 19, 2013); Certain
Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Thailand: Final Negative Countervailing Duty
Determination, 78 FR 50379 (August 19, 2013).
ITA, Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Determination in the
Countervailing Duty Investigation of Certain Steel Nails from the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam (October 27, 2014); ITA, Issues and Decision Memorandum
for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Laminated
Woven Sacks from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (April 4, 2019) [LWS Final
IDM]; ITA, Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the
Countervailing Duty Investigation of Utility Scale Wind Towers from the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam (June 29, 2020) [Wind Towers Final IDM].
Certain Steel Nails from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Preliminary
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment of Final
Countervailing Duty Determination with Final Antidumping Duty Determination,
79 FR 65184 (November 3, 2014).

299

Certain Steel Nails from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Final Affirmative
Countervailing Duty Determination, 80 FR 28962-01 (May 20, 2015).
Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam:
Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation, 85 FR 38850 (June 29, 2020).
Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the Republic of Korea, Taiwan,
Thailand, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of Less Than-FairValue Investigations, 85 FR 38854 (June 29, 2020).
Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam:
Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Alignment of
Final Determination with Final Antidumping Duty Determination, 85 FR 71607
(November 10, 2020).
Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam:
Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 86 FR 28566 (May 27,
2021) [Passenger Tires CVD Final Determination].
ITA, Press Release, U.S. Department of Commerce Issues First Analysis of
Currency Undervaluation as a Countervailable Subsidy, available at
https://www.trade.gov/press-release/us-department-commerce-issues-firstanalysis-currency-undervaluation-countervailable, accessed on August 22, 2021.
United States of America, Department of Commerce, Public Hearing, In the matter
of: Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from Vietnam., Case No. C-552-829,
Public Document, Friday, April 16, 2021.

ONLINE SOURCES:
ASEAN Economic Community, Vietnam in ASEAN: Toward Cooperation for
Mutual Benefits, available at https://asean.org/?static_post=vietnam-in-aseantoward-cooperation-for-mutual-benefits.
Associated Press Worldstream, End of U.S. Embargo on Vietnam Will Boost Asia
Trade, Stability (February 04, 1994).
Corporate Finance Institute, What is a Market Economy?, available at
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/economics/definitionmarket-economy/.
Dang, Le Ngoc, Nguyen, Dinh Dung, and Taghizadeh-Hesary, Farhad, StateOwned Enterprise Reform in Vietnam: Progress and Challenges, ADBI Working

300

Paper
Series,
No.
1071,
January
2020,
available
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/562061/adbi-wp1071.pdf.

at

Doherty, Jennifer, Law360, Commerce Affirms Duties Based on Currency
Manipulation, (May 24, 2021).
Farnsworth, Clyde H., Reagan Decides to Tighten Controls on Textile Imports,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1983.
Gao, Henry, SMU, and Weihuan Zhou, UNSW, The end of the WTO and the last
case?,
East
Asia
Forum,
available
at
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/07/10/the-end-of-the-wto-and-the-last-case/.
Greenberger, Robert S., Clinton Lifts Ban on Trade with Vietnam --- Full Ties Await
Accounting for Missing Soldiers; U.S. Firms Ready to Go, the Wall Street Journal,
Feb. 4, 1994.
Irwin, Douglas A., et al., The Genesis of the GATT, Feb. 13, 2008, available at
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265001187_The_genesis_of_the_GATT
Jehl, Douglas, Opening to Vietnam; Clinton Drops 19-Year Ban on U.S. Trade with
Vietnam; Cites Hanoi’s Help on M.I.A.’s, The New York Times, Washington (Feb.
3, 1994).
Jeffrey Gettleman, Times Staff Writer, The Nation; U.S. Catfish Is in Troubled
Water as Asian Catch Seizes the Market; Food: Vietnamese basa and tra look and
taste like the fish along the Mississippi Delta. Farmers contend they are sold below
cost, Los Angeles Times (July 16, 2002).
Jones, Vivian C., Trade Remedy Legislation: Applying Countervailing Action to
Nonmarket Economy Countries, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33550,
December 6, 2007 [CRS Report 2007].
Kirk, Bryson, Urge Congress to Fix GPX Decision in Parallel to Judicial Review,
Inside U.S.-China Trade (January 25, 2012).
Le, Hong Diep, How many strategic partners are enough for Vietnam?, Vietnamnet
Bridge,
(April
26,
2013),
available
at
http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/government/71780/how-many-strategic-partnersare-enough-for-vietnam-.html.
Leonhardt, Megan, House Vote Sends Countervailing Duty Bill to Obama, Law360
(March 06, 2012).

301

Lipman, Melissa, WTO Rejects U.S. Duty Double-Counting in China Fight,
Law360 (March 11, 2011).
Luu Huong, Divestment slow off the blocks for banks, Vietnam Investment Review,
April 13, 2021, available at https://vir.com.vn/divestment-slow-off-the-blocks-forbanks-83651.html.
Maher, John, Vietnam Markets Open to U.S. Dropping Trade Ban, Austin
American-Statesman (Texas) (Feb. 4, 1994).
Morrison, Wayne M., China-U.S. Trade Issues, CRS Report for Congress, Order
Code RL33536, March 7, 2008 [CRS Report 2008].
Pregelj, Vladimir N., The Jackson-Vanik Amendment: A Survey, CRS Report for
Congress, Order Code 98-545, Aug. 1, 2005. Available at
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/98-545.pdf.
Press Releases, Rep. Pascrell Backs Bipartisan Legislation That Protects American
Manufacturing
and
Jobs
(March
6,
2012),
available
at
https://pascrell.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=3025.
Reuters Asia Pacific, Vietnam denies subsidizing tires, rejects U.S. filing, May 27,
2021, available online at https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/vietnamdenies-subsidising-tires-rejects-us-finding-2021-05-27/.
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri), U.S. Embargo on Vietnam Assailed, FIVE
STAR Edition (February 11, 1993).
Thayer, Carlyle A., The US-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership: what’s in a
name?, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, The Strategist (July 31, 2013),
available at https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-us-vietnam-comprehensivepartnership-whats-in-a-name/.
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet on Vietnam Bilateral
Trade Agreement 07/13/00, 2000 WL 967020, July 13, 2000.
Trade Remedies Authority of Vietnam, TIN CẢNH BÁO SỚM [EARLY WARNING
NEWS],
available
at
http://www.trav.gov.vn/default.aspx?page=news&do=browse&category_id=116d
0b73-1399-4d78-91d9-bd883c1421c8.
Tran, Hong Minh, Director of Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM)
and Director of Aus4Reform Program, Mối Quan Hệ giữa Nhà Nước và Thị Trường
và Cải Cách Thể Chế Kinh Tế ở Việt Nam [The Relationship between the State and
Market and Economic Institutional Reform in Vietnam in English language],

302

Aus4Reform
Program,
Hanoi
(2019),
available
http://st.aus4reform.org.vn/staticFile/Subject/2020/04/27/sach-_nha-nuoc-thitruong-the-che_da-sua_27161804.pdf.

at

Trung Kien, Tiếp tục hiện đại hoá nền kinh tế, phát triển kinh tế tư nhân
[Continuing to modernize the economy, developing the private economy],
Electronic News Portal of Ho Chi Minh City Party Committee, February 15, 2021,
available at https://hcmcpv.org.vn/tin-tuc/tiep-tuc-hien-dai-hoa-nen-kinh-te-phattrien-kinh-te-tu-nhan-1491874739.
U.S. Lift Trade Embargo Against Vietnam; Clinton Cites Progress in MIA Search,
International Affairs Section, Facts on File World News Digest (Feb. 3, 1994).
United States, Briefing Room, FACT SHEET: Strengthening the U.S.-Vietnam
Comprehensive Partnership, The White House, Statements and Releases (August
25, 2021), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2021/08/25/fact-sheet-strengthening-the-u-s-vietnam-comprehensivepartnership/.
U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, NME Country
List, available at https://www.trade.gov/nme-countries-list.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Enforcement and Compliance, An Introduction to
U.S. Trade Remedies, available at https://enforcement.trade.gov/intro/index.html.
U.S. Department of State, Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and
Employment,
November
1945,
available
for
access
at
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/eccles/036_04_0003.pdf).
VCCI’s WTO Center, List of countries recognizing Vietnam as market economy
(June 2020), Advisory Council on Trade Remedies - VCCI, available at
https://chongbanphagia.vn/danh-sach-cac-quoc-gia-cong-nhan-viet-nam-la-nenkinh-te-thi-truong-62020-n21072.html.
Vuving, Alexander L., Will Vietnam Be America’s Next Strategic Partner?, The
Diplomat (August 21, 2021), available at https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/willvietnam-be-americas-next-strategic-partner/.
Ukraine Business Daily, US will grant market Economy Status to Ukraine soon,
Rice hopes, 2005 Interfax News Agency, Lexis (December 7, 2005).
Viet Hoa, TP.HCM: Kiến nghị Thủ tướng bỏ khung giá đất [Ho Chi Minh City:
Proposing that the Prime Minister repeal land price frameworks], Phap Luat News,
September 14, 2020, available at https://plo.vn/thoi-su/tphcm-kien-nghi-thu-tuongbo-khung-gia-dat-938366.html.

303

Vietnam Investment Review, SOE divestment a priority in CPTPP era, January 30,
2019, available at https://vir.com.vn/soe-divestment-a-priority-in-cptpp-era65586.html.
VVFC, Vietnam Appraisal, Những bất cập và hệ lụy [Inadequacies in land prices
and consequences], available at http://www.vvfc.vn/tin-nganh/nhung-bat-captrong-gia-dat-va-he-luy.html.
Washington Dateline, Chronology of Events in U.S. Relations with Vietnam, The
Associated Press (July 11, 1995); Clinton normalizes ties with Vietnam, Agence
France Presse - - English (July 12, 1995).
White House Press Releases, Fact Sheet: Background on the U.S.-Vietnam
Bilateral Trade Agreement (June 8, 2001).
WTO, The 128 countries that had signed GATT by 1994, available at
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm.
WTO, Understanding the WTO: Basics, What is the World Trade Organization,
available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm.
WTO, China, available at
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_chine_e.htm.
WTO, Russian Federation, available at
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_russie_e.htm.

304

